成唯識論述記 2.431

2.431

The Commentary states: The modulations of shape and size upon phenomena such as color-form are long, short, square, round, overt action (vijñapti), and so forth; or they are the written letters in books, which are also modulations of color-form. Yet the modulations of color-form are not distinct from color-form and are subsumed directly under the visual form sphere (rūpa-āyatana). The modulations upon sound should likewise not be distinct from sound, being subsumed under the sound sphere (śabda-āyatana). The formal argument is: 'The modulations of sound should not possess a distinct real entity apart from their basis, being subsumed under the mental-object sphere (dharma-āyatana); because they are modulations upon the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha), or because they are modulations upon either one of the two forms, color-form or sound; just like the length and so forth of the color-form sphere.' If one does not say 'subsumed under the mental-object sphere', the corroborating example would suffer from lack of the probandum (sādhya-vikala). Furthermore: 'Your modulations upon color-form should have distinct entities subsumed under the mental-object sphere; because they are modulations upon the form aggregate; like the modulations upon sound,' and the opponent's counter-analogy is also like this. You Mahāyāna master hold that although modulations upon sound are not real in essence, they are still subsumed under the mental-object sphere; so modulations upon color-form should likewise not be real in essence, yet be subsumed under the mental-object sphere. If you argue that because sound can reveal meaning, possesses the nature of teaching, and is cognised by mental consciousness, it is subsumed under the mental-object sphere and words and so forth are conventionally posited on it, our school says the same, as no differing reason can be found between them. This reasoning is invalid: it is not only based on sound that words and so forth are posited; they are also conventionally posited on the basis of light rays and so forth. Since they are based on multiple phenomena and are cognised solely by the intellect, they are subsumed under the mental-object sphere. One cannot object that since the essence of morality (śīla) is based solely on volition (cetanā), it should be subsumed under a different sphere, for it is currently within the same sphere. Below is the fourth part, the objection comparing the production of words by sound to signification by speech.