成唯識論述記 4.191

4.191

述曰：經部六識不俱時有，破大眾部，然彼無熏習義。設破熏習，又以經部有熏習故。設許俱時，亦不成熏。此破經部設許六俱，有熏習故，是義之本。《攝論》第二無性解云：若六轉識定俱有者，不應所依、所緣、作意三種各別。以各別故無相應義，此難俱時起識熏義。世親《攝論》云：復有餘義，謂行相亦別。此不成因，第八、六識根等許別行相亦異；又無同喻，非極成因。無性意謂根、境等定別，非定俱時故不成熏。故此中言根、境、作意，即三差別互相熏故。量云：眼等非可為耳等所熏；根、境、作意三定各別故；此無同喻。然以理責之，令不得互相熏。或如自他身六種轉識，故論文云：根、境、作意類別起故。不爾此言說之何用？《攝論》唯有此中一因。前解設破經部六識俱時受熏，今解但遮六識體非受熏，以根、境等三種各別，非必剎那剎那皆具足故；非識恒起故無熏習，不同無性。前解雖本，不作此解自為不定，八識三別互相熏故。又六與八非一向異，依之而起故許相應，彼六不然故無自失。「善等類別易脫起故」者，《瑜伽》等種子中有四位：一、三性善等位，互相望起；二、三界位，謂下、中、妙界心互相望起；三、有漏、無漏位，互相望起；四、世、出世位，互相望起。今以善為首等取彼位，故言善等類別易脫起故。宗如前量；因云易脫起故；喻如電光等，等取聲等。

The Commentary states: For the Sautrāntika, the six consciousnesses do not exist simultaneously; [as for] refuting the Mahāsāṃghika, they do not have the doctrine of perfuming. Even if refuting perfuming, it is because the Sautrāntika asserts perfuming. Even if simultaneity were granted, perfuming still would not be established. This refutes the Sautrāntika on the assumption that the six were simultaneous and had perfuming; this is the core of the doctrine. In the second fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Asvabhāva explains: 'If the six evolving consciousnesses necessarily existed simultaneously, their three factors—basis, intentional object, and attention—should not be distinct respectively. Because they are distinct, they lack the characteristic of concordance.' This challenges the doctrine of simultaneous arising consciousnesses perfuming. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'There is yet another meaning: their modes of apprehension are also distinct.' This cannot serve as a valid reason: between the eighth and sixth consciousnesses, faculties and so forth are acknowledged to be distinct and their modes of apprehension are also different; moreover, there is no supporting example, so it is not a universally accepted reason. Asvabhāva's intent was that faculties, objects, and so forth are definitively distinct and not definitively simultaneous, hence perfuming is not established. Therefore, here it says: 'faculties, objects, and attention,' meaning that these three differences perfume each other. The syllogism is: The eye [consciousness] and so forth cannot be perfumed by the ear [consciousness] and so forth; because the three—faculty, object, and attention—are definitively distinct; here there is no supporting example. Yet pressing them with reasoning prevents them from perfuming each other. Or it is like the six evolving consciousnesses of one's own body and another's body; hence the text of the Treatise says: 'Because faculties, objects, and attention arise as distinct types.' Otherwise, what would be the use of stating this? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha contains only this one reason here. The previous explanation hypothetically refuted the Sautrāntika's six consciousnesses receiving perfuming simultaneously; the present explanation merely excludes the substance of the six consciousnesses from receiving perfuming, because the three factors such as faculties and objects are distinct and not necessarily complete moment by moment; since consciousness does not arise constantly, there is no perfuming—unlike Asvabhāva. Although the previous explanation was fundamental, if one does not adopt this explanation, it becomes indeterminate on its own, because the eighth consciousness and the three differences [in the others] perfume each other. Furthermore, the sixth and eighth are not purely different; because [the sixth] arises dependent upon [the eighth], they are allowed to be concordant; the six [among themselves] are not so, hence there is no fault of self-contradiction. 'Because they arise through easy alteration among categories such as the wholesome': in the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, seeds have four states: 1. the states of the three natures, wholesome and so forth, arising relative to each other; 2. the states of the three realms, meaning the minds of the lower, middle, and subtle realms arising relative to each other; 3. the states of sāsrava and anāsrava, arising relative to each other; 4. the states of mundane and supramundane, arising relative to each other. Now taking wholesome as the primary to include those states, it says 'because they arise through easy alteration among categories such as the wholesome.' The thesis is as in the preceding syllogism; the reason is 'because they arise through easy alteration'; the analogy is 'like lightning and so forth,' where 'and so forth' includes sound and the like.