成唯識論述記 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.2

Treatise: However, the definition of a seed briefly comprises six aspects.

The Commentary states: Among the ten topics expanding on seeds, below is the eighth: how many definitions they possess. A seed has six characteristics, excluding what are not seeds. In this there are three parts: first, a general listing of the six characteristics; next, an individual explanation of each of the six; and finally, a general conclusion excluding what are not real seeds; this is the first. The fifth fascicle of the Yogācāra speaks of seven [characteristics of] seeds; here it speaks of six, hence it says 'briefly.' Dharmas are grouped into five categories: the first excludes unconditioned dharmas; the third excludes mind, mental factors, and the like, thereby completing the exclusions. But to exclude within their own category, other divisions are further established. The second excludes identity within its own category, which is not narrated further. Matter is not excluded, because external seeds among material dharmas also possess these six characteristics, and are metaphorically designated as seeds. If so, how can they exist simultaneously with the result? And how can they be said to continuously follow without interruption? Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not make this distinction, stating only that internal seeds possess them; Vasubandhu applies them to both. However, each of them explains on his own, saying internal dharmas are like this, external dharmas are like that; when it comes to existing simultaneously with the result, they speak only of internal seeds and do not discuss external ones. Collate each of them to clarify this in order. Here, we explain that external seeds also exist simultaneously with the result: just as a lotus root gives rise to a lotus, it is not that the result arises only when the cause has perished; root and stalk are simultaneous, as is well known in the world. This explanation is somewhat better and can be scrutinized in detail.

3.4

Treatise: First, ceasing in a kṣaṇa... can it constitute a seed.

3.5

The Commentary states: This reveals the meaning of seed: conditioned dharmas, because they have arising and ceasing, are able to take and give results in the state of transformation; only when they have this superior capacity do they constitute seeds.

3.6

Treatise: This excludes permanent dharmas... because they lack the function of being able to produce.

3.7

The Commentary states: This is the concise exclusion. Unconditioned dharmas are not like this: lacking transformation, they lack the function of taking and giving, and cannot produce; this also reveals that the twelve links of dependent origination held by the four schools including the Mahāsāṃghika and the Mahīśāsaka are not [unconditioned]. Because unconditioned dharmas lack taking, giving, and transformation, this also excludes the long-duration four characteristics of the Saṃmatīya, which do not cease in a kṣaṇa. If one claims that there is superior capacity at a later time and none in the initial state, then it should also exist initially, since their substance is one, just as at the later time; or it should be absent later, since their substance is one, just as in the prior state. Therefore, that whose substance immediately perishes without interval upon arising is called a seed; it possesses superior capacity as soon as it arises, without needing a later time. Furthermore, this excludes permanent dharmas such as the prakṛti and puruṣa of non-Buddhists from being causes, because they lack transformation. Yogācāra fascicle 5 states: 'Only impermanent dharmas are causes,' not permanent dharmas. When earlier teachers say that tathatā is the seed of all dharmas, they are wrong. If that were so, a prior seed could serve as the seed for an active manifestation of a subsequent thought-moment, or, even within the same thought-moment, could serve as a seed with respect to another person's body.

3.8

Treatise: Second, existing simultaneously with the result... can it constitute a seed.

3.9

The Commentary states: That is, this seed must exist simultaneously with the active manifestation that is the produced result. 'Manifest' (xian) has three meanings: manifest (xiānxian), present (xiànzài), and currently existent (xiànyǒu). By this, the seventh consciousness of an icchantika (person lacking the seed of liberation) is not called a seed, because its result is not manifest; that is, the word 'manifest' excludes that seventh consciousness; 'present' excludes prior and subsequent; 'currently existent' excludes nominal dharmas, since only that whose substance is real forms a seed. 'Manifest' pertains only to the result; 'currently existent' pertains only to the cause; 'present' applies to both cause and result; 'conjoined' excludes what are separated, thereby excluding a prior dharma from being the seed for a subsequent dharma. Some say that when a seed produces an active manifestation, it must involve prior and subsequent thought-moments and not this single kṣaṇa; how is this interpreted? That master means that, as in the Sthaviranikāya, thought has two times: the cause is at arising, and the result is at ceasing; thus, being together in the present, they do not contradict each other. This is Jayasena's provisional adoption of the Sthavira view, not his actual doctrine, which will be expounded in detail in the third fascicle. If so, seed with respect to seed should also be like this; why make this distinction? The Yogācāra states: 'A dharma is a cause for its own nature, but not in this very kṣaṇa'; this must be at a different time, not existing simultaneously with the result. If cause is at ceasing while result is at arising, and they are still called simultaneous, there would be the fault of two destinies arising alongside each other. From this we know: when a seed produces an active manifestation, they must be in the same period of time; when a seed produces a seed, they need not be in the same period of time. Although they must be in the same period of time, they constitute a seed only when in a state of conjunction with the active manifestation; this excludes being a cause for the active manifestation of another person's body, because they are not conjoined.

3.10

Treatise: This excludes prior and subsequent [moments] and what are definitely separated.

3.11

The Commentary states: This excludes the Sautrāntika and others' view that cause and result occur at different times; the Sthaviranikāya and others are also like this. A seed with respect to an active manifestation is definitely in one body and not separated, and therefore can be a cause. The non-Buddhist claim that Maheśvara creates all sentient beings and is the cause and condition of sentient beings is entirely invalid. Question: Why is it that seed with respect to seed is said to arise as cause and result at different times, whereas with respect to an active manifestation, they are permitted to arise simultaneously as cause and result?

3.12

Treatise: Active manifestations and seeds are of different classes... they have the function of being able to produce.

3.13

The Commentary states: Active manifestations and seeds are of different classes from each other, so they do not contradict each other; within one body at the same time, in the present, they have the function of being able to produce. For instance, material active manifestations have resistance, whereas seeds have no resistance; mental cognition and consideration should be understood by analogy to this. Because the substance and natures of cause and result are not similar, they are called 'different classes'; because they do not contradict each other, they can exist simultaneously.

3.14

Treatise: It is not as with seeds... they definitely do not exist simultaneously.

3.15

The Commentary states: A seed with respect to a seed is called 'same class' because their substances and natures are similar; because they conflict, they cannot be conjoined simultaneously in one body. Thus fascicle 5 of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'It is a cause for a different nature,' meaning seed with respect to active manifestation; and 'It is also a cause for its own nature in a subsequent moment, not in this very kṣaṇa,' meaning seeds producing each other consecutively. When seeds produce each other, why is simultaneity not allowed? The objection says: 'The darśanabhāga takes the darśana[bhāga] as object, and its own essence is cognized simultaneously; when a seed produces a seed, its own essence is simultaneous.' An explanation says: When seed is cause and result with respect to seed, if simultaneity were allowed, it would not be a direct cause (hetupratyaya). Although the darśanabhāga is cause and result simultaneously with respect to darśana, it is not included in hetupratyaya. If so, seed with respect to active manifestation should also be like this, so one should explain further: if seed with respect to seed were allowed to arise simultaneously, the substances would become infinite, because one's own class would be allowed to arise simultaneously; that is, in a single kṣaṇa many seeds would arise, completely lacking a hetupratyaya, because a subsequent seed is not allowed to produce further results. Active manifestations with respect to seeds are called different classes; although they also perfume seeds, subsequent seeds have not yet produced results, so there is no infinite regress; within a single kṣaṇa, two active manifestations of the same essence do not occur alongside each other, and the produced seed cannot thereby produce further active manifestations; seed with respect to seed should be considered analogous.

3.16

Question: If so, how can originally existent [seeds] in the same thought-moment produce newly perfumed [seeds]? Because their essences conflict, they are not simultaneous. Just as the worldly supreme dharma increases the untainted conditions of originally existent seeds and draws forth subsequent moments, the natural seed of its own class moving spontaneously can also serve as a cause to produce a single newly perfumed seed in the subsequent moment; since the conditioning power of the two seeds, original and new, is equal, they together produce a single active manifestation, so there is no fault of a seed producing a seed in the same thought-moment. This is also difficult to explain: if an originally existent seed produces a further seed, there would be four dharmas in a single thought-moment, namely: (1) originally existent; (2) produced by the originally existent; (3) perfumed by the new active manifestation; and (4) the active manifestation; how could one speak of 'three dharmas mutually interacting'? Now, we explain that it is not so: the originally existent seed and the active manifestation together serve as the hetupratyaya to produce a single newly perfumed seed, so there are only three dharmas. Another explanation: with respect to the newly perfumed seed, the originally existent seed is not its hetupratyaya; because the perfuming active manifestation is the hetupratyaya, this means the originally existent is a hetupratyaya only with respect to the active manifestation, and the active manifestation is a hetupratyaya only with respect to the newly perfumed. Hence, the essence of the prātimokṣa precept does not increase while its function increases, resembling the noble path and concentration precepts; since concentration and path precepts are active volitions, only their function increases from moment to moment, not their substance; the former explanation accords with the meaning that both substance and function increase for the prātimokṣa precept. Although here it is shown to exist simultaneously with the result, this is stated with respect to active manifestations, so that being a cause can be spoken of at the present time. Since seeds with respect to seeds are allowed to be at different times, if they enter the past, what constitutes their meaning as a cause?

3.17

Treatise: Although cause and result... because they lack intrinsic substance.

3.18

The Commentary states: That 'cause and result may be simultaneous' refers to producing active manifestations; 'or not simultaneous' refers to producing their own class. Although they 'may be simultaneous or not simultaneous, they must be in the present to possess causal function,' because they have substance. If they enter the past, they lack causal function, because their substance has already ceased; the future is also like this: the causal function has not yet arisen, because they lack substance. Question: Since being a cause applies both to seeds and to that which possesses seeds, why does it say here 'existing simultaneously with the result'?

3.19

Treatise: It is established as 'existing simultaneously with the result' based on producing active manifestations as results.

3.20

The Commentary states: It is in reliance upon the seeds that produce actualized effects that [a seed] is called 'coexistent [with its effect]', and not in reliance upon those that induce and produce their own kind that they are called seeds. Why is this so? Because they are produced by perfuming, because they are viewed in contrast to a disparate kind, because their effects are manifest and arisen, and because their characteristics are easy to cognize. A seed viewed in relation to another seed is not produced by perfuming, is not of a disparate kind, is not manifest and arisen, and is not easy to cognize; hence it is not discussed here. Therefore, the second [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Those that do not produce actual manifestations are called homogeneous types; when they produce actual manifestations, they are called seeds.' How does Jayasena explain 'not being in the very same moment'? Because he adheres to the view that cause and effect belong to the same period of time. How does he further explain the text 'the non-seed has already arisen'? It is as reconciled in his notes, and as found in the separate notes on the fifty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, as well as being expounded and understood in the fourth [fascicle] below. The actual manifestations capable of perfuming, such as the evolving consciousnesses, should [then] be called seeds.

3.21

[The Treatise states: Third, persisting in continuous transformation... only then does it constitute a seed.]

3.22

The Commentary states: This means it must be for a prolonged duration, its nature belonging to a single continuous category without interruption, until the path of counteraction is attained; this is called 'reaching the ultimate stage', because each reaches its own culmination.

3.23

[The Treatise states: This excludes the evolving consciousnesses... because they are discordant.]

3.24

The Commentary states: This excludes the seven evolving consciousnesses as well as form and other phenomena; they cannot serve as seeds. Here it mentions only citta, but in fact it also excludes form. The Sautrāntika view that the six consciousnesses and so forth can hold seeds is also refuted here, because the three feelings shift and transform, and their grasping of intentional objects is prone to distraction and interruption.

3.25

[The Treatise states: This reveals that seeds mutually produce their own kind.]

3.26

The Commentary states: This reveals the meaning of a preceding seed producing a subsequent one. This is not 'coexistent', because it is subsumed under seeds producing seeds. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not have this. Question: The seventh consciousness is also severed only upon reaching the vajropamasamādhi; why is it not called a seed? Answer: Because in the ten stages and so forth it undergoes transformation, its grasping of intentional objects is prone to distraction and interruption, and it transforms even before counteraction; seeds are not like this. If so, how are they called 'seeds with the characteristic of exhaustion of fruition' and 'seeds without the characteristic of exhaustion of fruition'? Nominal and neutral seeds produce fruits limitlessly and endlessly, so they can persist in continuous transformation; wholesome and unwholesome seeds produce fruits of a limited scope, so how do they persist continuously? The answer is: That is stated on the basis that their production of fruits has a boundary limit, hence they are called 'having the characteristic of exhaustion of fruition'; it does not mean that the substance of the seed is extinguished without remainder before attaining counteraction. Furthermore, karmic perfuming is called 'having the characteristic of exhaustion of fruition', while nominal perfuming is called 'persisting in continuous transformation'. These seeds only persist in continuous transformation as their own kind produces their fruit, which is to say they are called seeds despite not being coexistent with their fruit; this lacks the single meaning of constantly coexisting with the fruit. If one can be called a seed while lacking one meaning, then since the seventh consciousness lacks persisting in continuous transformation, it ought to be called a seed. This should not be so. Now, herein, it is precisely through the two principles of arising-and-perishing and persisting in continuous transformation that the meaning of a seed is revealed, whereas the others merely make specific exclusions and do not primarily reveal it; therefore, the seventh consciousness cannot constitute a seed. Moreover, it is said that a seed possesses all six characteristics; it is not meant that anything possessing the six is identical to a seed. Furthermore, this homogeneous kind is also not a seed [strictly speaking], because it is not coexistent with its fruit. Asvabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that it is not a seed, but is rather called a homogeneous type. This reveals that the homogeneous kind, up to the stage of counteraction, does not acquire the name of seed; at the time of producing a fruit it may be called a seed, but whenever it produces a fruit it must be simultaneous. If one discusses its substance, at the time of being of its own kind it is also called a seed, because it is not an actual manifestation; this merely spontaneously pulls forth and produces a subsequent fruit. If conditions are complete and superior so that the force of the seed intensifies, and a superior function of granting a fruit arises, only then is it called a seed. Asvabhāva reveals the distinction between these two stages: when coexisting with the fruit it is called a seed; otherwise, it is called a homogeneous type. Now, in this text, speaking of its substance on the basis of not being an actual manifestation, it is generically called a seed, which also does not contradict [this]. Moreover, it reveals that a seed is endowed with these six characteristics; it is not saying that in every moment it possesses all six characteristics and is therefore always called a seed. However, a distinction must be made: if it must possess all six characteristics to be called a seed, and failing one it fails to be so, then in sentient beings devoid of the nature [of enlightenment], the seventh consciousness lacks coexistence with an actualized fruit, so it is not a seed. If so, then seeds that persist in continuous transformation when not yet producing fruit would not be called seeds. Thus it should be explained: when the path of counteraction arises, it refers to the stage where actual manifestations and so forth are prevented from arising. For instance, with the asaṃjñi-samāpatti and so forth in the path of seeing, based on their substance being present, they are eradicated only in the path of cultivation; yet based on the fruit not arising, the seeds are severed in the path of seeing, because from that point on there is no meaning of coexistence with a fruit. What is now called 'coexistence with the fruit' means that up until the path of counteraction arises, it possesses the capacity of being coexistent and conjunct with actualized fruition phenomena; this is why it is called a seed, not that it must be conjunct with an actual manifestation at this very moment to be called a seed. If not, then within one realm the seeds of the three realms could not be established, and the meaning of the possession of seeds would fail to be established. Therefore we know that this is not spoken in terms of a single moment, but is spoken in terms of subsequently having the capacity of coexistence with the fruit in order to reveal its intrinsic nature. What Asvabhāva said regarding being called a homogeneous type when not producing fruit is discussed in terms of definitely never producing a future fruit. As in the case of the asaṃjñi-samāpatti in the path of seeing, if anything that persists in continuous transformation were to be called a seed, wholesome seeds and so forth would produce unwholesome fruits.

3.27

[The Treatise states: Fourth, determinate in nature... only then does it constitute a seed.]

3.28

The Commentary states: This means that in accordance with the force of the actualized cause at the time of previous perfuming, wholesome, unwholesome, and other [fruits] are produced, with determinate efficacy and without chaotic arising.

3.29

[The Treatise states: This excludes other schools... having the meaning of a primary cause (hetu-pratyaya).]

3.30

The Commentary states: This excludes the Sarvāstivādin and others, who hold that wholesome dharmas and the like can serve as homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu) for unwholesome, neutral, and other dharmas, thereby possessing the meaning of a primary cause (hetu-pratyaya). Now, a primary cause generates its own substance and accords in nature and mark; since wholesome dharmas and the like do not generate the intrinsic substance of unwholesome dharmas, and furthermore do not accord with them, in what sense could they be a primary cause? Furthermore, the vipāka-hetu encompasses both wholesome and unwholesome natures yet produces neutral effects; the sarvatraga-hetu and others produce effects of a disparate nature; and the sahabhū-hetu taking vipāka, samanantara, puruṣakāra, and other effects as their cause is likewise. If it requires a wholesome seed and so forth to serve as the cause for a wholesome dharma and so forth, then since the seed is ever-present, it should produce its fruit instantaneously.

3.31

[The Treatise states: Fifth, awaiting multiple conditions... only then does it constitute a seed.]

3.32

The Commentary states: This means that its own seed must await the combination of multiple conditions, so that the transformation of the seed gives rise to the function of grasping actualized manifestations and other fruits. Only when its efficacy is distinctive does it constitute a seed; therefore, a seed's own homogeneous kind is not a conjunction of primary causes and conditions and is not called a seed.

3.33

[The Treatise states: This excludes non-Buddhists... perpetually and instantaneously producing fruits.]

3.34

The Commentary states: This refers to non-Buddhists who adhere to a distinct phenomenon called 'spontaneity' (svabhāva) which, without awaiting multiple conditions, perpetually and instantaneously produces fruits; non-Buddhists in this land hold similar doctrines. Adherences to Mahābrahmā, time, space, and so forth are likewise, and are identically dispelled by this. Here, the doctrine of spontaneity is merely raised as an example.

3.35

[The Treatise states: Or it excludes other schools... not producing fruits perpetually and instantaneously.]

3.36

The Commentary states: According to the doctrine that the three times exist, the substances of conditions exist at all times, which means they are perpetually never absent. Now it is stated that seeds produce fruits only by awaiting conditions; thus it excludes that adherence. If conditions were perpetually present, they should perpetually produce fruits; since it is not accepted that seeds produce fruits perpetually, conditions are perpetually absent [when not functioning]. Question: Even assuming that conditions are present and the wholesome nature is determinate, should the seeds of wholesome form and so forth produce effects such as wholesome mental states?

3.37

[The Treatise states: Sixth, inducing its own fruit... only then does it constitute a seed.]

3.38

The Commentary states: This means that it is only by individually inducing distinct fruits of form, distinct fruits of mind, and so forth that they are called seeds; it is not the case that a wholesome seed of form producing a wholesome fruit of mind could be called a seed, because they are discordant.

3.39

[The Treatise states: This excludes non-Buddhists... producing all fruits.]

3.40

The Commentary states: Namely, regarding Maheśvara as the cause that produces all fruits and so forth are all part of this adherence. The fruits would have to be undifferentiated, because the cause is one. Since the fruits are distinct, the causes must also be different; therefore, a single cause does not produce all fruits.

3.41

[The Treatise states: Or it excludes other schools... mutually serving as primary causes (hetu-pratyaya).]

3.42

The Commentary states: The Sarvāstivādin and others take wholesome form in relation to the four aggregates as a cause, and the four aggregates in relation to the form aggregate can also serve as a cause. This is precisely not so. Only that which induces its own fruit conforms as cause and fruit, having the same efficacy; this is called a primary cause (hetu-pratyaya). If it were an empowering condition (adhipati-pratyaya) and so forth, the meaning would indeed be admissible. How could form and the like serve as causes for the mind when they do not conform to each other, having disparate efficacies? Question: It is said that persisting in continuous transformation is what is called a seed; since the actual manifestation of the eighth consciousness persists in continuous transformation, is it called a seed or not? Some say it may also be so, because it is named the 'all-seed consciousness'. If one thinks so, then since this actual manifestation in relation to its own seed is not a primary cause—not being capable of perfuming—how could it be called a seed? Some say it cannot; the expression 'all-seed consciousness' means that it contains all dharmas and is capable of generating all dharmas, hence it is called 'possessing all seeds', not that its actual manifestation is capable of generating its own seeds. Although seeds rely on consciousness, the substance of the actual manifestation is an intentional object of consciousness, which is not the same as the consciousness [as seed holder]; therefore, the actual manifestation of consciousness is not called a seed. Which meaning does this lack? It lacks coexistence with the fruit. The seventh consciousness of a person devoid of the [enlightenment] nature also possesses the six characteristics and should be called a seed; this is also not so. The Treatise itself explains: 'Only when coexistent and conjunct with the actualized fruit does it constitute a seed.' The characteristics of the dharma of a seed are sunken and concealed, while the characteristics of the fruit produced are coarse and manifest; hence only when coexisting with the actual manifestation does it constitute a seed. The seventh consciousness has manifest characteristics; even if it perfumes seeds, its fruits are sunken and concealed, and since it is not conjunct with actualized fruition dharmas, it is not called a seed. The actualized eighth consciousness is also like this, because it has no fruit to produce. The above has explained seeds under the eighth topic; from this point, the third section provides a general conclusion and brief differentiation.

3.43

[The Treatise states: Only within the root consciousness... constitute seeds and none other.]

3.44

The Commentary states: This discriminates against the evolving consciousnesses and so forth above not having the meaning of seeds. Herein, among the six characteristics above, it specifically explains that only internal seeds possess the six characteristics. However, Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha also extends this to external seeds; this is cited here to explain whether external seeds of grain, barley, and so forth, being capable of producing fruit, are called seeds or not.

3.45

[The Treatise states: External grain, barley, and the like... are not real seeds.]

3.46

The Commentary states: Although they are transformed by consciousness and conventionally called seeds, they are not real seeds, because they are actualized phenomena. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Because of the faults of action, non-action, loss, and gain, there is contradiction; external seeds have the internal as their condition, arising through dependence on that perfuming.' It also cites a verse: 'Earth, sky, wind, space, / waves, ponds, directions, and the great ocean / are all truly made by the internal; / conceptual discrimination is not external.' Thus, it is due to internal seeds that external grain and so forth ripen; they are not real seeds. Question: Seeds are also transformed by consciousness; should they then not be real seeds? Answer: This is not so. After internal seeds are transformed by consciousness, they further produce barley and so forth, and barley and so forth are again transformed by consciousness; because they are doubly transformed, they are not seeds, just like the eye faculty and the like. Therefore the text below states: 'External barley and the like, in their definite substance, do not produce fruits through primary causes.' Thus primary causes are only internal seeds and not external seeds; all these points above are found in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

3.47

From here, the ninth section examines both the producing and inducing causes, both internal and external. Do both these internal and external seeds possess the substance of both the producing and inducing causes? Answer: They do. What are they?

3.48

[The Treatise states: The power of this seed... is called the inducing cause.]

3.49

The Commentary states: When internal or external seeds produce an immediate result or produce a direct result, they are called 'productive causes'; when they project a distant result or project a remnant result, they are called 'projecting causes.' Asvabhāva says: For instance, internal seeds of consciousness producing the present consciousness and so forth are called an immediate result, and are the productive cause; in relation to name-and-form and so forth, they are the distant result, and are the projecting cause. In relation to the sprout, the external seed is an immediate result, and is the productive cause; in relation to the stalk and so forth, it is a distant result, and is the projecting cause. Vasubandhu says: For instance, internal seeds producing the direct result are called productive causes, and producing the remnant result are called projecting causes; that is, present seeds producing the present body are called productive causes, and producing the six sense-bases and so forth are all called productive causes, while projecting the remaining withered corpse and so forth is called a projecting cause. Even though [the sentient being] is born into another realm or the like, by the power of its momentum the remaining corpse still exists, as explained below. The external seed producing the sprout, stalk, and so forth is the productive cause, which is the direct cause; producing the withered, dead grass and so forth is the projecting cause, by the power of its momentum. Yet when that state is reached, the internal and external seeds are both absent—either [the sentient being] has been born into another realm or the like, or the seed has long since perished. Nevertheless, by the power of the momentum of their prior production, they project that which still remains; that is to say, conceptually speaking, that seed which was the productive cause is called the projecting cause. Now, according to both explanations, productive causes and projecting causes have no separate substantial entity; it is a single entity viewed in differing relations, and hence two are spoken of. If there were no power of momentum from a projecting cause, then after death everything would instantaneously cease, just as in the death of an apparitional being. If [one considers whether] both causes are fully present throughout the four modes of birth, Asvabhāva's principle is superior, because when apparitional beings die there is no corpse. However, in Vasubandhu's commentary, the meaning is that the master Asanga spoke of withered corpses and the like to establish the projecting cause, hence stating the verse: 'Withering and death are due to that which projects, / Just as there is later perishing by natural course.' Vasubandhu explains: If there were no projecting cause, there would be no result of withering and death, just as there is later perishing by natural course. It is simply that Vasubandhu's explanation is concise and Asvabhāva's commentary is broad, so they do not contradict each other. Although these are passages from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the fourth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya speaks of the projecting and projected, and the productive and produced; the ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states that both the projecting and the projected are projecting causes, and that which is productive is called the productive cause. The tenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: From ignorance up to feeling are projecting causes; craving, grasping, and becoming are productive causes. This intends to show that the seven branches that have not yet been moistened are still distant from the result, and are called projecting causes because they project a distant result; the two moistening branches and the moistened becoming are near to the result, and are therefore called productive causes because they immediately produce the result, which is also subsumed under the immediate and distant discussed here. Asvabhāva merely takes the distance of the result from the cause among already-moistened seeds as 'near' and 'distant,' while the Yogācārabhūmi takes the distance of the result from the cause according to the stages of being moistened or unmoistened; thus they do not contradict each other. Next, the fourteenth section distinguishes internal and external seeds by cause and non-cause condition, and the distinction between perfumed and unperfumed.

3.50

Treatise: Internal seeds must be [perfumed]... are of the nature of cause condition.

3.51

The Commentary states: Internal seeds are cause conditions; they must depend on perfuming to be able to produce results. This is because innate seeds must depend on perfumed growth before they can produce results; and newly perfumed seeds are produced through perfuming before they can produce results, because they are dharmas of sentient beings.

3.52

Treatise: As for external seeds, [whether they have] perfuming... to distinguish the results produced.

3.53

The Commentary states: The second fascicle of Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: Just as from charcoal, cow dung, and hair, there are produced in sequence sesame, blue lotus roots, and reeds. It is not that sesame and the like co-arise and co-cease with charcoal and the like, perfuming one another and being produced from them—this is called having no perfuming. Just as sesame and the like [arise] together with flowers and the like, co-arising and co-ceasing, and due to perfuming produce fragrance and the like—this is called having perfuming. External seeds are indefinite; internal ones are definitely perfumed. Therefore, since external seeds are only present actualities, they serve as sovereign conditions to distinguish the results produced.

3.54

Treatise: They must depend on internal seeds... results produced [by them].

3.55

The Commentary states: This shows that external seeds are not without a cause condition, because they are produced from internal common-mark seeds, as is broadly distinguished in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha itself. Below is the second part, explaining the meaning of perfuming, in which there are three: first, a general question; second, a brief answer; third, an extensive analysis.

3.56

Treatise: Based on what meaning is the term 'perfuming' established?

3.57

The Commentary states: First, the question is raised.

3.58

Treatise: The perfumed and the perfumer... is therefore called perfuming.

3.59

The Commentary states: This indicates the complete meaning and explains the name 'perfuming,' briefly answering what was asked. 'Perfum-' (xun) means to bring forth, or to cause to occur; '-ing' (xi) means to produce, to be close to, or to repeat. That is, it brings forth and deposits results within the fundamental consciousness, causing seeds to be produced and brought close, and causing them to be produced and grow. This brief presentation has three parts: first, the four [characteristics] of the perfumed; second, the four [characteristics] of the perfumer; third, that causing seeds to be produced and grow is called perfuming.

3.60

Treatise: What are called the four characteristics of the perfumed?

3.61

The Commentary states: This is the extensive analysis. Within this there are three parts: first, distinguishing how many conditions the perfumed possesses; second, distinguishing how many conditions the perfumer possesses; third, explaining the meaning of perfuming and so forth. In the first part there are three: first, a question; next, an answer; finally, a conclusion; this is the first. The second fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also has this text, though with slight differences, which should be distinguished as they occur. However, among the five groups of dharmas, the first eliminates material dharmas, mental factors associated with the seven consciousnesses, and so forth; the second eliminates the Buddha-fruit, wholesome dharmas, and the like; the third eliminates the unconditioned and the mental factors concomitant with the non-associated; the fourth eliminates the position that perfuming is permissible across different bodies at the same time. For what is absent in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, only by examining and comparing them one by one can the differences be known.

3.62

Treatise: First, the nature of staying firm... only then is it the perfumed.

3.63

The Commentary states: This is the second part, the answer. From the beginning of beginninglessness to the end of ultimate culmination, of a uniform nature, continuing without interruption, able to maintain habit-energy—only such is the perfumed.

3.64

Treatise: This excludes the evolving consciousnesses... therefore they are not the perfumed.

3.65

The Commentary states: This excludes the seven evolving consciousnesses and their mental factors. The word 'consciousness' here includes mental factors; thus manas and the rest are all called evolving consciousnesses. If they were permitted to hold seeds, then at the time of the anāsrava mind on the path of seeing of the first bhūmi, all sāsrava seeds would be lost. 'Sound, wind, and the like' excludes the sense-faculties, sense-objects, material form in the realm of dharmas, and so forth; because when born into the formless realm, material form is absent; and when entering the cessation attainment and the like, mind is also absent; hence they are said to have 'a nature that is not firm.' Why are only wind and sound mentioned here? Because their marks of interruption are prominent; it does not mean that material form and the like are not addressed here. This is not in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. If something were perfumable simply because it is firm, then since the Buddha's fundamental consciousness is firm, it would follow that its nature, being wholesome and so on, would also be permitted to be perfumable. This eliminates the Sautrāntika view that matter and mind can be perfumed, since they do not stay firm.

3.66

Treatise: Second, the nature of being neutral... only then is it the perfumed.

3.67

The Commentary states: Only if a dharma is impartial and does not oppose or reject wholesome and unwholesome habit-energies can it receive perfuming, because neutrality does not conflict with either the wholesome or unwholesome classes.

3.68

Treatise: This excludes the wholesome and the defiled... therefore they are not the perfumed.

3.69

The Commentary states: Just as aloeswood, musk, garlic, scallions, and the like cannot receive perfuming; and also like a person of equanimous conduct whose nature is broad and tolerant, and can therefore accept matters. If one is clever or of an evil disposition, one cannot accommodate anything. Moreover, wholesome nature does not merely oppose what is unwholesome; it also opposes its own wholesome kind, just as aloeswood does not receive the scent of sandalwood; the same applies to evil and the like, and hence they cannot be perfumed. But the neutral nature does not oppose the wholesome or the unwholesome, just as an equanimous person does not oppose circumstances. This also excludes the class of consciousness that is wholesome and so forth from receiving perfuming; within the seventh consciousness, none are the perfumed. This is the same as what is explained later, only as unobstructed-neutral.

3.70

Treatise: Therefore, the Tathāgata... does not newly receive perfuming.

3.71

The Commentary states: Because only the neutral receives perfuming, the Tathāgata's eighth pure anāsrava consciousness carries these old seeds only as perfumed during the causal stage, and does not newly receive perfuming. Being exclusively wholesome, it conflicts with the wholesome and so on, just like aloeswood; hence this is not in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. It is distinguished from being identical with the Buddha-stage, and is described as unperfumed. What fault would there be in its being perfumed? Because it would oppose and reject dharmas, because there would be increase and decrease, because the wholesome is consummate, and because there would be superior and inferior; hence it cannot receive perfuming. If it were the perfumed merely through having a neutral nature and staying firm, then the five mental factors such as ideation concomitant with the fundamental consciousness, as well as space and the like, should also be the perfumed.

3.72

Treatise: Third, the nature of being perfumable... only then is it the perfumed.

3.73

The Commentary states: If a dharma is the lord, independent in entity, not dependent on others; its nature is not dense and solid, its entity is vacuous and porous, easily capable of receiving perfuming, not like stone and the like—then it is perfumable. If it is not dense and solid, and has vacuity and porosity, it can accommodate seeds; dense and solid things are not so.

3.74

Treatise: This excludes mental factors... therefore they are not the perfumed.

3.75

The Commentary states: The five mental factors concomitant with the fundamental consciousness are not independent in entity and arise dependent on others; therefore they are not the perfumed. Although the lord necessarily requires mental factors to arise, it is not called dependent on others, for it obtains the designation 'lord,' which is the meaning of being independent; this is not in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. What would be the harm in their receiving perfuming? This is explained below under 'contact and so forth are also like this.' It also excludes the unconditioned, because, being dense and solid, it does not receive perfuming, like solid stone and the like; hence space and the like cannot be perfumed. If so, should nominal dharmas on consciousness such as arising and so forth be capable of receiving perfuming? Now, they are subsumed under dependent-on-others and possess no real entity of their own, for the nominal is spoken of on the basis of the real. Furthermore, one should say here: If it is not dense and solid, possesses an entity, and is independent, only then can it receive perfuming. The first eliminates the unconditioned, the second eliminates nominal dharmas, and the last eliminates mental factors; this excludes the unconditioned, nominal dharmas, mental factors, what is dependent on others, and the dense and solid; therefore they are not the perfumed. It was not said this way by the author because it is intended to be stated now. Moreover, the reason why having a real entity is not mentioned here is that nominal dharmas do not exist in the first place, so why would one need to eliminate them further? If so, what about the unconditioned such as space? If one speaks of tathatā, it is not neutral; if one speaks of the non-deliberate-cessation and so forth as nominal, like nominal dharmas such as arising, they are not discussed. For this reason, the first explanation is good; ignorance eliminates tathatā, and from this one knows it is incorrect; it also excludes perfuming upon nominal classes of consciousness and so forth. If being perfumable made it the perfumed, perfuming across different bodies should also be established.

3.76

Treatise: Fourth, being concomitant with the perfumer... only then is it the perfumed.

3.77

The Commentary states: The harmony of the perfumed and perfumer is the meaning of saṃprayukta (concomitance). If they are at the same time and in the same locus, the entity of the perfumed is not identical with the perfumer, nor is it entirely separated from it, as when a consciousness in another person's body acts as the perfumer, and so on.

3.78

Treatise: This excludes another's body... therefore they are not the perfumed.

3.79

The Commentary states: This excludes another's body being permitted as perfumable, and preceding and succeeding moments, because they are not concomitant and lack the meaning of harmony; therefore they are not the perfumed. This differs from the Sautrāntika masters' [view] that the consciousness of the preceding moment perfumes the class of the succeeding moment.

3.80

Treatise: Only the vipāka-consciousness... not mental factors and the like.

3.81

The Commentary states: The third [part] concludes. Only the eighth consciousness is endowed with these four meanings and can be that which is perfumed, not the five simultaneous mental factors and so forth or the remaining transforming consciousnesses. The mention of 'heterogeneous ripening consciousness' is precisely because it is at the stage of being perfumed. If one were to claim that active manifestation produces seeds at a different time, how could one explain this? Thus we know that this meaning is precisely the correct one. In a person lacking the [enlightenment-]nature, this seventh consciousness is fully endowed with the four meanings, so why does it not receive perfuming? Because defiled neutral [activity] conflicts with the wholesome and unwholesome categories. Here, when 'neutral' is mentioned, it refers solely to non-defiled neutral. Among that which is perfumed, why is that which is enduring called capable of receiving perfuming? Because when the various forms and so forth are born into the formless realm, and the various transforming consciousnesses and so forth enter the absorption without mind and so on, there would be no dharma to hold the various seeds. If both were to hold them, there would be the fault of a single seed giving rise to two sprouts, as will be refuted later. Why can wholesome and unwholesome [dharmas] not receive perfuming? Because they are not accommodating, like aloeswood and so forth, as the text itself explains. Why can nominal dharmas, mental factors, and unconditioned [dharmas] not receive perfuming? Because they lack [real] substance, are not self-determined, and cannot be perfumed; hence they cannot hold seeds. Question: Just as a jar can hold things, why can a nominal dharma not do so as well? Answer: It cannot; a collective nominal entity cannot hold [things], while the particular forms and so forth can hold [them]. Because the particulars constitute the collective, one says the jar can hold [things]. The substance of a jar is just real form and so forth; the various [citta-]viprayukta-saṃskāras are just form, mind, and so forth, so just like form and so forth they cannot hold seeds, nor can they receive perfuming. If so, nominal things such as production on the basic consciousness ought to be able to receive perfuming. [If] the real [consciousness] has already received perfuming, what need is there for nominal dharmas? Just as in obstruction to mind nominal dharmas are also admitted, so in receiving perfuming nominal dharmas ought to be admitted. If spoken of nominally, they may also receive perfuming; but only the self-substance division can receive other perfuming. Just as the mental factors above cannot receive perfuming, so below it is said that contact and so forth are likewise. Why can that which is not associated not be that which is perfumed? If it were, one would admit that there is perfuming of another's body. What fault is there in perfuming another's body? One would commit an offence oneself, causing another to receive the fruition, because there would be karmic seeds and so forth in the other's body and one would receive the fruition oneself; or an ordinary worldling would perfume an arhat and so forth. Therefore, the four meanings are required, distinguishing and retaining as above. Although this is present in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it has not yet made these distinctions; the four meanings of the capable perfumer alone are absent in the other treatises.

3.82

Treatise: What are called the four meanings of that which is capable of perfuming?

3.83

The Commentary states: This follows the preceding [section] to raise the question.

3.84

Treatise: First, having arising and ceasing, [up to] is that which is capable of perfuming.

3.85

The Commentary states: This corresponds to the six meanings [of a seed] mentioned earlier, excluding unconditioned dharmas as causes. Only because it has function can it perfume, just as seeds have the function of arising and ceasing and therefore can produce fruitions.

3.86

Treatise: This excludes unconditioned [dharmas], [up to] therefore it is not that which is capable of perfuming.

3.87

The Commentary states: This excludes the [unconditioned] dharma.

3.88

Treatise: Second, having superior function, [up to] is that which is capable of perfuming.

3.89

The Commentary states: Superior function is twofold: first, the vigorous function of being capable of cognition, which excludes the various forms [by restricting them] to perfuming as the object-aspect (nimittabhāga), not perfuming as the capable cognizer; second, an intense superior function, meaning not arising spontaneously, which excludes other classes of heterogeneous ripening minds and so forth, which have the function of cognitive reflection but lack intense function, perfuming as the object-aspect and not perfuming as the capable cognizer. From this, form and so forth have intense function but lack cognitive function; heterogeneous ripening minds and so forth have cognitive function but lack intense function; and non-associated dharmas lack both functions; none of these are capable of perfuming. Only superior vigorous function can effect perfuming, just as a strong and vigorous person can effect results. Therefore, the five mental factors and so forth concurrent with the eighth [consciousness] are likewise not capable of perfuming. If they serve as conditions for another, there is no fault at all; the general statement here is intended in this way.

First 89 of 816 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese