成唯識論述記 5.76

5.76

The Commentary states: Below is the resolution of the contradiction. What the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states is a 'concessive refutation'—that is, hypothetically conceding to the Sautrāntikas within the Hīnayāna Sthaviravāda that form has the equal-and-immediate condition, in order to refute their generative cause (hetu-pratyaya); for they lack the eighth mind and take form as the cause, meaning that even if form were conceded to have this condition, it would have no meaning of generative cause. If one does not explain it this way, the word 'equal' is useless: that is, when there is one dharma before and after respectively, being similar is called 'equal'; here, even when dissimilar they would be called 'equal'. Therefore, this hypothetical concession has two meanings. First, because that school posits that form has this condition, this text is taken as proof. If so, why does the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state: 'It is not the case for the Sautrāntikas that material dharmas alone are named the immediate condition'? In the third fascicle, it is spoken of as having this condition with reference to form containing seeds or including mind. The first fascicle is based on their having neither consciousness nor seeds, and possessing form alone; hence it says it cannot constitute an equal-and-immediate condition; or, the first fascicle reflects the Sautrāntika position, and the third fascicle the doctrine of the Sthaviras and others. Second, the text of the first fascicle is taken as definitive. This meaning is definitive: the original Sautrāntika tenet does not necessarily admit form as an immediate condition, because it is not equal. In the third fascicle, it is temporarily conceded in order to refute the generative cause, not that they posited form as equal-and-immediate; here it is form and mind before and after, the former being the cause for the latter.