成唯識論述記 8.18

8.18

述曰：「觀」者對也；「待」者藉也。即是此因通能、所受，然所假藉能、所之受，方是餘非。然有人云：唯三受為體者不然，亦待食等而求噉等。即以所待食為欲因，若待情欲方求飲食，以受為食因。然領受處通能、所受，不可言欲，欲不遍故，非受性故，即觀於此隨是能、所受，領彼所、能受果，或生、住、成、得，此所待與所生等為因也。然《大論》等皆言待此若求、若取，即所待受為所求等因。三十八等云：「觀待足故，足為因故，有往來業。」未必以受為因，所待非受故。又，此論云：通所受故。然此所待若能所受，皆此因攝。有以能受為因，能受為果，如待苦為樂；有以能受為因，所受為果；有以所受為因，所受為果；有以所受為因，能受為果，四句別也。所領受法亦名領受故。今於能受唯取受數，一、常遍諸心；二、五分位別。別境等法，不常遍諸心，作意等四，無五分位故，觸雖有爾，然於所受非領屬己，不如於受，所以不取。其所受中，通一切法，但除種子因緣之法，此因疎故。唯疎相待，方是此因，如種望芽，內種望現，皆非此因。不爾，下應言得等流果，以不得故，唯疎相待者得，即親所待皆是引發、牽引等攝。問：何故說因緣是牽引、生起攝故，亦是定異等攝，說觀待因是觀待，復是牽引等攝，竟有何失？答曰：不然。以名遠故，名觀待者，即要非親，定異等因，名相通故。又解，若親相待亦是此因，下此果中，但據疎遠不言親者故，不說得等流果等也，此解為勝。又解，觀待情欲是觀視義，要境待情，情待境，方是即能所受性。以種望芽，非情能所觀待，故非此因。問：若爾，何故言足為因故有往來業？答：亦是內法情所待故。因緣芽等法，非情所待，情所待時，非因緣故，前說正義。既所受中以所待為因，芽待於種亦可此因，且無記之因，若無記即因唯有漏，無記性果通漏、無漏、三性等法；若果是無記，與無記為因，即因通三性、漏、無漏，果唯無記，餘染等皆准此知。

The Commentary states: "Guan" (contemplating / viewing) means facing; "dai" (relying / waiting) means depending upon. That is to say, this cause covers both that which experiences (the experiencer) and that which is experienced. However, only when experiential capacity and object of experience are depended upon is it this [cause]; otherwise, it is not. But when someone says: "Its substance is solely the three feelings," that is incorrect, for one also depends upon food and the like to seek eating and so forth. That is, using the food depended upon as the cause for desire; if one depends on sentiment and desire before seeking food and drink, one takes feeling as the cause of food. However, the basis of experiential reception covers both that which experiences and that which is experienced; it cannot be called merely desire, because desire is not all-pervasive and is not of the nature of feeling. That is, viewing this [basis]—whether it be the experiencer or the experienced—and experiencing that result of what is experienced or what experiences, or [its] arising, staying, completion, or attainment: what is thus depended upon serves as the cause for what is produced, and so on. Furthermore, the Great Śāstra and others all state that depending upon this, one either seeks or takes; that is, the feeling depended upon is the cause for what is sought, and so forth. Fascicle thirty-eight and others state: "Because one depends upon feet, with feet as the cause, there is the activity of coming and going." This is not necessarily taking feeling as the cause, because what is depended upon is not feeling. Moreover, this treatise states: because it covers what is experienced. Thus, whether what is depended upon is the experiencer or the experienced, all are subsumed under this cause. There is taking the experiencer as cause and the experiencer as effect, as in depending upon suffering to experience pleasure; there is taking the experiencer as cause and the experienced as effect; there is taking the experienced as cause and the experienced as effect; and there is taking the experienced as cause and the experiencer as effect: these are four distinct alternatives. This is because the phenomena experienced are also named "experiential reception." Now, regarding the experiencer, we take only the mental factor of feeling (vedanā), because, first, it is constantly pervasive throughout all minds, and second, it has the distinction of five stages. Phenomena such as the object-determining [mental factors] are not constantly pervasive throughout all minds; the four beginning with attention (manaskāra) lack the five stages; although contact (sparśa) possesses these, it does not appropriate what is experienced to oneself in the manner of feeling, and therefore it is not taken. Among what is experienced, it covers all phenomena, only excluding the phenomena of seed-causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya), because this cause is remote. Only remote interdependence constitutes this cause, just as a seed toward a sprout, or an internal seed toward an active manifestation, are neither of them this cause. If it were not so, below it ought to be said that one attains the outflow-equal result (niṣyanda-phala); since it is not attained, only what is remotely interdependent attains it; that is, what is immediately depended upon is subsumed under inducing, leading, and so forth. Question: Why is it that the causal condition is subsumed under leading and giving rise to, and also subsumed under definitive differentiation and so forth, yet when the reliance-cause is spoken of as reliance, it is furthermore subsumed under leading and the like—what fault would there ultimately be in this? Answer: It is not so. Because the name is remote: what is named "reliance" must be non-immediate, whereas causes such as definitive differentiation share a common name. Another explanation: If immediate interdependence is also this cause, below regarding this result, it is merely based on what is remote without mentioning what is immediate; therefore, it does not speak of attaining an outflow-equal result, and so on; this explanation is superior. Another explanation: "Relying upon sentiment and desire" has the sense of viewing and regarding: the object must depend on the sentiment, and the sentiment must depend on the object; only then is it of the nature of the experiencer and the experienced. As for a seed toward a sprout, it is not an experiencer and experienced of sentiment, so it is not this cause. Question: If so, why is it said that with feet as cause there is the activity of coming and going? Answer: It is also because it is an internal phenomenon depended upon by sentiment. Phenomena such as seeds and sprouts as causal conditions are not depended upon by sentiment; when depended upon by sentiment, they are not causal conditions; thus what was said before is the correct meaning. Since within what is experienced, what is depended upon is taken as the cause, a sprout depending on a seed may also be this cause. Now, concerning an indeterminate cause: if it is indeterminate as cause, the cause is only defiled (sāsrava), while an indeterminate effect covers defiled, undefiled, the three natures, and other phenomena; if the effect is indeterminate and serves as cause for an indeterminate, the cause covers the three natures, defiled, and undefiled, while the effect is solely indeterminate. The remaining defiled and other states should be understood according to this.