成唯識論述記 7.706

7.706

述曰：此中有三：一、釋出體義；二、辨差別；三、八識分別。此出所緣緣體相。「謂若有法」者，謂非遍計所執。此中有二師釋：初或通緣假；次或唯緣實。前師即眼識緣長等，後師即不緣，故此但總言有法，不別定其假、實體法。此則明非所執，所執無體不能發生能緣之識，故非是緣。緣者必是依他、無為，可有力用發能緣識名為緣故，即簡經部眼識，緣和合色體是假法，識雖似彼有所緣義，而非是緣以無體故，今此必是有體方緣。「是帶已相」者，帶有二義：若古西方師釋，己者境體，帶者是心似彼境相義，即能緣之心有似所緣之相名帶。相者相狀，小乘是行相，能緣體攝；大乘是相分所攝，以前第二卷中解：謂能緣心等帶此色等己之相也，以此理故，正量部師般若毬多造謗大乘論，遂破此云，無分別智不似真如相起，應非所緣緣。我之大師戒曰大王為設十八日無遮會時，造制惡見論遂破彼云：汝不解我義，帶者是挾帶義，相者體相，非相狀義。謂正智等生時，挾帶真如之體相起，與真如不一、不異，非相、非非相。若挾帶彼所緣之己以為境相者，是所緣故，若相言體，即有同時心、心所之體相，亦心挾帶而有，雖有所託，然非所慮故，非所緣緣故。相者相分義或體相義，真如亦名為相——無相之相，所以經言皆同一相，所謂無相。前句是緣，此句是所緣。緣生於誰，誰帶己相，謂心或此相應法，是所緣緣果，非與色、不相應為所緣故，三十八說：唯望心、心所為所緣故。若爾，古師、大師二釋皆有妨難，謂能為緣生能照法，能照法體若帶己相，說此名彼所緣緣者，即鏡、水等所照外質，亦能為緣生鏡中影，鏡中影即是帶己之相，鏡等外質，應是鏡等所緣緣，為解此疑故。次說言「所慮、所託」，所慮，即前所緣義；所託者，即前緣義。設此為彼所慮非所託者，不名為緣，如和合假等，設為彼所託彼得生，亦須彼能慮於此方是所緣。謂鏡等不能慮，質非鏡等所慮，故便非鏡等所緣緣。不同心等，雖無分別亦能慮故。「慮」者緣慮義。《佛地論》云：若無見分應非能緣。此中意說：若是有體之法，是帶己相之心，及心所法所慮、所託者是所緣緣故，一切有為、無為皆此緣攝。安惠等師既無見分，如何解所緣？

The Commentary states: Herein there are three parts: first, explaining the substance and definition; second, distinguishing variations; third, classification according to the eight consciousnesses. This presents the essential marks of the objective condition. 'If there is an existent dharma' means that it is not of the imagined nature (parikalpita). Here there are two masters' interpretations: the first holds that it can generally apprehend the nominal; the second holds that it exclusively apprehends the real. For the former master, the visual consciousness apprehends 'long' and so forth; for the latter master, it does not. Therefore, this text merely speaks generally of 'an existent dharma' without distinctly determining its nominal or real substantial reality. This clarifies that it is not the conceptualized; the conceptualized lacks real substance and cannot engender the apprehending consciousness, hence it is not a condition. A condition must be dependent (paratantra) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), because only something possessing functional efficacy to generate an apprehending consciousness is called a condition. This excludes the Sautrāntika view that the visual consciousness apprehends aggregated matter whose substance is nominal: although the consciousness resembles it and thus possesses the sense of an object (ālambana), it is not a condition (pratyaya) because it lacks real substance. Here it must have real substance before it can be a condition. 'Carrying its own aspect' (bandha-sva-lakṣaṇa): 'carrying' (dài) has two meanings. According to the ancient Western masters' explanation: 'its own' is the substance of the object; 'carrying' means that the mind resembles the aspect of that object; that is, the apprehending mind possessing an aspect resembling what is apprehended is called 'carrying'. 'Aspect' (xiàng) means mark or appearance: in the Hīnayāna it is the subjective mode of apprehension (ākāra), subsumed under the substance of the apprehending consciousness; in the Mahāyāna it is subsumed under the objective image component (nimittabhāga). As explained earlier in the second fascicle: it means that the apprehending mind and so forth carries this own-aspect of matter and so forth. Based on this reasoning, the Saṃmatīya master Prajñāgupta composed a treatise slandering the Mahāyāna, subsequently refuting this by saying: non-conceptual wisdom does not arise resembling the aspect of tathatā, so tathatā should not be its objective condition. When our Great Master [Xuanzang], under Great King Śīlāditya, held the eighteen-day unhindered assembly (sarvadaśāniyāma-mahāpariṣad), he composed the Treatise Refuting Evil Views and refuted him, saying: 'You do not understand our doctrine. "Carrying" means holding along with; "aspect" means substantial nature, not a phenomenal mark. That is, when correct wisdom and so forth arise, they arise holding along with the substantial nature of tathatā, being neither identical to nor different from tathatā, neither an aspect nor non-aspect.' If 'carrying its own' that is apprehended means taking it as the objective aspect, it is an object; if 'aspect' means substance, then the substantial natures of the simultaneous mind and mental factors are also held along with and present in the mind; although they are leaned upon, yet because they are not what is cogitated, they are not the objective condition. 'Aspect' means the image component, or it means substantial nature. Tathatā is also called 'aspect'—the aspect of marklessness; hence the sūtras say: 'They all share the identical aspect, namely, marklessness.' The preceding clause represents the 'condition'; this clause represents the 'object'. For whom does the condition generate? Who carries its own aspect? It refers to the mind or its associated dharmas, which are the fruit of the objective condition, for it is not an object for matter or non-associated dharmas. As the Thirty-Eight [fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi] states: 'It is an objective condition solely with respect to mind and mental factors.' If so, both the ancient master's and the Great Master's explanations face an objection: if that which can serve as a condition to generate an illuminating dharma is said to be its objective condition when the substance of the illuminating dharma carries its own aspect, then the external archetype illuminated by a mirror, water, or the like, can also serve as a condition to generate a reflection in the mirror, and the reflection in the mirror is precisely carrying its own aspect; thus the external archetype of the mirror and so forth should be the objective condition of the mirror and so forth. To resolve this doubt, the text next states: 'what is cogitated and what is leaned upon.' 'What is cogitated' is the meaning of 'object' (ālambana) mentioned before; 'what is leaned upon' is the meaning of 'condition' (pratyaya) mentioned before. Supposing something is cogitated by it but not leaned upon, it is not called a condition, such as aggregated nominalities; supposing it is leaned upon by it and it manages to arise, it must also be that it can cogitate this before it is an object. A mirror and so forth cannot cogitate, and the archetype is not cogitated by the mirror; therefore it is not the objective condition of the mirror and so forth. It is unlike mind and so forth, which can cogitate even without conceptual discrimination. 'Cogitation' (lǜ) means apprehending and cogitating. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Without the seeing component (darśanabhāga), it could not be an apprehender.' The intention here is: if it is a dharma with real substance, and is what is cogitated and leaned upon by the mind and mental factors that carry its own aspect, it is an objective condition; therefore, all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are subsumed under this condition. Since masters such as Sthiramati do not accept the seeing component, how do they explain the objective condition?