成唯識論述記 7.198

7.198

述曰：五十六說：復如何通？彼頌言：五種姓不成者，彼言且說五蘊性不成故，彼覺天等言非別有所，但心前後分位別故。說有五者，是諸分位相望，有無皆成失故。有諸分位作用別者，由相異故，體亦應異，離體無相故。若無作用別者，如何可言分位別故立五蘊也？分位差過失者，彼論又言：「不應謂如六識分位說其差別」，彼計六識體一，而所依分位別，故說六識。此蘊亦爾者，不然，設許六識無別六體，六識依、緣皆各別故，可說有六。今此心所所依、所緣一處可得，故成非理。若謂一識，有前後轉變說有五者，不然，非色法故。無色無轉變，可如乳等前後變異故。色法無依、緣可有轉變，心則不然，如何有轉變，此計前後分位別立。因緣無別故者，謂現在一念，有種種行相不同，既唯一識，無心所者，有何差別因緣，令一識有多行相分位差別？此難一念分位變異，設多念變異，根、境相似，因緣無別，亦成過失。與聖教相違者，彼論引云：如經說言：貪、嗔等法，染惱其心，令不解脫等。彼有問答，若起貪心俱時無識，則貪無有所依染心，由此貪心但是能染，非所染故。若謂前心是識，後心是貪，染前心者，無差別故。謂前心亦緣此境，後心亦緣此境，無別因緣。如何前是識，後是貪染？又復經言：觸俱受、想等，又言如是諸法和合非不和等，如前已引，《顯揚》第一心所中亦有。又經說：燈明喻等，勘《楞迦》下三卷頌中亦有。然長行如前引，又違三喻：謂乳、酪、蘇等。即彼所說，麁四大種以之為我，此在欲界四大麁故如乳，有色意生，即是色界，色化生故。漸勝如酪，無色想生，即無色界轉勝如蘇。如是等經豈唯有色，或唯有心，唯有想也。故《六界經》等是密意說，種種質彼，廣如彼說。以上並是與聖教相違，即五經也。此等第二難，今答之云。

The Commentary states: Fascicle fifty-six says: how can that also be reconciled? Its verse says: 'The five kinds of nature would not be established,' which means that the nature of the five aggregates would temporarily not be established, because Buddhadeva and others say that there are no separate mental factors, but merely successive states of the mind that differ. If one posits five, comparing these states with each other, both their existence and non-existence result in faults. If these states have different functions, because their characteristics are distinct, their substances must also be distinct, since apart from substance there are no characteristics. If there are no different functions, how can one say that the five aggregates are established because of differences in states? Regarding the fault of differences in states, that treatise also says: 'It should not be claimed that their differences are like the states of the six consciousnesses.' They hold that the substance of the six consciousnesses is one, yet because their bases and states are different, six consciousnesses are spoken of. If one says that these aggregates are also like this, it is not so: even if one concedes that the six consciousnesses do not have six distinct substances, since the bases and objects of the six consciousnesses are each distinct, it is plausible to say there are six. But now, the bases and objects of these mental factors are found in the same place; hence it is unreasonable. If one claims that there is a single consciousness with successive transformations that are said to be five, it is not so, because they are not material dharmas. Non-material dharmas do not undergo transformations, as milk and the like transform and alter over time. Material dharmas lack bases and objects and thus can undergo transformation; the mind is not like this, so how could it transform? This refutes the tenet that posited them as successive differences in states. Regarding 'because there are no different causes and conditions': in a single present moment, there are various different aspects. Since there is only a single consciousness and no mental factors, what distinct causes and conditions could cause a single consciousness to have multiple differences in aspects and states? This refutes momentary transformation of states; even if it were transformation across multiple moments, when faculties and objects are similar, the causes and conditions are not different, which also results in fault. Regarding 'contradicts the sacred teachings': that treatise cites sūtras saying: 'Dharmas such as greed and anger defile and torment its mind, causing it not to be liberated,' and so on. There is a question and answer there: if, when a mind of greed arises, there is no consciousness at the same time, then greed lacks a defiled mind to serve as its basis, because this greed is only that which defiles, not that which is defiled. If one says that the earlier mind is consciousness and the later mind is greed that defiles the earlier mind, there is no distinction, because the earlier mind also cognizes this object and the later mind also cognizes this object, with no distinct causes and conditions. How could the earlier be consciousness and the later be defiling greed? Furthermore, the sūtras state: 'Contact arises together with sensation, perception, etc.,' and also state that 'such dharmas are harmoniously united and not unharmonious,' as already cited above, and as also found among the mental factors in the first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. Moreover, the sūtras state the metaphor of the lamp and its light, which can also be verified in the verses of the last three fascicles of the Laṅkāvatāra. The prose is as cited previously. Furthermore, it contradicts the three metaphors: namely, milk, curd, and clarified butter. That is, what they say: taking the gross four great elements as the self—this is in the desire realm where the four great elements are gross, hence like milk; having a material mind-made body, which is the form realm because of its material apparitional birth, gradually superior like curd; non-material born of perception, which is the formless realm, increasingly superior like clarified butter. How could such sūtras mean that there is only matter, or only mind, or only perception? Therefore, the Sūtra on the Six Elements and the like are spoken with intentional meaning; they interrogate them in various ways, at length as explained there. All of the above are contradictions with the sacred teachings, namely the five sūtras. These constitute the second objection, and now we answer them.