成唯識論述記 5.381

5.381

述曰：為簡別境亦是遍染，故言忘念等。忘念、不正知，若即別境念、惠為性，不遍染心。論又言「遍」者，依無明分說。所以者何？破第二師，以彼唯執是彼數故。「非諸染心皆緣曾受」，破彼念數，且如邪見，撥無滅諦，此豈曾受？彼若言「是先聞名故方撥無」者，豈撥名耶？今邪見撥體，體未曾受故。非諸染心皆有簡擇，簡前師說「有不正知是惠分」故。此二若以無明為體，可遍染心，其五遍中亦可。約此別境為體者，以不遍故不說有之。六中但約無明為體，遍故說也。問曰：此中所說何假、何實？如後自解。問：如起邪惠簡擇法時亦有愚癡，即便有二不正知耶？餘忘念等，為問亦爾？答曰：不然。說有惠分時，不說無明分；無惠分時，說有無明分。有不正知時，亦說有無明，義別說故。餘數亦爾，或總於惠、無明。立一不正知，不正知是假，不可言有二，如放逸等依四法立，不約貪等別，說二相應故。

The Commentary states: In order to distinguish that specific-object factors are also universally defiled, it says "forgetfulness" and so forth. If forgetfulness and incorrect comprehension have the specific-object factors of smṛti and prajñā as their nature, they do not universally pervade defiled minds. When the treatise further states they are "universal," it speaks in reliance on them being portions of avidyā. Why is this? It refutes the second master, because he exclusively clung to their being those [specific-object] factors. "Not all defiled minds cognize what was previously experienced" refutes that factor of smṛti; for instance, wrong views repudiate the truth of cessation—could this ever have been previously experienced? If they say, "It is because one previously heard the name that one then repudiates it," could one merely be repudiating the name? Here wrong views repudiate the entity itself, and the entity was never previously experienced. Not all defiled minds possess discernment, which qualifies the previous master's statement that "there is incorrect comprehension that is a portion of prajñā." If these two have avidyā as their entity, they can universally pervade defiled minds, which is also admissible among the five universals. In terms of taking these specific-object factors as their entity, because they are not universal, they are not stated to exist. Among the six, they are only treated as having avidyā as their entity, and because they are universal, they are stated. Question: Among what is stated here, which is nominal and which is real? As will be explained below. Question: When bad wisdom arises to discern dharmas, delusion also exists; would there then be two incorrect comprehensions? Would the same question apply to the remaining factors such as forgetfulness? Answer: Not so. When spoken of as possessing the prajñā portion, the avidyā portion is not spoken of; when lacking the prajñā portion, the avidyā portion is spoken of. When incorrect comprehension exists, avidyā is also spoken of, being designated with different meanings. The remaining factors are also like this; or, incorrect comprehension is established nominally as a single entity comprehensively based on prajñā and avidyā. Incorrect comprehension is nominal, so one cannot say there are two, just as heedlessness and so forth are established based on four dharmas, not designated separately based on rāga and so on, so two are not said to be conjoined.