成唯識論述記 6.531

6.531

俱非有八者，有色等四，有邊等四。一、執我有色死後非有想非無想，執色為我，見諸有情入非想非非想定，想不明了，作如是執：唯尋、伺非得定，乃至廣說；二、執我無色死後如前，執無色蘊為我等，入非想非非想定不明了故，作如是執，乃至廣說。非等至，唯尋、伺起；三、執我亦有色亦無色死後如前，執色、無色為我，見諸有情想不明了，作如是執：唯尋、伺者，乃至廣說；四、執我非有色非無色為我死後如前，遮第三是。有邊等四者，一、執我有邊死後非有想非無想，乃至第四執我非有邊非無邊死後非有想非無想，如是一切皆執無色為我，已得非想非非想處定，容有此執。一、由彼定時分促故，以一一蘊為所緣，執我有邊；二、由彼定時分長故，總以四蘊為所緣，執我無邊；三、由彼定時分或短或長，或一一蘊或總為我故，成第三句；第四即遮說故。以上常見攝。

Regarding the eight doctrines of neither: there are four of having form and so on, and four of finite and so on. First, grasping that my self has form and has neither ideation nor non-ideation after death: grasping form as the self, and seeing sentient beings enter the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation where ideation is indistinct, one constructs such a grasping: this is solely vitarka and vicāra, not attainment of concentration, and so on at length. Second, grasping that my self is formless and after death is as before: grasping the formless aggregates as the self, etc., because entering the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation is indistinct, one makes such a grasping, and so on at length. This is not [from] meditative attainment, but arises solely from vitarka and vicāra. Third, grasping that my self is both having form and formless, and after death is as before: grasping form and the formless as the self, seeing that sentient beings have indistinct ideation, one makes such a grasping; this is solely one of vitarka and vicāra, and so on at length. Fourth, grasping that my self is neither having form nor formless, and after death is as before: this negates the third. The four of finite and so on: First, grasping that my self is finite and has neither ideation nor non-ideation after death, up to fourth, grasping that my self is neither finite nor infinite and has neither ideation nor non-ideation after death. All such grasp non-form as the self; having already attained the concentration of the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation, it is possible to have this grasping. First, because the duration of that concentration is short, taking each individual aggregate as an object, one grasps that the self is finite. Second, because the duration of that concentration is long, taking the four aggregates collectively as an object, one grasps that the self is infinite. Third, because the duration of that concentration is either short or long, taking either each individual aggregate or all collectively as the self, the third proposition is established. The fourth simply negates the statements. The above are subsumed under the view of permanence.