成唯識論述記 3.234

3.234

The Commentary states: Below, in distinguishing the mode of activity (ākāra), this is the third major text section, a general summary. 'Therefore, the mode of activity of consciousness is discerning'—this concludes the word 'discerning' (liao) in the verse; the intrinsic entity of this discerning is precisely the darśanabhāga of the eighth consciousness, returning to what was originally explained. However, Śīlabhadra posits only one bhāga, Nanda posits two bhāgas, Dignāga posits three bhāgas, and Dharmapāla posits four bhāgas. Now, in this treatise text, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, relying on the four teachings and reasons, explains four distinctions; they are all the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), not what teachers like Śīlabhadra understood or saw. When these four bhāgas are regarded mutually as objective referents (ālambana), as each being self-witnessing and the mode of activity, what is an objective referent is easily known; explaining in sequence according to difficulty: the fourth is named the mode of activity, the third is named the objective referent and is also named the intrinsic entity, because it can cognize its own intrinsic entity. One cannot take the darśanabhāga as its intrinsic entity, because it does not cognize the fourth; just as when the third serves as the mode of activity, the second is named the objective referent and the fourth is named the intrinsic entity, which can cognize the third, because it takes an active cognizing phenomenon as its intrinsic entity. Furthermore, when the third bhāga acts as the mode of activity cognizing the fourth, the fourth is the objective referent, and the objective referent is precisely the intrinsic entity; just as when the fourth cognizes the third, the reciprocal reasoning is equal. The third is the intrinsic entity, the darśanabhāga is the mode of activity, and the nimittabhāga is the objective referent, as has already been distinguished above. Moreover, an objection says: the second is valid cognition (pramāṇa) or invalid cognition (apramāṇa), while the other two bhāgas are strictly direct perception (pratyakṣa); the second is defiled or undefiled, while the other two bhāgas are definitely undefiled. Furthermore, since valid and invalid cognition differ, suffering, pleasure, and equanimity should also differ. Furthermore, the darśanabhāga has understanding and lack of understanding, while the other two definitely both possess understanding; all other phenomena can be known by applying this objection. Furthermore, if the mind were to cognize itself, then there would be the fault of absence of distinction in cause and effect, what acts and what is acted upon, what accomplishes and what is accomplished, what leads and what is led, what generates and what is generated, what belongs and what is belonged to, what binds and what is bound, what characterizes and what is characterized, and what realizes and what is realized; nor should one say that consciousness is produced by two conditions, or that consciousness is produced by the conjunction of the three, because consciousness would also produce consciousness; nor should one posit that there is a mind of wrong views, because a mind of wrong views would know itself to be wrong; nor should one say that the whole entity of an unwholesome mind is entirely unwholesome, because the mind that knows itself is unwholesome, and this would be correct knowledge and not wrong or unwholesome. The four applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) should also have no distinction, because mindfulness of the body and so on would just be mindfulness of phenomena and so on. Furthermore, the knowledge of the four truths should have no distinction, because knowledge of suffering and so on would just constitute knowledge of the path and so on. Furthermore, knowledge of past abodes would also not be established, because it would know the present; knowledge of other minds would also be likewise, because it would know itself. Furthermore, if knowing another is like knowing oneself, knowing another should be erroneous, taking the other as oneself; knowing oneself like another—the counter-objection is also like this. Furthermore, because the functions are two, the entity should not be one, just like a lamp illuminating itself: this metaphor fails to serve as a metaphor, because [the lamp] lacks an active cognizer and so on, while the mind has an active cognizer and so on; thus, there is the fault of the reason being contradictory to the intrinsic character of the subject, and the metaphor failing to establish what is to be proved. Furthermore, if a lamp's nature is to illuminate, why would it still need to be illuminated? If it is not luminous, it should not be an active illuminator, and its entity should be darkness. Various objections such as these should be further reflected upon and resolved in order. However, the third fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi[-sūtra-śāstra] has a resolution to the objection of the lamp illuminating [itself], but no resolution to the remaining objections. However, cognizing other realms, the unconditioned, the undefiled, and so on are stated based on the darśanabhāga, not the self-witnessing bhāga. Furthermore, holding stubbornly is called invalid cognition, and neither inferring nor directly witnessing is called invalid cognition; although self-witnessing is a wrong view with respect to an object, because it directly witnesses its own intrinsic entity, it does not produce understandings such as wrong or right; therefore, none of the preceding objections are logically established. It is just like the defilements of greed, anger, and so forth in the five consciousnesses: although defiled, they are still direct perception; because they are induced by another, they become defiled, but because they directly obtain [their object], they are subsumed under direct perception. The distinctions among the four bhāgas across the gates of the eight consciousnesses, the three wisdoms, the three valid cognitions, cause and effect, and so forth, are all as in the separate chapter. The above has broadly explained the mode of activity; below, the objective referent (ālambana) is broadly explained, in which there are three parts: first, the external objective domain; next, the internal objective domain; and finally, the analytical determination. In the first, there are two parts: first, a general explanation, and then the assertions of various masters.