成唯識論述記 7.198

7.198

The Commentary states: Fascicle fifty-six says: how can that also be reconciled? Its verse says: 'The five kinds of nature would not be established,' which means that the nature of the five aggregates would temporarily not be established, because Buddhadeva and others say that there are no separate mental factors, but merely successive states of the mind that differ. If one posits five, comparing these states with each other, both their existence and non-existence result in faults. If these states have different functions, because their characteristics are distinct, their substances must also be distinct, since apart from substance there are no characteristics. If there are no different functions, how can one say that the five aggregates are established because of differences in states? Regarding the fault of differences in states, that treatise also says: 'It should not be claimed that their differences are like the states of the six consciousnesses.' They hold that the substance of the six consciousnesses is one, yet because their bases and states are different, six consciousnesses are spoken of. If one says that these aggregates are also like this, it is not so: even if one concedes that the six consciousnesses do not have six distinct substances, since the bases and objects of the six consciousnesses are each distinct, it is plausible to say there are six. But now, the bases and objects of these mental factors are found in the same place; hence it is unreasonable. If one claims that there is a single consciousness with successive transformations that are said to be five, it is not so, because they are not material dharmas. Non-material dharmas do not undergo transformations, as milk and the like transform and alter over time. Material dharmas lack bases and objects and thus can undergo transformation; the mind is not like this, so how could it transform? This refutes the tenet that posited them as successive differences in states. Regarding 'because there are no different causes and conditions': in a single present moment, there are various different aspects. Since there is only a single consciousness and no mental factors, what distinct causes and conditions could cause a single consciousness to have multiple differences in aspects and states? This refutes momentary transformation of states; even if it were transformation across multiple moments, when faculties and objects are similar, the causes and conditions are not different, which also results in fault. Regarding 'contradicts the sacred teachings': that treatise cites sūtras saying: 'Dharmas such as greed and anger defile and torment its mind, causing it not to be liberated,' and so on. There is a question and answer there: if, when a mind of greed arises, there is no consciousness at the same time, then greed lacks a defiled mind to serve as its basis, because this greed is only that which defiles, not that which is defiled. If one says that the earlier mind is consciousness and the later mind is greed that defiles the earlier mind, there is no distinction, because the earlier mind also cognizes this object and the later mind also cognizes this object, with no distinct causes and conditions. How could the earlier be consciousness and the later be defiling greed? Furthermore, the sūtras state: 'Contact arises together with sensation, perception, etc.,' and also state that 'such dharmas are harmoniously united and not unharmonious,' as already cited above, and as also found among the mental factors in the first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. Moreover, the sūtras state the metaphor of the lamp and its light, which can also be verified in the verses of the last three fascicles of the Laṅkāvatāra. The prose is as cited previously. Furthermore, it contradicts the three metaphors: namely, milk, curd, and clarified butter. That is, what they say: taking the gross four great elements as the self—this is in the desire realm where the four great elements are gross, hence like milk; having a material mind-made body, which is the form realm because of its material apparitional birth, gradually superior like curd; non-material born of perception, which is the formless realm, increasingly superior like clarified butter. How could such sūtras mean that there is only matter, or only mind, or only perception? Therefore, the Sūtra on the Six Elements and the like are spoken with intentional meaning; they interrogate them in various ways, at length as explained there. All of the above are contradictions with the sacred teachings, namely the five sūtras. These constitute the second objection, and now we answer them.