成唯識論了義燈 4.113

4.113

問：護法正義云：非諸染心皆緣曾受境，及邪簡擇故，忘念、不正知依念、惠者，不遍染心，依無明立即遍染心者，如緣現在，復非簡擇，起此忘念、不正知時，與無明俱不。若許俱者，忿等應嗔俱；若不俱者，應非遍染。答：義別說之。猶如見、惠，雖不相應，可得俱起，以他性相應，非自性故。問：如緣曾境及邪簡擇起忘念等，依二法立，為一忘念等，為有二耶？答：疏有二解，後說為正。然《要集》云：有說兩說，皆違第六，故第六云：染念、染惠雖非念、惠俱，而癡分者，亦得相應，既廣破已彼自釋云：若無念、惠，唯癡上立。若念、惠起，即與無明各二法立。即自問云：既二並起，為一？為異？答：謂攬二分假立一法，具含二義。故癡分義念、惠相應，念惠分義，非念、惠俱，與癡相應故無有過。今謂此說，即是前明，何勞別說？本疏云：惑總依惠、無明立一不正知，不正知是假，不可言有二。今云：攬二分假立一法，豈非前明。本疏引例，如放逸等依四法立，不約貪等別，說二相應故，此意放逸雖依貪立，二得相應，據餘分說。說遍染故，例不正知等，相應亦爾，何勞更言故癡分義，念、惠相應；念惠分義，非念、惠俱，與癡相應故無有失耶。又復彼說自有過失，何者彼云：或可念、惠、無明各別立一，雖有多種相用，無別故說為一。二十隨惑等，但說一故，據實有多，隨用立多而體非多，故說事等約體說等，用望於體，不說相應，非他性故。若爾，不害、無嗔，二數應不相應。第六云：信等皆遍善心故。解云：但云遍善不言相應，亦不言俱，故無有過。今難彼云：既云各別立一，即有多放逸等。若用若體俱多法故，何得云等，非受、想等，有多並故。又云：不害、無嗔彼但云遍，不言相應，亦不言俱者，豈許不害、無嗔前後別起，言不俱起。故依雖別，取各功能，假立為一，名為體等，不害、無嗔雖不相應，而許俱起。問：且如不翻別境，入隨惑中。別境染念、染惠。亦名忘念，及不正知不？若不爾者，應非是染，以正念、正知故，若許，亦名忘念及不正知者，與隨惑中二法何別？答：別境中忘念者，謂於過去曾受境界，忘追憶故，隨中忘念，只忘失正念，不要忘念過去之境。問：若爾，前善心中，不能記憶曾所受境，應非忘念，以非染故？答：起善心時，雖有不能憶過去境，而於現境，能正念故。問：緣現可爾，緣過如何（思之）？若別境中惡惠必邪簡擇，隨中惡惠能惡於惠，即令知不正，非要邪簡擇。又假、實殊，有無體別，隨惑但作用，而無別自體，別境有別體。

Question: Dharmapāla's orthodox position states: Not all defiled minds take previously experienced objects as their objective support, nor do they engage in erroneous discernment. Therefore, when forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā) and incorrect comprehension (asaṃprajanya) are established on the basis of mindfulness (smṛti) and discernment (mati), they do not pervade defiled minds; but when established on the basis of ignorance (avidyā), they do pervade defiled minds. If so, when one perceives the present and does not engage in discernment, upon giving rise to this forgetfulness and incorrect comprehension, are they associated with ignorance or not? If you permit that they are associated, then wrath (krodha) and so forth should also be associated with anger (dveṣa). If they are not associated, they would not pervade defilement. Answer: This is explained through a distinction in meaning. It is just like views (dṛṣṭi) and discernment: although they are not [in themselves] associated, they can arise together, because their association is with another entity, not with their own nature. Question: When one takes a previously experienced object as the support and engages in erroneous discernment to give rise to forgetfulness and so forth, which are established on the basis of two dharmas, is there one [dharmic entity of] forgetfulness, or are there two? Answer: The Commentary (Shu) offers two explanations, and the latter is regarded as the orthodox view. However, the Yaoji states: Some say both explanations contradict the sixth [fascicle], for the sixth fascicle says: "Although defiled mindfulness and defiled discernment are not associated with mindfulness and discernment, as portions of delusion they also achieve association." Having thoroughly refuted them, he then explains: If there are no mindfulness and discernment, they are established purely on delusion. If mindfulness and discernment arise, then they are established as two dharmas, one along with ignorance each. Then he asks himself: Since the two arise together, are they one or different? The reply says: Taking the two portions, a single nominal dharma is established, which fully contains both meanings. Thus, under the meaning of the portion of delusion, it is associated with mindfulness and discernment; under the meaning of the portion of mindfulness and discernment, it is not associated with mindfulness and discernment, but is associated with delusion; hence there is no fault. Now, I maintain that this explanation is merely the previous clarification; what need is there to explain it separately? The basic Commentary says: "Or, taking discernment and ignorance collectively, one incorrect comprehension is established; incorrect comprehension is nominal, and one cannot say there are two." Now [the Yaoji] says, "Taking the two portions, a single nominal dharma is established"—how is this not the previous clarification? The basic Commentary cites the analogy: just as negligence (pramāda) and so forth are established on the basis of four dharmas, without distinguishing greed and so on, it says the two are associated; the meaning is that although negligence is established on greed, the two can be associated in terms of the other portions. Because it is said to pervade defilement, the analogy of incorrect comprehension and so on being associated is also like this. Why take the trouble to further say: "Thus under the meaning of the portion of delusion, it is associated with mindfulness and discernment; under the meaning of the portion of mindfulness and discernment, it is not associated with mindfulness and discernment, but is associated with delusion; hence there is no fault"? Furthermore, what he says carries its own faults. What are they? He says: "Or perhaps on mindfulness, discernment, and ignorance respectively, one [entity] each is established; although there are multiple kinds of characteristics and functions, because there is no difference they are spoken of as one. Because the twenty secondary afflictions and so on are only spoken of as one, in reality there are many; they are established as many in accordance with function, but in substance they are not many. Therefore, speaking of equality of items refers to substance being equal; regarding function in relation to substance, one does not speak of association, because it is not another entity." If so, then the two mental factors of non-harm (ahiṃsā) and non-anger (adveṣa) should not be associated. The sixth fascicle says: "Faith and so on all pervade wholesome minds." His explanation says: "It only says they pervade the wholesome, but does not say they are associated, nor does it say they are concurrent; hence there is no fault." Now, I refute him saying: Since you say each is established separately as one, there would be multiple instances of negligence and so forth. If both function and substance are multiple dharmas, how could one speak of equality, since sensation, ideation, and so forth do not have multiple instances concurring? Furthermore, regarding what he says: "For non-harm and non-anger, it merely says they pervade, but does not say they are associated, nor does it say they are concurrent"—could one possibly permit that non-harm and non-anger arise separately before and after, saying they do not arise concurrently? Therefore, although their bases are distinct, one takes each of their functions and nominally establishes one, which is called substantive equality; non-harm and non-anger, though not associated [with their own type], are permitted to arise concurrently. Question: What if, without transposing the object-determining factors into the secondary afflictions, the defiled mindfulness and defiled discernment among the object-determining factors are also named forgetfulness and incorrect comprehension, or not? If not, they should not be defiled, because they would be right mindfulness and correct comprehension. If you permit that they are also named forgetfulness and incorrect comprehension, then what is their difference from the two dharmas among the secondary afflictions? Answer: Forgetfulness among the object-determining factors means failing to recall an object previously experienced in the past. Forgetfulness among the secondary afflictions means merely losing right mindfulness; it does not necessarily involve forgetting past objects. Question: If so, when within the aforementioned wholesome mind one cannot remember a previously experienced object, should that not be forgetfulness, because it is not defiled? Answer: When giving rise to a wholesome mind, although one might not remember past objects, regarding the present object one is able to maintain right mindfulness. Question: Concerning the present it may be so, but what about concerning the past? (Reflect on this.) If evil discernment among the object-determining factors must involve erroneous discernment, evil discernment among the secondary afflictions corrupts discernment, thereby causing comprehension to be incorrect, without necessarily requiring erroneous discernment. Furthermore, there is a distinction between nominal and real, and between having an intrinsic entity and lacking one: the secondary affliction is merely a function lacking a separate intrinsic entity, whereas the object-determining factor has a separate intrinsic entity.