成唯識論述記 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.2

From here below is the second part: the specific refutation of the Hīnayāna. In this there are three parts: first, a general question; next, a brief answer; finally, an extensive refutation.

2.3

Treatise: As for what is posited by the other vehicles […] how can they be nonexistent?

The Commentary states: This is the general question. What is "other than the Great Vehicle" is the Lesser Vehicle (Hīnayāna). If one said "different from consciousness," it would also apply to the Great Vehicle, because form is different from mind. Now it says "apart from consciousness" to avoid the fault of contradicting one's own doctrine.

2.5

Treatise: The form and the rest posited by them […] because in principle they do not exist.

2.6

The Commentary states: This is the brief answer. Mind, mental factors, and so forth are somewhat similar to the Great Vehicle, so they are not refuted for the time being.

2.7

Treatise: To begin with, is the form posited by them […] not composed of atoms?

2.8

The Commentary states: Below is the extensive refutation. In this there are three parts: first, refuting form; next, refuting the non-associated [formations]; finally, refuting the unconditioned. Because mind and mental factors are grasping subjects and their substance is consciousness, they are somewhat close; only later, in the general refutation of what is internal, will they be refuted.

2.9

In refuting dharmas, there are eleven schools in total whose distinct meanings are refuted, namely: Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Saṃmatīya, Mahāsāṃghika, Ekavyāvahārika, Lokottaravāda, Gokulika, Sthavira, Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya, and Dharmaguptaka; the views of the remaining nine schools are all refuted as well. In refuting form, there are three parts: first, a general recount of the varieties of form posited by the heterodox [and Hīnayāna]; next, taking them up individually to refute them; finally, concluding generally that they do not exist. This is the first part. There are three kinds of "resistance" (pratigha): namely, that of cognitive object (ālambana), that of obstruction (āvaraṇa), and that of sensory sphere (viṣaya). First, resistance by cognitive object means mind and mental factors with respect to their own cognitive objects. Next, resistance by obstruction means that the ten form elements (rūpadhātu) are obstructed and do not arise in the place of another, like a hand obstructing a hand. Finally, resistance by sensory sphere means the twelve elements and a portion of the dharma element—the cognitive faculties—with respect to cognitive spheres such as form. The distinction between the first and the last is: mind and mental factors arise by apprehending the object, and that object is called having a cognitive object with respect to mind and the rest; if with respect to that object this [faculty] has functional efficacy, then that object is called the sensory sphere of this dharma, as extensively explained in the second fascicle of the Kośa and elsewhere. However, what is spoken of here is resistance meaning mutual obstruction—taking resistance by obstruction. The ten bases (āyatana) are called having resistance, and the dharma base is called non-resistant; this is established by both sides, except for what results from supreme concentration, which the other schools do not accept.

2.10

Treatise: Whether that resistant form […] because it is not really existent.

2.11

The Commentary states: This takes up [the category of] obstructive [matter] to refute it. Herein there are three parts: first, refuting obstructive [matter]; next, refuting non-obstructive [matter]; and finally, refuting both together. Within the first, there are two parts: first, refuting the obstructive matter of the various schools as unestablished; and next, concluding that obstructive matter is unestablished. Within refuting obstructive matter there are three parts: first, refuting the constitutive atoms of obstructive matter as unestablished; next, refuting the constituted obstructive matter such as the eye [-faculty] as unestablished; and finally, setting forth the correct teaching. Within refuting the constitutive [atoms], there is first a general rejection; next, specific refutations; and finally, a general conclusion. This [segment] is the general rejection. The meaning of constitutive and constituted faculties and atoms will be known when we come to the text. However, according to the Sautrāntika and others, atoms are subsumed under the ten āyatanas such as the eye and visible form, yet they are not nominal; they are not grasped by the visual consciousness and the like, but rather form composite matter to serve as objects for the eye and so forth. Arguing from reason, they are grasped only by the mental consciousness and ought to be included in the dharmāyatana; but because the real follows the nominal, they are subsumed under the āyatanas of visible form and the like, since nominal matter is formed by gathering these real dharmas. In the Nyāyānusāra, [Saṃghabhadra] disputes with the Sautrāntika, not allowing that there is separate matter in the dharmāyatana, and therefore [asserting that] they are not subsumed under the dharmāyatana. For the Sarvāstivādin, atoms are subsumed under the āyatanas of visible form and the like, being precisely aggregated matter and so forth, because the fine is subsumed under the coarse. In the Mahāyāna, atoms are nominal matter belonging to the dharmāyatana, unable to form accumulated matter such as the eye. Accordingly, a fourfold analysis should be made: for the Sautrāntika, the ten āyatanas are coarse-nominal and fine-real; for the Mahāyāna conventional truth, coarse-real and fine-nominal; for the Sarvāstivādin and others, both coarse and fine are real; for the Ekavyāvahārika and others, both coarse and fine are nominal. Because the atoms posited by the Sautrāntika masters, the Sarvāstivādin, and others are each wide of the mark, they are now refuted. However, among the tenets of the various schools, those that are entirely wide of the mark are stated in passing, while those that are closer are not recounted. 'Such obstructive matter is definitely not real' is the general establishment of the thesis of rejection, directly aimed at the Sarvāstivādin. If aimed at the Sautrāntika, it is not what they accept; wishful to criticize what is not universally established as a constituted entity, because of its being obstructive, this explanation is not made. If it were said to be aimed at the Sautrāntika, it would commit the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), since they say that constituted obstructive matter is not substantially real. 'Because the constitutive atoms are not substantially real' is the general establishment of the reason of rejection; however, this reason contains the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha).

2.12

The text below has two parts: first, refuting having obstruction and lacking obstruction; second, refuting having spatial parts and lacking spatial parts.

2.13

Treatise: That is to say, the atoms […] are nominal and not real.

2.14

The Commentary states: From here downward, it specifically refutes the tenets of the Sarvāstivādin masters, the Sautrāntika, and others, because all say that atoms are substantially existent, and all possess the nature of obstruction—among the three types of obstruction, obstructive obstruction (pratighāta-sapratigha); having obstruction is called 'obstructive'. Sarvāstivādin atoms are obstructive; if they have spatial parts, they are called obstructive. The Sarvāstivāda [asserts they] are non-obstructive [in spatial division]; only the Sautrāntika holds [they have parts]. Below, each is addressed accordingly. The formal inference is: 'These [atoms] should be nominal; because you accept that they are physically obstructive; like objects such as pots.' The five faculties and five objects are also included within this, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika).

2.15

This is the Sautrāntika's spatial parts with physical obstruction, as well as the original tenet of the Sarvāstivādin; below, it provides a hypothetical rebuttal.

2.16

Treatise: If they lack physical obstruction […] forming pots, cloth, and the like.

2.17

The Commentary states: Fearing there might be a divergent view that also says 'atoms lack obstruction', this refutation is now hypothetically raised. Furthermore, lacking spatial parts is called 'lacking obstruction', and the Sarvāstivādins and others also designate [atoms as] 'lacking obstruction'. The formal inference is: 'Your atoms cannot aggregate into pots and the like; because they lack obstruction; like non-material dharmas.' The unconditioned, non-associated [formations], citta, and caitasikas are all included in the example, so there is also no inconclusiveness. If aimed at the Sarvāstivādin, the reason should be changed to: 'Because they lack spatial parts, though having physical obstruction.' Since one cannot examine every single formal inference, by aligning carefully with the text's detailed division of passages, it may likewise be inferred.

2.18

Treatise: Furthermore, if atoms […] then they would not be substantially existent.

2.19

The Commentary states: The formal inference here is: 'The posited atoms should be susceptible to analysis, and should not be substantially real; because they possess spatial parts; like coarse matter and the like.' These two formal inferences refute the Sautrāntika masters and all who posit that atoms have spatial parts. However, the direction is itself the part, and there is no part beyond it. The Viṃśikā says: 'If an atom has spatial parts, logically it cannot be a single unity.'

2.20

Treatise: If they have no spatial parts […] catching light and casting a shadow.

2.21

The Commentary states: Below, challenging the lack of spatial parts, there are roughly five objections. This first is the objection that if atoms lack spatial parts, there should be no light and shadow. Lacking spatial parts is the tenet of the Sarvāstivāda; they hold that atoms and the like are precisely composite matter, that there are no separate atoms outside composite matter, and no composite matter outside atoms. Challenging through reason: 'Your composite matter should lack spatial parts, because its substance is precisely the atoms, just as your atoms form composite matter and already lack spatial parts.' Hence the formal inference is established: 'Your composite matter and the like cannot catch light and cast a shadow; because they lack spatial parts; like non-material entities and the like.'

2.22

Treatise: As soon as the solar disc rises […] light and shadow appear separately.

2.23

The Commentary states: This sets forth the reasoning: when the solar disc rises and illuminates a pillar or the like, the eastern part catches the light and the western side casts a shadow; therefore it says 'appear separately'.

2.24

Treatise: Since catching light and casting shadows […] they definitely have spatial parts.

2.25

The Commentary states: This is the direct challenge: catching light and casting shadows differ between east and west, hence we know atoms definitely have spatial parts. If, when the sun illuminates a pillar, the atoms in it lacked spatial parts, then when the sun illuminated the eastern side, the western side would also have light; because lacking spatial parts, there should be no obstruction. 'Your atoms should have spatial parts; because they are composite matter; like composite matter.' The eastern side is not the west, clearly proving they have spatial parts.

2.26

Treatise: Furthermore, if when seen and touched […] they must have spatial parts.

2.27

The Commentary states: This is the second objection: that if atoms lack spatial parts, seeing and touching would admit of no distinction. Setting forth the reasoning from facts: if one holds that atoms completely lack spatial parts, when the eye sees a wall and the like, or the hand touches it, one grasps only this side that is seen or touched, and does not grasp that other part that is not seen or touched; yet this composite object is precisely the atoms. If atoms lack spatial parts, when seeing or touching this side, one should also grasp that part; because this is precisely that; that is just like this—the formal inference being the same as before. Since coarse matter's spatial parts are precisely the atoms, we know atoms definitely have spatial parts.

2.28

Treatise: Furthermore, as for atoms […] the meaning of coming together or aggregating.

2.29

The Commentary states: This is the third objection: that atoms having a middle and an exterior, one would have to comprise six parts. Furthermore, if they lacked spatial parts, they could not either combine (saṃyoga) or aggregate (saṃghāta). 'Combine' addresses the ancient Sarvāstivādin masters; 'aggregate' addresses the neo-Sarvāstivādins and the author of the Nyāyānusāra. Atoms should not combine or aggregate into coarse, large objects; because they lack spatial parts; like space (ākāśa) and the like. However, the Sautrāntika masters state that they 'have spatial parts'; now challenging them on 'lacking spatial parts' would not apply to those who combine, hence we know this applies only to the position of the ancient Sarvāstivādin masters. Otherwise, the reason would commit the fallacy of being unestablished for one party. Wherever they reside, even granting you that they do not touch one another, when they are juxtaposed, there must be distinctions of above, below, and the four cardinal directions. Since the juxtaposed eastern side is not the western side, it clearly has spatial parts. If east were not east, west should not be west; they would then be non-matter, not what is called atoms.

2.30

Treatise: Or else they would interpenetrate […] they definitely have spatial parts.

2.31

The Commentary states: This is the fourth objection: that if atoms lack a middle and exterior, the atomic aggregate would not be different [in size from a single atom]. If they lack the juxtaposed directions of east, west, and so forth, all atoms should interpenetrate and coalesce into a single substance, and thus coarse [matter] would not be formed. The Viṃśatikā says: 'When an atom joins with six, one must have six parts; if it is in the same place as the six, the aggregate must be like an atom.' The first half refers to the preceding [argument], and the second half refers to this one. Because of this, atoms definitely have spatial parts; hence the Abhidharmakośa says: 'Whether touching or not touching, all must have parts.'

2.32

Treatise: If one holds that obstructive matter […] there should be no obstruction or separation.

2.33

The Commentary states: This is the fifth objection: that if atoms are identical to coarse matter, there should be no obstruction or separation. Your obstructive coarse matter should lack obstruction and separation; because it is identical to atoms; just like atoms. You hold that obstructive matter is precisely atoms, and that outside atoms there is no obstructive matter. If atoms lack spatial parts, coarse matter should also lack spatial parts; because of lacking spatial parts, there would also be no obstruction or separation; like non-material entities and the like, the formal inference being as before. The Viṃśatikā says: 'Without it, shadow and obstruction would not exist'—this refers to the absence of obstruction.

2.34

Treatise: If that were so, then it would not be obstructive obstruction.

2.35

The Commentary states: If it lacked obstruction and separation, then it would not be subsumed under obstructive obstruction. The formal inference is: 'Your ten āyatanas are not obstructive obstruction; because they lack obstruction and separation; like citta and caitasikas.'

2.36

Treatise: Therefore, your atoms […] are definitely not substantially existent.

2.37

The Commentary states: Consequently, your atoms must have spatial parts; having spatial parts, they can be analyzed; being analyzable, they are definitely not substantially existent. The Viṃśatikā says: 'The aggregate is not different, there are no two.'

2.38

Treatise: Therefore, obstructive matter being substantially existent is unestablished.

2.39

The Commentary states: This concludes the rejection. Since the constitutive atoms are not substantially real, obstructive matter as constituted is unestablished as substantially real.

2.40

Above, refuting the constitutive atoms as unestablished is concluded; below, refuting the constituted obstructive matter of faculties and objects as unestablished.

2.41

Treatise: Do the five consciousnesses lack matter as their support and intentional object?

2.42

The Commentary states: From here downward is the second part, explaining that constituted obstructive matter is unestablished, within which there are two: first, a question; second, an answer. This is the question: the Hīnayānist asks, 'If, because there are no real constitutive atoms, there is no constituted obstructive matter, then do your Mahāyāna five consciousnesses lack matter as their support (āśraya) and intentional object (ālambana)?'

2.43

Below, the answer has three parts: first, setting forth the correct teaching; second, refuting internal āyatanas such as the eye as unestablished; third, specifically refuting external āyatanas as unestablished.

2.44

Treatise: Although it is not without matter, it is transformed by consciousness.

2.45

The Commentary states: This directly sets forth the correct teaching. Here, the word 'although' encompasses both concession and objection: it partially agrees with the concept of matter, but intends to show that the transformation of consciousness is not like the other [school's] matter. That is, the treatise master answers: although there is matter as support and intentional object, it is manifested through the transformation of consciousness; it is not that there are separate atoms outside the mind to form faculties and objects.

2.46

Treatise: That is to say, when consciousness arises […] serving as their support and intentional object.

2.47

The Commentary states: This explains the transformation of consciousness. When the eight consciousnesses arise, by the power of internal causes and conditions such as seeds, the eighth consciousness transforms to resemble the five faculties and the five dust-objects. The five consciousnesses such as the visual rely on the faculties transformed by it and take as intentional objects the fundamental dust-objects transformed by it; although they do not directly grasp them, they necessarily depend on them to arise. In reality, upon the material dust-objects of the fundamental consciousness, they transform and appear as images of the five dust-objects, taking those five faculties as their support and taking both that and this form of the five dust-objects as their intentional objects. If the five consciousnesses did not depend on what is transformed by the eighth consciousness, they would have no intentional object, because within intentional objects there are immediate and remote ones. The above is the general first part, setting forth the correct teaching.

2.48

Treatise: However, the faculties such as the eye […] are not produced by external [elements].

2.49

The Commentary states: From here downward is the second part, specifically refuting the five faculties. The five dust-objects such as visible form are seen in common by the world and attained through direct perception (pratyakṣa); the five faculties such as the eye are not attained through direct perception. Although the eighth consciousness cognizing them and the Tathāgata and others cognizing them is attained through direct perception, this is not commonly believed by the world; in other ordinary, distracted states of mind they are not attained through direct perception. Since they merely have the function of generating consciousness, they are known to exist through inference; they are not attained through the direct perception of other minds or the ordinary six consciousnesses, with the sole exception of the Tathāgata. In the Hīnayāna doctrine, the Tathāgata also attains them by direct perception, but because this is not commonly accepted by the world, it is not used as proof.

2.50

These merely possess functionality; they are not form transformed by great elements existing separately outside the mind. This word "functionality" refers to the function that gives rise to the five consciousnesses. By observing the function one knows the entity, just as by observing the function of producing a sprout, one inferentially knows that its entity exists. The Ālambanaparīkṣā also states: "The functionality of form upon consciousness is logically termed the five sense faculties." Because by means of function one inferentially knows that the essential nature exists, on this basis it is said that the sense faculties are merely seeds. The Viṃśikā says: "Consciousness arises from its own seed, and evolves resembling the marks of an object-domain." This is because the Ālambanaparīkṣā does not say "manifest form", but says "functionality". However, regarding this meaning now, the various assertions differ. The Mahāsāṃghikas and others say that the five kinds of material faculties have the flesh-mass as their entity; the eye does not see form, up to the body does not feel touch, because the sūtras say that the sense faculties are defined as the respective hardness, etc., transformed by the four great elements, and hence they are the flesh-mass; the flesh-mass is impure, and therefore does not see form, but being slightly superior to other forms, it is called pure. The Sarvāstivādin masters maintain that there are separate four great elements, and the five causes, such as production, serve as their primary cause (hetupratyaya) to transform the faculties, object-domains, and so forth; the great elements are solely the tangible of the body, and although the sense faculties are aggregations, being dharmas apart from the mind, they still truly possess real entity. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra master, named Harivarman, originally went forth into the religious life within the Sāṃkhya tradition; based on this, he established their tenet, saying: from the four object-domains of form, sound, smell, and taste, the four great elements are transformed, which are impermanent dharmas; here, the four great elements collectively come to form the faculties, serving as the entity of the five faculties. According to the Sautrāntikas, although the entities of both the five material faculties and their domains are nominal, they are composed of real subtle atoms. The Prajñaptivāda encompasses both the nominal and the real, because they are subsumed separately under the gates of aggregates (skandha) and bases (āyatana). The Ekavyāvahārika school says that there is only the name, without any substantial entity whatsoever. The Lokāyata non-Buddhists posit that they are simply the four great elements. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the four great elements are all subsumed under the category of substance (dravya); hardness, moisture, warmth, and motion are subsumed under the category of quality (guṇa). The eye perceives only three, excluding only the air element; the body faculty perceives four, and also perceives hardness, and so on. However, their school says: the eye faculty is fire; the ear faculty is space; the nose faculty is earth; the tongue faculty is water; the skin faculty is air. The Sāṃkhya masters say that primordial nature produces the great (mahat), the great produces egoity (ahaṃkāra), and egoity produces the five subtle elements (tanmātra)—namely form, sound, smell, taste, and touch; these five are objects experienced by the self, and when objects are experienced, there must be functions. The faculties refer to the eleven faculties; they cannot arise of themselves, but must rely on the five great elements. Because they rely on the five great elements, from the five subtle elements the five great elements are again produced; only after the five great elements are produced are the eleven faculties completed, since they are instruments capable of experiencing. Some say form transforms fire, and fire forms the eye; sound transforms space, and space forms the ear; the ear is unobjectionable (unobstructed), and sound is also unobstructed; smell transforms earth, and earth forms the nose; taste transforms water, and water forms the tongue; touch transforms air, and air forms the skin. Regarding the mental faculty (manas), there are two theories: one says it is the flesh-mass; one says it is non-material. For the one that is non-material, transformation is not spoken of; for the one that is material, transformation is spoken of, or it is said to be transformed only by earth, or that the five great elements can all transform the other faculties, and there is also the theory that the five great elements can universally transform it. However, now within the Mahāyāna, one explanation is: internal seeds of its own serve as its primary cause, and the manifest four great elements of the nimittabhāga transformed within the mind serve as the conditioning cause (adhipatipratyaya) to transform the form of faculties and domains; therefore this treatise says: they are not transformed by real great elements outside the mind. The second explanation says: the sense faculties are just seeds, because they are called functionality, and because they are called seeds, citing the scriptures as before. Among them there are three theories, which should be known below. Since their entity is not material form, they are not transformed by the four great elements of the external bases. The third explanation says: strictly speaking, the five faculties both encompass the manifest and seeds; however, the treatises mostly designate manifest form as the faculty. Here, the meaning of transformation is analyzed through various gates, as in the Commentary on the Abhidharma-samuccaya.

2.51

Treatise: External resistant matter [...] are transformations of the internal consciousness.

2.52

The Commentary states: Now, for the Sarvāstivādins, the five sensory domains all possess real entity apart from consciousness; although they are conditions aggregated together, their entities are still truly existent. The Sautrāntika masters say that they are composed of real subtle atoms, but the entities of the five domains are nominal. The Prajñaptivāda posits: if within the gate of bases (āyatana), on account of being aggregations of conditions, they are said to be nominal; if within the gate of aggregates (skandha), the entities of the five sensory domains are real; therefore, the entities of the five domains universally encompass both the nominal and the real. According to the master of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, their entities are real, and they are also transforming agents. The Ekavyāvahārika school says that there are only nominal designations, without real entities of the domains. The Sāṃkhya masters say that the entities of the five sensory domains are permanent, yet of an obstructive nature, and are subsumed under transforming causes. The Vaiśeṣika masters say that sound and smell are strictly impermanent; form, taste, and touch encompass both the permanent and the impermanent; all five are unobstructed. The Lokāyata non-Buddhists posit that they are simply the four great elements. Within the Mahāyāna, some take the nimittabhāga of past five consciousnesses to be the five domains; some take the present great elements and what is transformed by them to be the five domains, though there are nominal and real. For example, among the twenty-five kinds of form, four primary colors are real, while the remaining forms are all nominal; echoing sound is nominal, while other sounds are real; among tangibles, what is transformed is nominal, while the four great elements are real; no statement is seen that smell and taste encompass the nominal. External resistant matter has already been refuted previously; therefore these various faculties are merely transformations of internal consciousness. The Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Internal form appears as if external, serving as the ālambanapratyaya for consciousness, because it is accepted that its mark exists in consciousness and is capable of producing consciousness."

2.53

Treatise: Those that give rise to the visual and other consciousnesses [...] give rise to the visual and other consciousnesses.

2.54

The Commentary states: However, although they are transformations of consciousness, their functions are distinct. Those that give rise to the visual and other consciousnesses are called the eye and other faculties; because these serve as the support, the visual and other consciousnesses are produced. One must not say that whatever is transformed by consciousness and is merely form has no distinction whatsoever; this, then, concludes the sense faculties and explains the definition of the faculties. Now, if one explains this text according to the ordinary masters' view, they take manifest pure form as the five faculties; in various places it is merely said that the pure form transformed by the four great elements is called a faculty. If according to the Ālambanaparīkṣā, Dignāga takes the seeds of the five consciousnesses to be the five faculties, or takes the seeds of the five domains to be the faculties. In the fourth fascicle, in Dharmapāla's defense of the meaning, the karmic seeds of the five consciousnesses are called the five faculties. The first fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya states: "The eye-element refers to what has previously seen form and its seed." Furthermore, the Viniscayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, etc., all take both manifest and seed dharmas to be the eye and other faculties. However, those who solely advocate seeds explain the Abhidharma-samuccaya, etc., by saying that when originally perfumed, the mind transformed resembling form, and it takes its name from the time of perfuming; also, because the seeds of consciousness presently have the function of producing consciousness, they are nominally described as manifest material faculties. If one solely explains manifest activity as the faculty, the explanation of the text on seeds alone is as given in the fourth fascicle below and the Ālambanaparīkṣā. As for explaining the texts that encompass both the manifest and seeds: in reality, only manifest activity is the faculty; because it is said to be pure form transformed by the great elements, in contrast to the resultant consciousness that is produced, manifest activity is nominally called functionality. The meaning that truly only the functionality of manifest form produces consciousness is established in common by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; it is brought forward to show whether the entity is real or non-existent, and because both sides dispute it, it is not spoken of, for the holy teaching says that the faculties refer to pure form; in reality, seeds are not the nature of the five faculties. The school that uses both will be explained extensively below in the fourth fascicle; it cannot be stated in advance. The view of seeds alone is the doctrine of Dignāga and others, because the Viṃśikā says that the five material faculties are all seeds, as cited in the fourth fascicle. The view of manifest activity alone has no separate master who propounds it; here it is merely stated according to the evident marks and meanings of texts throughout various teachings; that is, Dharmapāla and others universally use both the manifest and seeds as the faculties. Since the faculties are like this, the domains are also like that. Here, in support of Dignāga, it is therefore said that karmic seeds are also the entity of the faculties; one may look into the fourth fascicle below, as well as the Ālambanaparīkṣā, the Viṃśikā, the first fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and so forth... they cannot be cited in full.

2.55

The second section above, separately refuting the sense faculties, is concluded; below is the third, refuting the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya).

2.56

Treatise: Do these visual and other consciousnesses [...] serve as the object-condition?

2.57

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation of the object-condition. The main text has three parts: first, marking the transformation of consciousness to determine the definition of the object-condition; next, directly refuting attachments; and finally, returning to the correct doctrine. This [passage] marks the transformation of consciousness.

2.58

The object perceived by internal consciousness, which is not apart from the mind, we also admit to exist; however, an object-condition outside the mind definitely does not exist. Outsiders cling to the aggregates of other persons' minds, and all external objects capable of producing the mind, as being the entity of the object-condition; therefore it is now negated, which is a general negation of the eighteen schools. However, the Mahāsāṃghika, Ekavyāvahārika, Lokottaravāda, and Gokulika schools also perceive their own minds and also perceive dharmas outside the mind; now, only one portion is negated, so there is no fault. Thus the Samayabhedoparacanacakra says: the citta and caitasika dharmas of all stream-enterers (srotāpanna) are able to cognize their own nature. This will be known in the second fascicle.

2.59

Treatise: All that are able to induce and produce [...] this object-condition?

2.60

The Commentary states: The above general text means: regarding form, mind, etc., that are able to induce and produce a consciousness that takes as its object a resemblance to its own form or mind, do you cling to that as being the object-condition of this [consciousness]? This is a general restatement of the commonly accepted definition of the object-condition. Below, it intends to refute it specifically. This is stated in contrast to all schools except the Saṃmatīya: whenever consciousness takes a dharma as an object, the dharma must have an entity and be able to produce consciousness, which is the meaning of "condition" (pratyaya); a non-existent dharma is not a condition; and upon consciousness there must be a mark resembling the object-domain, which is the meaning of "object" (ālambana). If being an object were without this mark, then the eye faculty, etc., should be the object of the visual consciousness. If that were so, then what is illuminated by a mirror would also possess both meanings, and a face, etc., with respect to the mirror, should be an object-condition; this is also not so, because this mirror is not capable of mental reflection and reliance; this will be explained extensively under the four conditions in the seventh fascicle below. However, this is accepted in common by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, not only by our own school. That mark resembling the object-domain is simply the cognitive form (ākāra); the distinction between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna is as in the end of the second fascicle and the Ālambanaparīkṣā, which cannot be cited in full. For instance, when form serves as a condition to give rise to visual consciousness, when the visual consciousness takes form as an object, there is a mark resembling form, which is the cognitive form, called resembling its own consciousness.

2.61

Treatise: Because it is not merely being able to produce [...] an object-condition.

2.62

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation proper of these attachments, within which there are four [sections]: first, refuting the Saṃmatīya; second, refuting the Sautrāntika; third, refuting the ancient Sarvāstivāda; fourth, refuting the neo-Sarvāstivāda. Here it is only the Saṃmatīya school that is refuted. The Saṃmatīya does not establish a resembling aspect (nimitta) in consciousness; directly apprehending the front object is called being a condition (pratyaya). For the Vaiśeṣika, the eye emits light reaching the object to cognize it, whereas the other [sense] objects reach the sense organ before being cognized. Since below there is a separate refutation of the Sarvāstivāda, this first part refutes the Saṃmatīya. The Saṃmatīya does not accept that possessing both meanings is called being a condition, [holding that] merely being able to produce consciousness is indeed the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya)—why need it resemble oneself? Now, challenging them, we say: If being able to produce consciousness makes it an ālambana-pratyaya, then causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya) and so forth ought to be ālambana-pratyayas. 'And so forth' includes equal-and-immediate conditions (samanantara-pratyaya), dominant conditions (adhipati-pratyaya), and so forth. Setting up a formal syllogism against them: When your visual consciousness presently cognizes visible matter, the causes, conditions, and so forth possessed by visual consciousness ought to be ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness (thesis); because they merely can produce visual consciousness (reason); like present visible matter and so forth (example). Or, conversely excluding visible matter and so forth from being ālambana-pratyayas: like the visual organ and so forth, because they merely can produce [consciousness] without [consciousness bearing] a resembling aspect. For Sautrāntika masters and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means seeds and so forth; for Sarvāstivādins and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu) and so forth; neither of these are ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness, hence they are now excluded. Furthermore, [the statement that] 'being able to produce consciousness is being an ālambana-pratyaya' incurs the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Taking the single category of visible matter as a proposition: Is this category of visible matter of yours like sound and so forth, being able to produce the five consciousnesses and therefore included among the ālambana-pratyayas of any one of the five consciousnesses; or is it like the eye and other dominant conditions, homogeneous causes, and so forth, which can produce the five consciousnesses, and therefore is not an ālambana-pratyaya? Since factors like causes and conditions are not ālambana-pratyayas, one should know that external visible matter and so forth outside mind are likewise so; this refutes the direct object-condition (sākṣād-ālambana-pratyaya). However, Hīnayāna and others collectively posit that phenomena such as another's mind are the direct object-conditions of one's own consciousness, which is grasping phenomena outside the mind; hence it is now refuted. These meanings of direct and indirect object-conditions, distinguishing the cognitive aspect and matter, are as explained in the seventh fascicle. If one does not exclude external phenomena as indirect object-conditions (dūra-ālambana-pratyaya), it is the eighth [consciousness] serving as the substrate, which the other consciousnesses rely on to transform. The Ālambanaparīkṣā states: Past visible matter and consciousness are the ālambana-pratyayas of the present five consciousnesses. The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā and so forth are all as found below in the fourth fascicle, and cannot be separately recounted here.

2.63

The above concludes the first part, refuting the Saṃmatīya; from here down is the second part, refuting the Sautrāntika masters.

2.64

[Treatise:] The five consciousnesses, such as the visual, [do not take the combined form as their object-condition, because the combined form lacks real entity; nor do they take the individual atoms as their object-condition,] because [consciousness lacks] the aspect of resembling them.

2.65

The Commentary states: This cites the Sautrāntika masters' assertion; from here on, it is entirely the same as the Ālambanaparīkṣā. They say that atoms really exist, but are not the objects of the five consciousnesses, because there is no aspect of atoms upon the five consciousnesses; when numerous atoms subsumed under those respective locations combine together, they collectively form one thing termed 'the combination' (saṃghāta), like an aṇurajas and so on, which only then becomes the object of the five consciousnesses. The combination is nominal (prajñapti), established on the basis of real atoms; namely, because there is a combined aspect upon the five consciousnesses, they are said to resemble that aspect.

2.66

[Treatise:] The combined aspect [does not exist as a real entity distinct from the atoms, because when that combination is analyzed, the consciousness cognizing the nominal combined aspect] definitely does not arise.

2.67

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation proper. The syllogism is: That combined aspect does not exist as a real entity distinct from the atoms (thesis); because it is nothing other than the atoms (reason); like an atom (example). This incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). The Sautrāntika does not say that the combination has real entity, so it is now cited and determined. Stating that the combined aspect is not real serves to demonstrate that it is not the condition (pratyaya) of the five consciousnesses. It is not that your—the Sautrāntika master's—combined aspect has a real individual entity distinct from the original, real atoms, because when that combination is analyzed, the consciousness that cognizes the nominal combined aspect definitely does not arise.

2.68

[Treatise:] That combined aspect [is not the condition of the five consciousnesses, because it lacks real entity,] like a second moon.

2.69

The Commentary states: Since the combination is nominally posited, it is accepted to be the object (ālambana) because there is an aspect upon consciousness, but not accepted to be a condition (pratyaya), because being nominal, it lacks real entity.

2.70

[Treatise:] Lest a second moon and so forth could produce the five consciousnesses.

2.71

The Commentary states: Raising the [second] moon as an objection, one should set up the syllogism: Your combined visible matter, even granted to be the object of visual consciousness, is not its condition (thesis); because it completely lacks a real entity (reason); like a second moon (example). The second moon, in their doctrine, is also nominal, does not produce the five consciousnesses, and is cognized solely by mental consciousness. The Ālambanaparīkṣā verse says: 'The combination, with respect to the five consciousnesses, / Granted it is an object, is not a condition; / Because its entity is truly non-existent, / Just like a second moon.' For the Sautrāntika, a second moon is also not an object of the five [consciousnesses]; using it now as an example is intended to take a partial aspect.

2.72

That is, 'the combination with respect to the five consciousnesses' is the subject (dharmin), and 'is not a condition' is the predicate (dharma); 'because its entity is truly non-existent'; 'just like a second moon' is merely by conceptually conceding that the combination is granted to be an object. In the text it says: Even if it is not the case that a second moon is also accepted as an object [of the five], here it merely excludes its having the meaning of a condition, without saying that it is an object of the five. Furthermore, concerning the second moon, there are briefly two explanations according to Master Gopa: One explanation says it is apprehended solely by mental consciousness; its being used here as an example for the five consciousnesses has no fault because of the meaning of not being a condition and so forth, and since the five consciousnesses are subsumed under the subject, the homogeneous example lacks it, so there is no fault of lacking the probandum. Also, by conceptually reducing the text, one must remove the word 'five' from the subject, stating directly: 'The combination, with respect to consciousness, granted it is an object, is not a condition' as the thesis, since it is an object of the mental [consciousness]. Or, removing the words 'granted it is an object', merely stating: 'The combination, with respect to consciousness, is not a condition' as the thesis is also acceptable. The second explanation says: The aspects of a second moon, sky-flowers, and so forth are indeed objects of visual consciousness and so forth; grasping them as real and so forth only then belongs to mental consciousness. If one relies on this meaning, visible forms like sky-flowers would lack an underlying substance (maula-dravya) and would not be the nature of phenomena (dharmatā) either; hence the former explanation is superior, and Dharmapāla agrees with the former. Furthermore, 'object' means the objective sphere, established whether existent or non-existent; since that text is correct, it does not need deletion or addition. The Sautrāntika master also does not say that the five consciousnesses cognize a second moon; hence in the text of the treatise, the thesis, reason, and example should be understood according to the syllogism. Now, not accepting that it is truly an object, it says 'granted'. If the five consciousnesses cognize nominal phenomena like length, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness; now it is explained by saying that we only take the five consciousnesses as strictly cognizing real [phenomena], so there is no contradiction. However, roughness and so forth among the tangible sphere are precisely the differentiated states of the four great elements and are called nominal, apprehended by the body faculty; they are not like the aggregation of nominals subsumed under length and so forth, and are not apprehended by visual consciousness and so forth. They are spoken of as the visible sphere because clear grasping takes the eye as its gateway. If it is said that the five consciousnesses also cognize nominals, this is within consciousness, unlike other schools; just as cognizing the life-faculty and so forth is also an ālambana-pratyaya, separately transforming into an aspect because it is subsumed under the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). Or it cognizes both real and [nominal]; your combination has no phenomenon outside consciousness, and cannot be used as a parallel, as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā.

2.73

[Treatise:] It is not that the individual atoms, [when in an uncombined state, each serve as the object-condition,]

2.74

The Commentary states: This is the third part, citing the doctrine of the original Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣika masters. As with the Sautrāntika masters, that which is formed by the combination of atoms is nominal, and cannot serve as a condition to produce the five consciousnesses. Now [for the Vaibhāṣika], when combined, each atom has a coarse combined aspect and each can serve as a condition to produce the five consciousnesses, because having a real entity, it can serve as a condition. However, the five consciousnesses do not apprehend the distinct aspects of atoms, hence they are rejected.

2.75

[Treatise:] because upon this consciousness there is no aspect of atoms.

2.76

The Commentary states: Here the syllogism is: The atoms of visible matter and so forth, even granted to be conditions of the five consciousnesses, are not objects (thesis); because upon the five consciousnesses there is no aspect of those atoms (reason); like the visual organ and so forth (example). The visual organ and so forth serve as conditions producing the five consciousnesses, yet the five consciousnesses do not cognize them, hence they are used as an example.

2.77

The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā also makes this statement, because atoms individually cannot be apprehended. The Ālambanaparīkṣā verse says: 'Atoms, with respect to the five consciousnesses, / Granted they are conditions, are not objects; / Because consciousness lacks their aspect, / Just like the visual organ and so forth.'

2.78

[Treatise:] It is not that the atoms [possess this aspect when combined, because even when combined, they lack this aspect.]

2.79

The Commentary states: Even if they defend by saying that upon the individual atoms there is a combined aspect that serves as the object of the five consciousnesses—the combined aspect being a resembling single aspect, this aspect being an activity greater than the original atoms, and activity not being separate from the entity, and since the entity really exists, it constitutes an ālambana-pratyaya; or there is no objection to this being their original doctrine—we now also reject it. The syllogism is: When atoms are combined, they should have no distinct combined aspect (thesis); because their entity is identical to the original atoms (reason); like when they are not combined (example). The meaning here is: It is not that upon the atoms there is a distinct combined aspect, because when uncombined this aspect does not exist; hence this too is not an object.

2.80

[Treatise:] It is not that in the combined state [and uncombined state, these atoms differ in entity or aspect,]

2.81

The Commentary states: This reinforces the refutation: It is not that between the combined state and the uncombined state these atoms differ in either entity or aspect, such that in the combined state they could serve as objects.

2.82

[Treatise:] therefore, in the combined state [they are like the uncombined state, definitely not the sphere of the five consciousnesses.]

2.83

The Commentary states: By such reasoning, atoms in the combined state are also not the sphere of the five consciousnesses. The syllogism is: Your atoms when uncombined should be objects of the five consciousnesses (thesis); because their entity is identical to the combined atoms (reason); like the combined atoms (example). Also, by reverse parallel: The combined aspect is not an object of the five consciousnesses (thesis); because its entity is identical to the atoms when uncombined (reason); like the atoms when uncombined (example). There are two meanings in this treatise passage, which may be known by reflection and inference. If they defend by saying: When uncombined there is also a combined aspect, but because it is subtle and concealed, the aspect is difficult to discern; one should again refute them: The atoms when uncombined should produce the cognition of combination, because their entity is identical to the combined atoms, like when combined; conversely challenging the combined to be like the uncombined, the inference is also the same. 'Definitely not the sphere of the five consciousnesses' summarizes and concludes it.

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成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese