成唯識論述記 3.287

3.287

The Commentary states: That [treatise] says that the ālayavijñānas of oneself and another each manifest as indriyas on their own, not that one's own manifests another's indriyas. For one thing, they are useless, so one does not manifest another's indriyas; secondly, because that treatise does not definitively say that one's own fundamental consciousness manifests another's indriyas, it cannot be used as proof. Furthermore, in the form realm's apparitional birth, there is no indriya where the physical support could be absent, whereas in the desire realm this is not the case. Again, if one did not manifest the indriyas in that form realm, the physical support would be ugly, like the wooden person's nose and tongue; because of the excellence of wholesome karma, the physical support induced is extremely luminous and pure, so it must rely on the mutual support of the indriya for the physical support to be fine; this is not the case here, so it cannot serve as an analogy. If so, since in the desire realm one also induces and enjoys another's wonderfully exquisite body, why not manifest the indriyas to support the physical support and make it luminous and clean? This reasoning is incorrect: the various indriyas of the form realm are manifested by one's own consciousness, whereas here it would be manifesting another's; how could that serve as an analogy? Moreover, in that form realm, there is merely the absence of [sensory] consciousness; if consciousness were to rely on the indriya, the indriya would be functional. Here in the desire realm, if it were manifested as an indriya, it would completely lack real practical function, because it does not serve as a basis for one's own or another's consciousness; they are entirely non-analogous. This meaning should be deliberated upon. How does one know that it manifests another's physical support?