成唯識論述記 7.423

7.423

The Commentary states: This is a verse from the tenth fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Citta, manas, mano-vijñāna, and so forth, based on principle and the conventional truth in accordance with the differentiated marks of affairs, can be said to be distinct. In terms of the ultimate truth of ultimate truths, because it is real, their marks have no distinction. In the fourth ultimate truth, the principle transcends words and thoughts; now, to negate distinctness, it merely says there is no distinction. Since it is said to transcend words, what distinction or non-distinction could there be? Because the intrinsic nature of consciousness lacks defining marks, and because defining marks are non-existent, that which is marked is also non-existent. The two natures of defining mark and that which is marked are established based on consciousness, yet when sought they cannot be found. On consciousness, what are the defining mark and that which is marked? Function is the defining mark, and substance is that which is marked. If in the affairs of the conventional truth there are this function and substance, in the principle of the true ultimate truth they transcend thought and words and neither can be spoken of. If one clings to distinctness based on the first conventional truth, contrasted with all four ultimate truths there is the principle of non-distinction. In the first ultimate gate, it is because they are like an illusion; in the second ultimate gate, it is because of their nature as cause and fruit; in the third ultimate gate, it is because both are without self; in the fourth ultimate gate, it is because thought and speech are extinguished; in all of them there are no distinct marks. This is because in the four ultimate truths, real functions and so forth, as parikalpita, are non-existent as defining marks, and real substances and so forth are non-existent as that which is marked. If based on the second conventional truth affairs have distinct eight vijñānas, contrasted with the three ultimate truths it is also like this, because the defining marks of paratantra function and the marked substances of paratantra dharmas are non-existent. Or taking the darśanabhāga as the defining mark and the nimittabhāga as that which is marked, or taking the seven vijñānas as the defining mark and the eighth as that which is marked, it is also like this; all should be considered. Based on the third conventional truth, the mutual perfuming of the eighth and the remaining seven as cause and fruit can be distinct, but contrasted with the two ultimate truths this also does not exist. Contrasting the fourth conventional with the fourth ultimate is also like this. When pushed into the ultimate gates, in principle there is no distinction. The ultimate gates merely negate distinctness by stating non-distinction; non-distinction is also non-existent, and distinctness is not non-distinct; all should be considered. Since that which is marked is non-existent, how could there be a defining mark? Since the defining mark is non-existent, that which is marked is also non-existent; therefore there is no determinate or indeterminate distinction among the eight vijñānas. In this prose section, it is discussed only in contrast with the fourth ultimate truth. The principle in the verse broadly applies to the older verse, which reads: "Citta, manas, and mano-vijñāna / Discriminate external marks and objects; / The eight have no discriminative mark, / Neither that which can see nor that which can be seen." This verse does not have the marks of the distinct conventional, but speaks only of the presence or absence of distinguishing marks.