成唯識論述記 6.528
成唯識論述記 6.528
- Language
- Classical Chinese
6.528
「及計後際有想十六」者,初四見依三見立,一、命者即身;二、命者異身;三、此總是我,遍滿無二,無異無缺。依第一見立第一我,有色死後有想,以執色為我,故名我有色;取諸法想,說名有想。在欲界全、色界一分,除無想天,許無色界亦有色者。此亦在彼前三無色,此有想故,不在後一。依第二見故,立第二我。無色死後有想,執無色蘊為我等。其釋名等,如論應知。此在欲界乃至無所有處,除無想天。依第三見立第三我,亦有色我亦無色。死後有想,執五蘊為我,乃至廣說。在欲界全,乃至廣說。第四,我非有色非無色,死後有想,即遮第三,無別依見。如是四種或依尋、伺,或依等至皆容得起。次四見,一、執我有邊,死後有想。若執色為我,體有分限,或在身中,如指節量等,乃至廣說。非色為我,亦有分限,所依所緣有分限故。此在欲界全、色界一分,無色有色等如前說;二、執我無邊,死後有想。若執色為我,遍一切處,此所不知皆謂為有,非其所見。能知無邊,三千界等有分限故,下准此解。以其智慮不知邊際,名為無邊,非遠知也,餘如前說;三、執我亦有邊亦無邊,死後有想。《瑜伽》第六云:執我隨身,或舒或卷,其量不定。身無量等,我亦無量等,餘義准上;四、執我非有邊非無邊,即遮第三。此四依尋伺、等至皆起。次四依想異,一、我有一想;二、我有種種想;三、我有小想;四、我有無量想。次四依受,一、我純有樂,死後有想;二、我純有苦,死後有想;三、我純有苦有樂,死後有想;四、我純無苦無樂,死後有想。一想者在前三無色,種種想在欲、色界,除無想天。少想者,執少色為我等,想為我所等。我與彼合,名為小想,在欲、色界,除無想天。無色界如前說。無量想者,執無量色為我等,想為我所等如前說,乃至廣如彼論。如是四種,尋伺、等至皆容得起。
Regarding 'and the sixteen [theories] of having ideation that reckon the future': The first four views are established based on three views: first, that the living soul is identical with the body; second, that the living soul is different from the body; third, that this is the self in its totality, all-pervading, non-dual, without difference, and without defect. Based on the first view, the first self is established: having form and having ideation after death. Because one grasps form as the self, it is said that 'my self has form'; grasping the ideation of phenomena is called 'having ideation'. It is present in the entirety of the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excluding the heaven without ideation. If one allows that the formless realm also has form, this is also present in those first three formless [absorptions]; because it has ideation, it is not present in the last one. Based on the second view, the second self is established: formless and having ideation after death, grasping the formless aggregates as the self, and so on. The explanation of its name and so on should be understood as in the treatise. This is present from the desire realm up through the sphere of nothingness, excluding the heaven without ideation. Based on the third view, the third self is established: the self is both having form and formless, having ideation after death, grasping the five aggregates as the self, and so on at length. It is present in the entirety of the desire realm, and so on at length. Fourth: the self is neither having form nor formless, having ideation after death; this simply negates the third, having no separate underlying view. These four kinds can arise either based on vitarka and vicāra or based on meditative attainment. The next four views: First, grasping that the self is finite and has ideation after death. If one grasps form as the self, its substance has limits, or it is within the body like the size of a finger joint, and so on at length. If non-form is taken as the self, it also has limits, because its basis and object have limits. This is present in the entirety of the desire realm and a portion of the form realm; the formless having form and so on are as explained before. Second, grasping that the self is infinite and has ideation after death. If one grasps form as the self, it pervades all places; what this [intellect] does not know it claims to exist, though not seen by it. Being able to know the infinite—the trichiliocosm and so on having limits—the explanation below should be interpreted in accordance with this. Because one's intellect does not know the limits, it is called 'infinite', not that it knows remotely; the rest is as explained before. Third, grasping that the self is both finite and infinite, having ideation after death. The Yogācāra[-bhūmi], fascicle six, says: Grasping that the self conforms to the body, either extending or contracting, its measure is indeterminate; if the body is immeasurable, the self is also immeasurable, etc.; the rest of the meaning is to be inferred from the above. Fourth, grasping that the self is neither finite nor infinite, which simply negates the third. These four arise based on both vitarka-vicāra and meditative attainment. The next four are based on differences in ideation: first, my self has a single ideation; second, my self has diverse ideations; third, my self has limited ideation; fourth, my self has immeasurable ideation. The next four are based on feeling: first, my self has purely pleasant feeling and has ideation after death; second, my self has purely painful feeling and has ideation after death; third, my self has both painful and pleasant feeling and has ideation after death; fourth, my self has neither painful nor pleasant feeling and has ideation after death. 'A single ideation' exists in the first three formless [absorptions]; 'diverse ideations' exists in the desire and form realms, excluding the heaven without ideation. 'Limited ideation' grasps limited form as the self, etc., and ideation as what belongs to the self, etc.; the self being conjoined with that is called 'limited ideation', which is in the desire and form realms, excluding the heaven without ideation; the formless realm is as explained before. 'Immeasurable ideation' grasps immeasurable form as the self, etc., and ideation as what belongs to the self, etc., as explained before, and so on at length as in that treatise. These four kinds can all arise from vitarka-vicāra and meditative attainment.
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- 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 — Classical Chinese