成唯識論述記 3.283

3.283

The Commentary states: Since it says that it also resembles another's indriyas, it therefore admits that it is manifested. What meaning is there in this? If one says that in terms of enjoyment one does not use another's indriyas, and furthermore that manifestations of the fundamental consciousness all have real practical function, then if one allows the manifestation of indriyas, it completely lacks real practical function, because it does not serve as a basis for the other; what would be the use of manifesting it? This too is not so: for the purpose of enjoying the physical support (adhiṣṭhāna) of another's body, one manifests another's indriyas. This is because when the indriya is absent, the physical support is also absent. Just as with the physical supports of the nose and tongue bound to the form realm: if the indriyas were absent, the physical supports would also be absent. Otherwise, that realm should lack the two indriyas, possessing only the physical supports to adorn the body; thus, for the sake of enjoyment, it also manifests a resemblance to the indriyas. Furthermore, [if one argues that] since manifestations of the fundamental consciousness all have real practical function, and these cannot generate consciousness and therefore cannot be manifested, this reasoning is also incorrect. Although the nose and tongue indriyas of the form realm cannot generate consciousness, the fundamental consciousness also manifests them; the same applies to those born blind, etc. Therefore, one knows that the fundamental consciousness definitely manifests another's indriyas, yet they lack the real function of an indriya because they do not serve as a basis for another's consciousness. This is the interpretation of Sthiramati and other great treatise masters. However, in that very treatise, the fourth verse of the old translation says: "Indriyas, dusts, self, and consciousness: the fundamental consciousness arises resembling them." This should not be so; could the fundamental consciousness again generate a self, and also condition the mind? Now the correct translation is: "Consciousness arises manifesting a resemblance to objects (artha), sentient beings (sattva), self, and cognitions (vijñapti); these objects are not truly existent, and because the objects are non-existent, consciousness is non-existent." "Consciousness" refers to the eight consciousnesses. "Arises manifesting a resemblance to objects" refers to the five dusts; the word "objects" (artha) denotes sense objects, because dependent phenomena resemble truly existent things. "Manifesting a resemblance to sentient beings" refers to the five indriyas, which are phenomena counted among sentient beings; sentient beings are indeed the indriyas, hence called sattva. "Manifesting a resemblance to the self" is manifested by the conditioning of manas. "And cognitions" are conditioned by the six consciousnesses. That is, the eighth conditions the two forms of dusts and indriyas; the seventh conditions the self; and the six consciousnesses condition the phenomena and objects cognized through the six dusts. The prose of the old treatise agrees in meaning with this; that verse was mistranslated because the translator intended the meaning of a single mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna), so that verse and prose contradicted each other. Now this treatise cites the prose text of that treatise, which only says that it appears resembling the five indriyas of one's own and another's body, without definitively stating who conditions it or that the eighth can condition the indriyas of oneself and another.