成唯識論述記 5.76

5.76

述曰：下釋相違。《攝論》所說是「縱奪言」，謂假縱小乘上座部中經部師，色有等無間緣；奪彼因緣，彼無第八心，以色為因故，即是設許色有此緣，無因緣義。不作此解，「等」言無用，謂前及後各有一法，相似名「等」；今不相似亦名「等」，故此設縱言有二種義：一者，彼部計色有此緣故，此文為證。若爾，何故《攝論》第一云：非經部師，唯色等法名無間緣？第三卷中約色之中含諸種子或及心故，說有此緣。彼第一卷據彼無識及種子故，唯有色法。言不得成等無間緣，或第一卷是經部計，第三卷中上座部等義。二者，以彼第一論文為正。此義為正，經部本計非必許色為無間緣，以不等故。第三卷中且設許有欲奪因緣，非彼計色為等無間，此中即是色心前後，前為後因。

The Commentary states: Below is the resolution of the contradiction. What the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states is a 'concessive refutation'—that is, hypothetically conceding to the Sautrāntikas within the Hīnayāna Sthaviravāda that form has the equal-and-immediate condition, in order to refute their generative cause (hetu-pratyaya); for they lack the eighth mind and take form as the cause, meaning that even if form were conceded to have this condition, it would have no meaning of generative cause. If one does not explain it this way, the word 'equal' is useless: that is, when there is one dharma before and after respectively, being similar is called 'equal'; here, even when dissimilar they would be called 'equal'. Therefore, this hypothetical concession has two meanings. First, because that school posits that form has this condition, this text is taken as proof. If so, why does the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state: 'It is not the case for the Sautrāntikas that material dharmas alone are named the immediate condition'? In the third fascicle, it is spoken of as having this condition with reference to form containing seeds or including mind. The first fascicle is based on their having neither consciousness nor seeds, and possessing form alone; hence it says it cannot constitute an equal-and-immediate condition; or, the first fascicle reflects the Sautrāntika position, and the third fascicle the doctrine of the Sthaviras and others. Second, the text of the first fascicle is taken as definitive. This meaning is definitive: the original Sautrāntika tenet does not necessarily admit form as an immediate condition, because it is not equal. In the third fascicle, it is temporarily conceded in order to refute the generative cause, not that they posited form as equal-and-immediate; here it is form and mind before and after, the former being the cause for the latter.