成唯識論述記 4.264

4.264

The Commentary states: Fifth, Bhavya's signless Mahāyāna: in conventional truth, they also say that the dependent and the consummate exist; [but hold that] in ultimate truth, all are empty. Here, speaking of emptiness eliminates the conceptually imagined; yet they cling to this text as the correct interpretation. Relying on pseudo-inferences such as 'in true nature, conditioned phenomena are empty' in the *Karatalaratna*, they deny this consciousness and say that all phenomena are devoid of substantial entity. Saying 'pseudo-inferences' means: with respect to our school, conditioned and unconditioned phenomena in their true nature are neither empty nor non-empty, so there is the fault of one part of the subject not being commonly accepted (aprasiddhaviśeṣya), because you do not accept my ultimate truth; for they are each subsumed within the four kinds of conventional and ultimate truths. If following the Hīnayāna, they are substantially existent, which then contradicts their own school. If following your own school's ultimate emptiness, because I do not accept your empty ultimate truth, it is likewise not commonly accepted. Furthermore, according to our exposition, if considered conventionally, both unconditioned and conditioned exist; if considered ultimately, they are neither empty nor non-empty. Now you proclaim emptiness, which incurs the fault of contradicting your own teachings; hence they are called pseudo-inferences.