成唯識論述記 8.18

8.18

The Commentary states: "Guan" (contemplating / viewing) means facing; "dai" (relying / waiting) means depending upon. That is to say, this cause covers both that which experiences (the experiencer) and that which is experienced. However, only when experiential capacity and object of experience are depended upon is it this [cause]; otherwise, it is not. But when someone says: "Its substance is solely the three feelings," that is incorrect, for one also depends upon food and the like to seek eating and so forth. That is, using the food depended upon as the cause for desire; if one depends on sentiment and desire before seeking food and drink, one takes feeling as the cause of food. However, the basis of experiential reception covers both that which experiences and that which is experienced; it cannot be called merely desire, because desire is not all-pervasive and is not of the nature of feeling. That is, viewing this [basis]—whether it be the experiencer or the experienced—and experiencing that result of what is experienced or what experiences, or [its] arising, staying, completion, or attainment: what is thus depended upon serves as the cause for what is produced, and so on. Furthermore, the Great Śāstra and others all state that depending upon this, one either seeks or takes; that is, the feeling depended upon is the cause for what is sought, and so forth. Fascicle thirty-eight and others state: "Because one depends upon feet, with feet as the cause, there is the activity of coming and going." This is not necessarily taking feeling as the cause, because what is depended upon is not feeling. Moreover, this treatise states: because it covers what is experienced. Thus, whether what is depended upon is the experiencer or the experienced, all are subsumed under this cause. There is taking the experiencer as cause and the experiencer as effect, as in depending upon suffering to experience pleasure; there is taking the experiencer as cause and the experienced as effect; there is taking the experienced as cause and the experienced as effect; and there is taking the experienced as cause and the experiencer as effect: these are four distinct alternatives. This is because the phenomena experienced are also named "experiential reception." Now, regarding the experiencer, we take only the mental factor of feeling (vedanā), because, first, it is constantly pervasive throughout all minds, and second, it has the distinction of five stages. Phenomena such as the object-determining [mental factors] are not constantly pervasive throughout all minds; the four beginning with attention (manaskāra) lack the five stages; although contact (sparśa) possesses these, it does not appropriate what is experienced to oneself in the manner of feeling, and therefore it is not taken. Among what is experienced, it covers all phenomena, only excluding the phenomena of seed-causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya), because this cause is remote. Only remote interdependence constitutes this cause, just as a seed toward a sprout, or an internal seed toward an active manifestation, are neither of them this cause. If it were not so, below it ought to be said that one attains the outflow-equal result (niṣyanda-phala); since it is not attained, only what is remotely interdependent attains it; that is, what is immediately depended upon is subsumed under inducing, leading, and so forth. Question: Why is it that the causal condition is subsumed under leading and giving rise to, and also subsumed under definitive differentiation and so forth, yet when the reliance-cause is spoken of as reliance, it is furthermore subsumed under leading and the like—what fault would there ultimately be in this? Answer: It is not so. Because the name is remote: what is named "reliance" must be non-immediate, whereas causes such as definitive differentiation share a common name. Another explanation: If immediate interdependence is also this cause, below regarding this result, it is merely based on what is remote without mentioning what is immediate; therefore, it does not speak of attaining an outflow-equal result, and so on; this explanation is superior. Another explanation: "Relying upon sentiment and desire" has the sense of viewing and regarding: the object must depend on the sentiment, and the sentiment must depend on the object; only then is it of the nature of the experiencer and the experienced. As for a seed toward a sprout, it is not an experiencer and experienced of sentiment, so it is not this cause. Question: If so, why is it said that with feet as cause there is the activity of coming and going? Answer: It is also because it is an internal phenomenon depended upon by sentiment. Phenomena such as seeds and sprouts as causal conditions are not depended upon by sentiment; when depended upon by sentiment, they are not causal conditions; thus what was said before is the correct meaning. Since within what is experienced, what is depended upon is taken as the cause, a sprout depending on a seed may also be this cause. Now, concerning an indeterminate cause: if it is indeterminate as cause, the cause is only defiled (sāsrava), while an indeterminate effect covers defiled, undefiled, the three natures, and other phenomena; if the effect is indeterminate and serves as cause for an indeterminate, the cause covers the three natures, defiled, and undefiled, while the effect is solely indeterminate. The remaining defiled and other states should be understood according to this.