成唯識論述記 3.363

3.363

述曰：分別之用是觸功能，謂觸之上有似前三順生心所變異用功能，說名分別。分別即是領似異名，如子似父，名分別父。此意總顯根等三法，有能順起心所功能名為變異，此觸亦有順生心所功能作用，領似彼三，是故名為分別變異。問：三和之上，有功能順生於觸名變異，觸既似彼有功能，亦自順生名分別。設爾何失？若自順生名分別，應說觸觸以為緣；如順生受有功能，說觸用名分別故。若自不順名為分別，何故似生受等，非似生於觸耶？答：觸不似彼生觸功能，不自生故，如受等法不能生餘，即無領似，例觸應爾。又分限故，謂根及境能生於識，亦能生餘二種功能。識但生餘，無自生用，例觸應爾。觸不似彼生識及觸二種功能，無勢分故。若約見、自證分相生，亦有似義，又如受領觸，不領作意等。問：若似三功能，名分別變異，何故《集論》第一等云：「於根變異分別為體」？為答此問，故次說云。

The Commentary states: The function of discrimination is the capacity of contact; that is, upon contact there is a capacity that resembles the modifying function of the preceding three in conforming to generating mental factors, which is called 'discrimination' (vikalpa). Discrimination is another name for receiving and resembling; just as a son resembles his father, he is said to 'discriminate' the father. The general import here shows that the three phenomena, the faculties, etc., have the capacity to conform to and give rise to mental factors, which is called modification; this contact also has the functional capacity to conform to and generate mental factors, receiving and resembling those three, and is therefore called 'discriminating modification'. Question: Upon the harmony of the three, there is a capacity that conforms to generating contact, which is called modification; since contact resembles them and has this capacity, it should also conform to generating itself, which would be called discrimination. If this were so, what would be the flaw? If conforming to generating itself were called discrimination, one should say that contact has contact as its condition; for just as it has the capacity to conform to generating feeling, the function of contact is called discrimination. If it does not conform to generating itself yet is called discrimination, why does it resemble the generation of feeling, etc., but not the generation of contact? Answer: Contact does not resemble their capacity to generate contact, because it does not generate itself; just as feeling and other phenomena cannot generate other [instances of themselves], having no receiving and resembling, the case of contact should be considered by analogy. Furthermore, it is due to limitation: the faculty and object can generate consciousness, and can also generate the other two capacities. Consciousness only generates the others and lacks the function of generating itself; the case of contact should be considered by analogy. Contact does not resemble their two capacities to generate consciousness and contact, because it lacks that strength. If regarded in terms of the darśanabhāga and svasaṃvittibhāga generating one another, there is also the sense of resemblance; again, just as feeling receives contact but does not receive attention, etc. Question: If resembling the three capacities is called discriminating modification, why does the first fascicle of the Samuccaya, etc., say: 'Its essence is discrimination with respect to the modification of the faculty'? To answer this question, it next states: