成唯識論述記 2.60

2.60

The Commentary states: The above general text means: regarding form, mind, etc., that are able to induce and produce a consciousness that takes as its object a resemblance to its own form or mind, do you cling to that as being the object-condition of this [consciousness]? This is a general restatement of the commonly accepted definition of the object-condition. Below, it intends to refute it specifically. This is stated in contrast to all schools except the Saṃmatīya: whenever consciousness takes a dharma as an object, the dharma must have an entity and be able to produce consciousness, which is the meaning of "condition" (pratyaya); a non-existent dharma is not a condition; and upon consciousness there must be a mark resembling the object-domain, which is the meaning of "object" (ālambana). If being an object were without this mark, then the eye faculty, etc., should be the object of the visual consciousness. If that were so, then what is illuminated by a mirror would also possess both meanings, and a face, etc., with respect to the mirror, should be an object-condition; this is also not so, because this mirror is not capable of mental reflection and reliance; this will be explained extensively under the four conditions in the seventh fascicle below. However, this is accepted in common by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, not only by our own school. That mark resembling the object-domain is simply the cognitive form (ākāra); the distinction between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna is as in the end of the second fascicle and the Ālambanaparīkṣā, which cannot be cited in full. For instance, when form serves as a condition to give rise to visual consciousness, when the visual consciousness takes form as an object, there is a mark resembling form, which is the cognitive form, called resembling its own consciousness.