成唯識論述記 2.62

2.62

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation proper of these attachments, within which there are four [sections]: first, refuting the Saṃmatīya; second, refuting the Sautrāntika; third, refuting the ancient Sarvāstivāda; fourth, refuting the neo-Sarvāstivāda. Here it is only the Saṃmatīya school that is refuted. The Saṃmatīya does not establish a resembling aspect (nimitta) in consciousness; directly apprehending the front object is called being a condition (pratyaya). For the Vaiśeṣika, the eye emits light reaching the object to cognize it, whereas the other [sense] objects reach the sense organ before being cognized. Since below there is a separate refutation of the Sarvāstivāda, this first part refutes the Saṃmatīya. The Saṃmatīya does not accept that possessing both meanings is called being a condition, [holding that] merely being able to produce consciousness is indeed the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya)—why need it resemble oneself? Now, challenging them, we say: If being able to produce consciousness makes it an ālambana-pratyaya, then causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya) and so forth ought to be ālambana-pratyayas. 'And so forth' includes equal-and-immediate conditions (samanantara-pratyaya), dominant conditions (adhipati-pratyaya), and so forth. Setting up a formal syllogism against them: When your visual consciousness presently cognizes visible matter, the causes, conditions, and so forth possessed by visual consciousness ought to be ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness (thesis); because they merely can produce visual consciousness (reason); like present visible matter and so forth (example). Or, conversely excluding visible matter and so forth from being ālambana-pratyayas: like the visual organ and so forth, because they merely can produce [consciousness] without [consciousness bearing] a resembling aspect. For Sautrāntika masters and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means seeds and so forth; for Sarvāstivādins and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu) and so forth; neither of these are ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness, hence they are now excluded. Furthermore, [the statement that] 'being able to produce consciousness is being an ālambana-pratyaya' incurs the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Taking the single category of visible matter as a proposition: Is this category of visible matter of yours like sound and so forth, being able to produce the five consciousnesses and therefore included among the ālambana-pratyayas of any one of the five consciousnesses; or is it like the eye and other dominant conditions, homogeneous causes, and so forth, which can produce the five consciousnesses, and therefore is not an ālambana-pratyaya? Since factors like causes and conditions are not ālambana-pratyayas, one should know that external visible matter and so forth outside mind are likewise so; this refutes the direct object-condition (sākṣād-ālambana-pratyaya). However, Hīnayāna and others collectively posit that phenomena such as another's mind are the direct object-conditions of one's own consciousness, which is grasping phenomena outside the mind; hence it is now refuted. These meanings of direct and indirect object-conditions, distinguishing the cognitive aspect and matter, are as explained in the seventh fascicle. If one does not exclude external phenomena as indirect object-conditions (dūra-ālambana-pratyaya), it is the eighth [consciousness] serving as the substrate, which the other consciousnesses rely on to transform. The Ālambanaparīkṣā states: Past visible matter and consciousness are the ālambana-pratyayas of the present five consciousnesses. The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā and so forth are all as found below in the fourth fascicle, and cannot be separately recounted here.