成唯識論述記 7.706

7.706

The Commentary states: Herein there are three parts: first, explaining the substance and definition; second, distinguishing variations; third, classification according to the eight consciousnesses. This presents the essential marks of the objective condition. 'If there is an existent dharma' means that it is not of the imagined nature (parikalpita). Here there are two masters' interpretations: the first holds that it can generally apprehend the nominal; the second holds that it exclusively apprehends the real. For the former master, the visual consciousness apprehends 'long' and so forth; for the latter master, it does not. Therefore, this text merely speaks generally of 'an existent dharma' without distinctly determining its nominal or real substantial reality. This clarifies that it is not the conceptualized; the conceptualized lacks real substance and cannot engender the apprehending consciousness, hence it is not a condition. A condition must be dependent (paratantra) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), because only something possessing functional efficacy to generate an apprehending consciousness is called a condition. This excludes the Sautrāntika view that the visual consciousness apprehends aggregated matter whose substance is nominal: although the consciousness resembles it and thus possesses the sense of an object (ālambana), it is not a condition (pratyaya) because it lacks real substance. Here it must have real substance before it can be a condition. 'Carrying its own aspect' (bandha-sva-lakṣaṇa): 'carrying' (dài) has two meanings. According to the ancient Western masters' explanation: 'its own' is the substance of the object; 'carrying' means that the mind resembles the aspect of that object; that is, the apprehending mind possessing an aspect resembling what is apprehended is called 'carrying'. 'Aspect' (xiàng) means mark or appearance: in the Hīnayāna it is the subjective mode of apprehension (ākāra), subsumed under the substance of the apprehending consciousness; in the Mahāyāna it is subsumed under the objective image component (nimittabhāga). As explained earlier in the second fascicle: it means that the apprehending mind and so forth carries this own-aspect of matter and so forth. Based on this reasoning, the Saṃmatīya master Prajñāgupta composed a treatise slandering the Mahāyāna, subsequently refuting this by saying: non-conceptual wisdom does not arise resembling the aspect of tathatā, so tathatā should not be its objective condition. When our Great Master [Xuanzang], under Great King Śīlāditya, held the eighteen-day unhindered assembly (sarvadaśāniyāma-mahāpariṣad), he composed the Treatise Refuting Evil Views and refuted him, saying: 'You do not understand our doctrine. "Carrying" means holding along with; "aspect" means substantial nature, not a phenomenal mark. That is, when correct wisdom and so forth arise, they arise holding along with the substantial nature of tathatā, being neither identical to nor different from tathatā, neither an aspect nor non-aspect.' If 'carrying its own' that is apprehended means taking it as the objective aspect, it is an object; if 'aspect' means substance, then the substantial natures of the simultaneous mind and mental factors are also held along with and present in the mind; although they are leaned upon, yet because they are not what is cogitated, they are not the objective condition. 'Aspect' means the image component, or it means substantial nature. Tathatā is also called 'aspect'—the aspect of marklessness; hence the sūtras say: 'They all share the identical aspect, namely, marklessness.' The preceding clause represents the 'condition'; this clause represents the 'object'. For whom does the condition generate? Who carries its own aspect? It refers to the mind or its associated dharmas, which are the fruit of the objective condition, for it is not an object for matter or non-associated dharmas. As the Thirty-Eight [fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi] states: 'It is an objective condition solely with respect to mind and mental factors.' If so, both the ancient master's and the Great Master's explanations face an objection: if that which can serve as a condition to generate an illuminating dharma is said to be its objective condition when the substance of the illuminating dharma carries its own aspect, then the external archetype illuminated by a mirror, water, or the like, can also serve as a condition to generate a reflection in the mirror, and the reflection in the mirror is precisely carrying its own aspect; thus the external archetype of the mirror and so forth should be the objective condition of the mirror and so forth. To resolve this doubt, the text next states: 'what is cogitated and what is leaned upon.' 'What is cogitated' is the meaning of 'object' (ālambana) mentioned before; 'what is leaned upon' is the meaning of 'condition' (pratyaya) mentioned before. Supposing something is cogitated by it but not leaned upon, it is not called a condition, such as aggregated nominalities; supposing it is leaned upon by it and it manages to arise, it must also be that it can cogitate this before it is an object. A mirror and so forth cannot cogitate, and the archetype is not cogitated by the mirror; therefore it is not the objective condition of the mirror and so forth. It is unlike mind and so forth, which can cogitate even without conceptual discrimination. 'Cogitation' (lǜ) means apprehending and cogitating. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Without the seeing component (darśanabhāga), it could not be an apprehender.' The intention here is: if it is a dharma with real substance, and is what is cogitated and leaned upon by the mind and mental factors that carry its own aspect, it is an objective condition; therefore, all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are subsumed under this condition. Since masters such as Sthiramati do not accept the seeing component, how do they explain the objective condition?