成唯識論述記 7.423

7.423

述曰：即十卷《楞伽》第十卷頌也，心意識等以理、俗諦隨事差別相故，可說有別。約勝義勝義真故，相無別也。第四勝義，理忘言慮，今遮有別，但說無別。既曰離言，何別不別？以識自性能相無故，能相無故，所相亦無。能、所二性即依識立，求不可得。識上何者為能相、所相？謂用為能相，體為所相。若俗諦事中有此用、體，真勝義理中，即離心言俱不可說。若以初俗執有別，對四真皆有無別理。第一真門，如幻事故；第二真門，因果性故；第三真門，並無我故；第四真門，心言絕故，俱無別相。以四真中，如計所執實用等為能相，實體等為所相無故。若以第二俗事八識有別，對三真亦爾。依他作用能相及依他法體所相無故。或以見分為能相，相分為所相，以七識為能相，第八為所相等亦爾，一切應思。以第三俗八與餘七互熏習為因果可別，對二真亦無。以第四俗對第四真亦爾。推入真門理皆無別。真門但是遮別言無別，無別亦無，別無不別，一切應思。無所相故能相云何？能相無，故所相亦無，故無八識定、不定別。此長行中但對第四勝義為論。頌中理通舊頌云：心意及意識，分別外相義，八無分別相，非能見可見。此頌無有別俗之相，唯說有無差別相也。

The Commentary states: This is a verse from the tenth fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Citta, manas, mano-vijñāna, and so forth, based on principle and the conventional truth in accordance with the differentiated marks of affairs, can be said to be distinct. In terms of the ultimate truth of ultimate truths, because it is real, their marks have no distinction. In the fourth ultimate truth, the principle transcends words and thoughts; now, to negate distinctness, it merely says there is no distinction. Since it is said to transcend words, what distinction or non-distinction could there be? Because the intrinsic nature of consciousness lacks defining marks, and because defining marks are non-existent, that which is marked is also non-existent. The two natures of defining mark and that which is marked are established based on consciousness, yet when sought they cannot be found. On consciousness, what are the defining mark and that which is marked? Function is the defining mark, and substance is that which is marked. If in the affairs of the conventional truth there are this function and substance, in the principle of the true ultimate truth they transcend thought and words and neither can be spoken of. If one clings to distinctness based on the first conventional truth, contrasted with all four ultimate truths there is the principle of non-distinction. In the first ultimate gate, it is because they are like an illusion; in the second ultimate gate, it is because of their nature as cause and fruit; in the third ultimate gate, it is because both are without self; in the fourth ultimate gate, it is because thought and speech are extinguished; in all of them there are no distinct marks. This is because in the four ultimate truths, real functions and so forth, as parikalpita, are non-existent as defining marks, and real substances and so forth are non-existent as that which is marked. If based on the second conventional truth affairs have distinct eight vijñānas, contrasted with the three ultimate truths it is also like this, because the defining marks of paratantra function and the marked substances of paratantra dharmas are non-existent. Or taking the darśanabhāga as the defining mark and the nimittabhāga as that which is marked, or taking the seven vijñānas as the defining mark and the eighth as that which is marked, it is also like this; all should be considered. Based on the third conventional truth, the mutual perfuming of the eighth and the remaining seven as cause and fruit can be distinct, but contrasted with the two ultimate truths this also does not exist. Contrasting the fourth conventional with the fourth ultimate is also like this. When pushed into the ultimate gates, in principle there is no distinction. The ultimate gates merely negate distinctness by stating non-distinction; non-distinction is also non-existent, and distinctness is not non-distinct; all should be considered. Since that which is marked is non-existent, how could there be a defining mark? Since the defining mark is non-existent, that which is marked is also non-existent; therefore there is no determinate or indeterminate distinction among the eight vijñānas. In this prose section, it is discussed only in contrast with the fourth ultimate truth. The principle in the verse broadly applies to the older verse, which reads: "Citta, manas, and mano-vijñāna / Discriminate external marks and objects; / The eight have no discriminative mark, / Neither that which can see nor that which can be seen." This verse does not have the marks of the distinct conventional, but speaks only of the presence or absence of distinguishing marks.