成唯識論述記 7.508

7.508

述曰：此文第二牒外人難辭也。若唯內識無心外境，如何現見世間非情物，處、時二事決定，世間有情身及非情用二事不決定轉。此中言總，意顯處、時、用三是非情，身是有情，此依《二十論》，據理而言，四事皆通。舊真諦論云：「處、時悉無定，無相續不定，作事悉不成，若唯識無塵」。菩提流支論云：「若但心無塵，離外境妄見，處、時定、不定，人及所作事」。新翻論云：「若識無實境，則處、時決定，相續不決定，作用不應成」。言「相續」者，即是身也。彼長行云：「若離實有色等外法，色等識生不緣色等，何因此識有處得生非一切處。」此即第一經部師等難處定也。謂外量云：「如汝非緣終南山處，緣此識應生，執實山無此心生故，如正緣彼處，此言現識，非謂比識，若說比識者，非此處亦生」。彼論第二難云：何故此處有時識起，非一切時？此難第二時決定也。謂外量云：「如汝非緣終南山時，緣此識應起，執實境無此心生故，如緣終南山時」。彼論第三難云：同一處時有多相續，何不決定隨一識生？如眩翳人見髮、蠅等，非無眩翳有此識生，此難第三相續不定，謂外量云：「有多相續同一時間，於一處所，應定一見餘不能見，執唯識故。如多相續同一時間，於一空華等有見、不見者」。彼論第四難，於中有三：第一云：復有何因諸眩翳者，所見髮等，無髮等用。餘髮等物，其用非無，謂外量云：汝之髮等，應無彼用，執境非實，此心生故，如眩翳者所見髮等。又眩翳所見髮等，應有實用，執無實境髮等識生故，如餘髮等。第二云：復有何因夢中所得飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣等無飲等用，餘飲等物，其用非無，謂外量云：汝飲食等，應無實用，許體非實，此心生故，猶如夢中所見飲等。又夢中飲等，應有實用，執無此境，此識生故，如非夢中所有飲等。第三云：復有何因尋香城等，無城等用，餘城等物，其用非無，謂外量云：一切城等，應無城用，許無實城，生此心故，如尋香城等。又尋香城等，應有實用，許無實境，此識生故，如非尋香所有城等。如上皆有返覆比量，恐繁略也，如是總名外人難意。

The Commentary states: This text is the second, citing the phrasing of the opponent's objection. If there is only internal consciousness and no objects outside the mind, how is it that we visibly see that, for insentient things in the world, the two matters of place and time are determinate, while the bodies of sentient beings and the functions of insentient things in the world operate indeterminately? The wording here is general, intending to show that place, time, and function are insentient, while body is sentient; this is according to the Viṃśikā, though in terms of principle, all four matters apply across both. The treatise in Paramārtha's old translation says: "Place and time are not indeterminate; continuums are not indeterminate; the performance of action is completely established; how could there be consciousness-only without dust [objects]?" The treatise in Bodhiruci's translation says: "If there is only mind and no dust, false perception apart from external objects, place and time determinate and indeterminate, persons and actions performed." The newly translated treatise says: "If consciousness lacks real objects, then place and time being determinate, continuums being indeterminate, and functions being performed would not be possible." The word "continuum" (santāna) refers to the body. The prose of that text states: "If, apart from really existent external dharmas such as form, the consciousness of form and so forth arises without taking form and so forth as object, why does this consciousness arise in a certain place and not in all places?" This is the first objection by the Sautrāntikas and others regarding the determinacy of place. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Like when you are not cognizing Mount Zhongnan, the consciousness cognizing it should arise there; because this mind arises without holding to a real mountain; just like when directly cognizing that place." This refers to direct perception consciousness, not inferential consciousness; if one speaks of inferential consciousness, it arises even when not at this place. The second objection of that treatise states: "Why does consciousness arise at this place at a certain time, and not at all times?" This is the second objection regarding the determinacy of time. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Like when you are not cognizing Mount Zhongnan, the consciousness cognizing it should arise; because this mind arises while holding that there is no real object; just like when cognizing Mount Zhongnan." The third objection of that treatise states: "At the same place and time, where there are many continuums, why does it not determinately arise in just any one consciousness? Just as a person with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth, whereas one without cataracts does not have this consciousness arise." This is the third objection regarding the indeterminacy of continuums. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Where there are many continuums at the same time in one place, it should be determinate that one sees and others cannot see; because of holding to consciousness-only; just as when many continuums at the same time have seeing and not seeing with respect to a single sky-flower and so forth." The fourth objection of that treatise has three parts within it. The first states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that the hairs and so forth seen by those with cataracts lack the functions of hairs and so forth, while other hair objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "Your hairs and so forth should lack those functions; because this mind arises while holding that objects are not real; just like the hairs and so forth seen by one with cataracts. Moreover, the hairs and so forth seen by one with cataracts should have real functions; because a consciousness of hairs and so forth arises while holding that there are no real objects; just like other hairs and so forth." The second states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that food, drink, knives, staffs, poison, clothing, and so forth obtained in a dream lack the functions of drink and so forth, while other drink and such objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "Your food, drink, and so forth should lack real functions; because this mind arises while accepting that their substance is not real; just like the drink and so forth seen in a dream. Moreover, the drink and so forth in a dream should have real functions; because this consciousness arises while holding that there is no such object; just like the drink and so forth that are not in a dream." The third states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that a city of Gandharvas and so forth lacks the functions of a city and so forth, while other city objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "All cities and so forth should lack the functions of a city; because this mind arises while accepting that there is no real city; just like a city of Gandharvas and so forth. Moreover, a city of Gandharvas and so forth should have real functions; because this consciousness arises while accepting that there are no real objects; just like all cities that are not Gandharva cities." As above, there are reciprocal inferences for each; fearing verbosity, they are omitted. Such is the general designation of the opponent's intended objection.