成唯識論述記 7.508

7.508

The Commentary states: This text is the second, citing the phrasing of the opponent's objection. If there is only internal consciousness and no objects outside the mind, how is it that we visibly see that, for insentient things in the world, the two matters of place and time are determinate, while the bodies of sentient beings and the functions of insentient things in the world operate indeterminately? The wording here is general, intending to show that place, time, and function are insentient, while body is sentient; this is according to the Viṃśikā, though in terms of principle, all four matters apply across both. The treatise in Paramārtha's old translation says: "Place and time are not indeterminate; continuums are not indeterminate; the performance of action is completely established; how could there be consciousness-only without dust [objects]?" The treatise in Bodhiruci's translation says: "If there is only mind and no dust, false perception apart from external objects, place and time determinate and indeterminate, persons and actions performed." The newly translated treatise says: "If consciousness lacks real objects, then place and time being determinate, continuums being indeterminate, and functions being performed would not be possible." The word "continuum" (santāna) refers to the body. The prose of that text states: "If, apart from really existent external dharmas such as form, the consciousness of form and so forth arises without taking form and so forth as object, why does this consciousness arise in a certain place and not in all places?" This is the first objection by the Sautrāntikas and others regarding the determinacy of place. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Like when you are not cognizing Mount Zhongnan, the consciousness cognizing it should arise there; because this mind arises without holding to a real mountain; just like when directly cognizing that place." This refers to direct perception consciousness, not inferential consciousness; if one speaks of inferential consciousness, it arises even when not at this place. The second objection of that treatise states: "Why does consciousness arise at this place at a certain time, and not at all times?" This is the second objection regarding the determinacy of time. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Like when you are not cognizing Mount Zhongnan, the consciousness cognizing it should arise; because this mind arises while holding that there is no real object; just like when cognizing Mount Zhongnan." The third objection of that treatise states: "At the same place and time, where there are many continuums, why does it not determinately arise in just any one consciousness? Just as a person with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth, whereas one without cataracts does not have this consciousness arise." This is the third objection regarding the indeterminacy of continuums. That is, the opponent's inference states: "Where there are many continuums at the same time in one place, it should be determinate that one sees and others cannot see; because of holding to consciousness-only; just as when many continuums at the same time have seeing and not seeing with respect to a single sky-flower and so forth." The fourth objection of that treatise has three parts within it. The first states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that the hairs and so forth seen by those with cataracts lack the functions of hairs and so forth, while other hair objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "Your hairs and so forth should lack those functions; because this mind arises while holding that objects are not real; just like the hairs and so forth seen by one with cataracts. Moreover, the hairs and so forth seen by one with cataracts should have real functions; because a consciousness of hairs and so forth arises while holding that there are no real objects; just like other hairs and so forth." The second states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that food, drink, knives, staffs, poison, clothing, and so forth obtained in a dream lack the functions of drink and so forth, while other drink and such objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "Your food, drink, and so forth should lack real functions; because this mind arises while accepting that their substance is not real; just like the drink and so forth seen in a dream. Moreover, the drink and so forth in a dream should have real functions; because this consciousness arises while holding that there is no such object; just like the drink and so forth that are not in a dream." The third states: "Furthermore, what is the cause that a city of Gandharvas and so forth lacks the functions of a city and so forth, while other city objects do not lack their functions?" That is, the opponent's inference states: "All cities and so forth should lack the functions of a city; because this mind arises while accepting that there is no real city; just like a city of Gandharvas and so forth. Moreover, a city of Gandharvas and so forth should have real functions; because this consciousness arises while accepting that there are no real objects; just like all cities that are not Gandharva cities." As above, there are reciprocal inferences for each; fearing verbosity, they are omitted. Such is the general designation of the opponent's intended objection.