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成唯識論述記 4

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4.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Kuiji

4.2

Next below is the second part: using five scriptural teachings and ten rational arguments to establish that the root consciousness exists. There are three sections: first the question, next the answer, and third, from the fourth fascicle where it says, "That this consciousness exists separately is clear from teaching and logic" downward, the general conclusion urging faith.

4.3

Treatise: How should it be known... has a distinct self-substance?

4.4

The Commentary states: This is an outside question. The reason it does not say "ālaya" but says "the eighth consciousness" is that this term is general, because non-retrogressing bodhisattvas and the trainees of the three vehicles without more to learn all come to have it. Since that name [ālaya] is restricted—those without more to learn, etc., do not have it—it cites the eighth and does not say ālaya; all such passages elsewhere should be understood by conforming to this. When it speaks of "ālaya" in the discussion of annihilation and permanence, it takes its name from its status as a cause. When it further says "up to the stage of transformation," this is discussed as extending across the two vehicles and the ten stages of a bodhisattva; therefore, it is not consistently stated according to this precedent. The former indicates its naming according to its initial abandonment, while the latter's intent is a phrasing that extends through all stages; hence there are these two distinctions. Why does it say "apart from the eye and other consciousnesses, there is a distinct intrinsic nature"? The Hīnayāna and others assert that the name ālaya is a self, and scriptures also have this, as will be distinguished separately below. Yet for them, it is merely the six consciousnesses and there is no other distinct entity; hence now it asks: how is it to be known that apart from the eye and other consciousnesses there is a distinct intrinsic nature? If it had said "the consciousnesses, etc.," citing consciousnesses and so forth would include the remaining dharmas of form and so on. Now, saying "and other consciousnesses" takes only the remaining consciousnesses and does not take form and so on. Furthermore, conforming to what is said below regarding the Sarvāstivāda, in refuting their claim that the five appropriation aggregates are not what is clung to with craving, they assert that apart from form, etc., there is no other distinct substance, which does not pertain only to form. Now it should say "the eye and other consciousnesses" to include caitasikas, form-dharmas, and so on. Because they are not separate from consciousness, it briefly omits mentioning form. In citing the king, it takes the ministers, so it does not mention caitasikas. In citing the real, it takes the nominal, so it does not mention prāpti and so forth. Nirvāṇa is not an object of craving, so it is not discussed here. Although it is mutually accepted that outside the five appropriation aggregates there is no other distinct substance, that there is one apart from the aggregate of consciousness is not mutually accepted.

4.5

Now it answers in general.

4.6

Treatise: Because the sacred teachings and correct reasoning serve as standard proofs.

4.7

The Commentary states: Within the answer there are two parts: first, general; next, specific. This is the first. First, it adduces teaching and reasoning, stating that the consciousness has an entity. Because this is not an object of worldly direct perception, one only has faith in the words of the noble ones and inferentially knows its existence. Because these two means of knowledge serve as definitive proofs, it says "standard proofs." "Standard proof" means the sense of measurement and definitive standard, as should commonly be understood. Next below, first it cites teachings to answer specifically; afterwards, it provides reasoning to answer specifically. In the teachings, first it cites the uncommon Mahāyāna teachings, because the Hīnayāna does not believe them; next it cites the mutually accepted Hīnayāna teachings, because both traditions believe them. In the uncommon teachings there are two parts: first, it proves the existence of this consciousness by four verses and three sūtras; afterwards, it establishes that the Mahāyāna is subsumed under authoritative scripture. In first citing the sūtras there are two parts: first, citing the sūtras specifically; afterwards, pointing out the general precedent. However, two sūtras are identical to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts, while one sūtra does not exist in the various treatises. The first two verses are from the Abhidharma-sūtra; the latter two sūtras are self-evident in their texts. This first sūtra is precisely that of the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha; that text lacks explanations such as these, and one should check that text.

4.8

Treatise: Namely, it is stated in a Mahāyāna canonical scripture:

4.9

The Commentary states: This excludes the Hīnayāna Abhidharma, because this is Mahāyāna. The terms "Abhidharma" and "canonical scripture" are distinguished as usual. It does not say "facing the subject with properties" (dui youfa); it says "facing the property" (abhidharma) because it possesses the sense of standard and bearing, and is not a subject with properties. Conforming its meaning to pramāṇavidyā, because property (dharma) and subject (dharmin) are unfixed, it should not be raised as an objection. From here down, each sūtra has three parts: first, citing the sūtra verse; second, specific explanation in prose; third, general conclusion at the end. In the text below, we will not repeatedly burden the reader by pointing this out.

4.10

Treatise: / The realm from beginningless time / Is the common support of all phenomena; / Because this exists, all destinies exist, / As well as the realization of nirvāṇa.

4.11

The Commentary states: In the explanation that follows, there are three explanations in all: the first is extensive, and the latter two are brief. In the first extensive one, the first half of the verse is explained as cause and condition, as in Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle one, and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fascicle fifty-one. The latter half explains saṃsāric transmigration and its cessation in the same way.

4.12

Treatise: Although this eighth consciousness has an exceedingly subtle intrinsic nature, its function can be indicated to display it.

4.13

The Commentary states: In the explanation below there are two parts: first, resolving an implicit objection from outside; afterwards, specifically explaining the verse. This is the first. An objection says: if you wish to display the consciousness, you should display its entity; why explain the consciousness according to its functions? Hence it now answers: the intrinsic nature of this consciousness is subtle and difficult to display, so its entity is displayed by means of its functions. Here, "intrinsic nature" is an alternative name for entity. From here on, in the explanation, first there is the judgment, and afterwards the presentation and explanation.

4.14

Treatise: In the verse, the first half displays its functions as cause and condition: it serves as cause for all phenomena, and also serves as support for them.

4.15

The Commentary states: This is the initial judgment; the latter half can be understood from this. Because the meanings of the verse text in the first half differ, its lines are also distinct. Its first line is explained as the function of cause; the second line is explained as the function of condition. However, the four characters "from beginningless time" in the first line apply through to the function of support in the second line. The three characters "all phenomena" in the second line encompass the function of cause above, because they mutually elucidate each other. Therefore, each of the first two lines expresses one meaning. Why is this so?

4.16

Treatise: "Realm" (dhātu) means cause. It means that from beginningless time, this consciousness has continually and uninterruptedly served as the direct generative cause for all phenomena; therefore it is named cause.

4.17

The Commentary states: In the specific explanation below there are two parts: first, explaining the first half; afterwards, explaining the second half. In explaining the first half: first, specifically explaining the two lines; afterwards, concluding what has been clarified. Explaining the first line as the function of cause: The word "realm" (dhātu) is precisely the meaning of cause; hence it constitutes the function of cause. Between the seed and active consciousness, it is the seed-consciousness. Although the active [consciousness] is also called the causal aspect, because it directly produces all phenomena it is directly seed, continually succeeding from beginningless time, uninterrupted from moment to moment, directly producing all phenomena. The phrase "directly producing" indicates the meaning of cause, not an auxiliary condition, because it can directly produce them. "All phenomena" refers to the words "all phenomena" in the second line. This repeats the subsequent "all" by the word "all." This consciousness from beginningless time serves as cause for all phenomena; therefore the sūtra says "realm," which is the function of cause.

4.18

Treatise: "Support" means condition. It means that from beginningless time, this consciousness has served as the common support for all phenomena; therefore it is named condition.

4.19

The Commentary states: In explaining the second line below there are two parts: first, generally explaining the verse; afterwards, specifically explaining the support. This generally explains the verse: it is the active consciousness that holds all phenomena. "From beginningless time" takes up the four characters above, and with "all phenomena" takes up the three characters below, serving as a common support; hence it says "condition." This is the brief explanation; below is the extensive meaning of condition.

4.20

Treatise: That is, it can hold the seeds of all phenomena, and by this causal significance, it transforms into them and serves as their support.

4.21

The Commentary states: Below it specifically explains support. Within this there are again two parts: first, general; afterwards, specific. This is general. "What it currently holds" takes up the previous causal significance to show its serving as support for them. It means that the active consciousness can hold the seeds, and by virtue of this causal significance, it serves as the support for all active phenomena; that is, it transforms into those active phenomena, and can serve as the support for those active phenomena. Although serving as support for all active phenomena is the same, transforming and not transforming are distinct; hence a distinct statement is set forth.

4.22

Treatise: "Transforms into them" means that it transforms into the external vessels of the world, as well as the body with sense faculties.

4.23

The Commentary states: Below it specifically explains support, which is the objective domain transformed that is taken as object. It does not mention "transforming into seeds" because their marks are deeply hidden, so they are briefly omitted and not mentioned. Furthermore, because it is the seed-consciousness, they are briefly omitted and not mentioned. Furthermore, because it is the seed-consciousness, that is the holding mentioned before.

4.24

Treatise: "Serves as their support" means that it serves as the support for the active consciousnesses, the eye and the rest.

4.25

The Commentary states: That is, generally, the seven evolving consciousnesses are the results that are not transformed into as objects. How does it serve as support? First, it explains the five consciousnesses.

4.26

Treatise: Because it can appropriate the five corporeal faculties, the five consciousnesses operate in dependence on them.

4.27

The Commentary states: Because it appropriates the five corporeal faculties, the five consciousnesses can operate. That is, it shows that this consciousness serves as support indirectly. If it did not hold the five faculties, consciousness would not be able to rely on them, like a corpse and so forth. Therefore it is spoken of as a condition; it also has a seed-support. However, that is a cause-condition; now it is discussed in terms of the predominant condition of the five faculties, which is mutually accepted, as an evident matter. Next, it explains the "mental consciousness."

4.28

Treatise: Furthermore, it serves as the support for manas, and the mental consciousness operates in dependence on it.

4.29

The Commentary states: Although the eighth consciousness can serve as the co-nascent support, seed support, faculty, and intentional object for manas, now it takes only the co-nascent support. Saying that it serves as support for manas, the sixth mental consciousness operates in dependence on it. Furthermore, because the eighth consciousness can serve as the fundamental support for all phenomena, with manas as support, the sixth consciousness operates, like the eye faculty and the rest, which are faculties as predominant conditions. That the sixth separately relies on the seventh, and the seventh relies on the eighth, is not accepted by the various schools; therefore an inference should be formulated.

4.30

Treatise: Manas and the mental consciousness, like the five consciousnesses such as the eye, must also rely on co-nascent faculties, because they are subsumed under the evolving consciousnesses.

4.31

The Commentary states: The seventh and sixth consciousnesses also rely on co-nascent supports; because they are subsumed under evolving consciousnesses; like the five consciousnesses such as the eye. The reason for the sixth consciousness is that it is subsumed under evolving consciousnesses, which means it relies on the seventh manas, because the sixth consciousness is admitted to be subsumed under evolving consciousnesses. As for the reason for manas also being subsumed under evolving consciousnesses serving as the reason, this is unestablished for one party. Now one should first establish that the sixth has a faculty, which is precisely manas. Once manas is established, because it is admitted to be an evolving consciousness, it can serve as the reason. Here, the thesis and reason should be understood by conforming to the text and grasping the principle. Above, the establishment of the fundamental consciousness as support has been completed; fearing that an outside objection would say that the nature of the eighth consciousness should also have a support, below it shows that the eighth consciousness also relies on the seventh as support, because the seventh is uninterrupted, while the remaining six are interrupted.

4.32

Treatise: In principle, the eighth also ought to rely on the seventh as its co-nascent support.

4.33

The Commentary states: The inference is: the eighth should take the seventh as its co-nascent support; because it is of the nature of consciousness; like the sixth consciousness. This has the fallacy of inconclusiveness with the five consciousnesses, so it should say: because it is admitted to be of the nature of consciousness and not the five consciousnesses. This too is not so, for the seventh consciousness is admitted to not be the five consciousnesses, because it is of the nature of consciousness. One should generally say: the eighth in principle ought to have a co-nascent support; because it is of the nature of consciousness; like the eye and other consciousnesses; because this property does not say it takes the seventh as support, there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness. Thus, although it says it serves as support for the evolving consciousnesses, through this reason it shows that the eighth takes the seventh as support. Or if it were not so, what was previously said—that manas takes the eighth consciousness as its co-nascent support—would have the fallacy of inconclusiveness, because the eighth would have no co-nascent support; therefore it says the eighth also has a co-nascent support. Here there is no dispute over the immediately preceding condition or the causal seed; the causal seed is the previous line, hence both dispute the co-nascent.

4.34

Treatise: This is what is meant by this consciousness's function as cause and condition.

4.35

The Commentary states: The second part concludes the upper two lines of the verse in general; next it explains the lower two lines. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining "there are all destinies"; afterwards, explaining "there is nirvāṇa," etc. In explaining "there are destinies" there are three parts: first, generally explaining the verse; next, explaining specifically; afterwards, concluding in general. This is the first.

4.36

Treatise: "Because this exists" means: because this consciousness exists.

4.37

The Commentary states: It means: because of what is stated in the preceding second line, the consciousness that can serve as the support for all active phenomena, etc. The word "exists" (has) in the verse runs through both places: that is, within what this consciousness can have, and within what the destinies and the realization of nirvāṇa below have. Furthermore, the words "because this consciousness exists" run through the defiled and purified states that exist below.

4.38

Treatise: "All destinies exist" means that there are wholesome and unwholesome destinies.

4.39

The Commentary states: Because the words "wholesome and unwholesome" subsume the five destinies, this is precisely the word "exist" above running through the defilements that exist below.

4.40

Treatise: It means that because this consciousness exists, it can hold defiled seeds that accord with transmigration, causing sentient beings to transmigrate through birth and death.

4.41

The Commentary states: From here on, the second part expands upon the previous meaning of existence. Within this there are two parts: first, the correct explanation; afterwards, the critical analysis. This is the correct explanation. It means that because of this consciousness serving as the active support stated in the second line, it holds the defiled seeds of the first line. Saying that "realm" is cause refers to the seed-consciousness. These defiled seeds that accord with phenomena of transmigration can produce active manifestations, causing sentient beings to transmigrate through birth and death. Active defiled phenomena are called transmigration; seed defiled phenomena are called according with transmigration; dharmas that constitute contaminated states are all called transmigration. Fascicle four of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā states: "What is transmigration? It refers to all birth and death." That is, the former accords with the latter; its entity accords with its function. If so, then contaminated suffering and origination should all be called transmigration; why does the verse specifically speak of "the destinies"?

4.42

[Treatise:] Although defilement, karma, and rebirth [comprise transmigration, the realms are singled out because they are superior].

4.43

[The Commentary states:] Below, the definitive analysis has two interpretations; this is the first. Resolving this objection, it says: although defilement, karma, and rebirth—the defiled truths of origin and suffering—are all transmigration and all factors of birth-and-death, nevertheless the five realms are the suffering fruits of birth-and-death, and being superior, they are singled out. The fruit is birth-and-death proper and is the factor conformed to; karma and defilement are able to conform to the nature of the fruit of birth-and-death, hence it specifically mentions the fruit. What is explained here as upholding all factors conforming to transmigration takes the fruit of birth-and-death as the substance of transmigration. Upholding what conforms means upholding the factors of karma and defilement that can conform; it is not called upholding in the manner of form and the rest, but rather this is called upholding in the sense of upholding and serving as the support. Because consciousness upholds and serves as the support for active defilement and karma, consciousness does not grasp those active defilements and karma as its objective sphere. This interpretation differs from the preceding one, yet shares points with it.

4.44

[Treatise:] Or the word "realms" pervades both that which goes to the realms and that to which one goes.

4.45

[The Commentary states:] This is the second interpretation: karma, defilement, and the intermediate existence are also what is spoken of in the verse. Karma, defilement, and the intermediate existence of the various realms are that which goes to the realms. Why is that which goes to the realms also called a "realm"? A realm is that to which one goes; karma, defilement, and the intermediate existence are called realms by association with it.

4.46

[Treatise:] The requisites of the realms also receive the name of realms.

4.47

[The Commentary states:] This means that the physical world of the vessel is what is needed by the realms, the requisites of the realms; by association with that to which one goes, it is also called a realm. Alternatively, the word "requisites" explains the reason why karma and defilement are both named realms, since only internal factors are spoken of. In general, the transmigration of birth-and-death pervades all defiled factors; here in this verse, the word "realms" alone is used because that which goes, that to which one goes, and the requisites are all designated as realms, not only that to which one goes—just as joy and the factors conforming to joy are called the limb of enlightenment of joy, and so forth.

4.48

[Treatise:] All defilement, karma, and rebirth [operate relying on this, and it performs the function of support for them].

4.49

[The Commentary states:] Third is the general conclusion. Due to the existence of this consciousness, defilement by affliction is established; defilement by karma is established; defilement by rebirth is established; and worldly purification is established, because it subsumes all defiled factors. That these are established as stated above means that it performs the function of support for transmigration and performs the function of support for cessation, and so forth. What is its meaning?

4.50

[Treatise:] "And the attainment of nirvāṇa" means [only when this exists is there the attainment of nirvāṇa].

4.51

[The Commentary states:] Next, the second part explains the lower line of the verse. Within this there are three parts: first, a general explanation of the verse; next, a distinct analysis; and finally, a general conclusion. This is the first part. The phrase "due to this there is" above also applies to this. Having restated that which possesses this consciousness above, it reveals the attainment of nirvāṇa that exists below.

4.52

[Treatise:] That is to say, because this exists, [one is able to realize and attain nirvāṇa].

4.53

[The Commentary states:] This is the detailed distinct analysis. Within this there are two parts: first, a general explanation; below, the definitive analysis itself. The untainted seeds within the body are called the factors conforming to cessation. As for the words "return and cessation," the fifty-first [fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi] explains: return is the truth of the path, and cessation is the truth of cessation. That is, the seeds conform to the active manifestation, and the path can realize cessation. Alternatively, it serves as the support for the active path, causing one to attain nirvāṇa. The prior conforms to the latter, substance conforms to function, and return conforms to cessation, which should be explained in accordance with the preceding. This explanation accords with the first master below who says only "attainment," meaning that without this consciousness, supramundane purification cannot be established at all. Or it subsumes worldly purification, as it distantly realizes nirvāṇa. Or it is solely nirvāṇa that is upheld by consciousness, which is also an upholding by way of support. Although it speaks of upholding seeds of untainted factors, the intention is realizing nirvāṇa, and taking only nirvāṇa, it is that which is upheld by way of support. In chapter four of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, under the three natures, it says: the other-dependent nature is the support for the imagined nature, and also the support for the consummate nature; nirvāṇa is the fruit sought, hence it is singled out here. This accords with the second interpretation below which takes only nirvāṇa, while the third takes both, upholding untainted seeds and being the support for nirvāṇa. Explaining the words "attainment of nirvāṇa" in the verse: does it take attainment, or does it take nirvāṇa?

4.54

[Treatise:] Here it speaks only [of the path of attainment, for it exists because of this consciousness].

4.55

[The Commentary states:] Below, the definitive analysis has three views; this is the first. It means this speaks only of the path that can attain it, upholding untainted seeds and not upholding nirvāṇa, because nirvāṇa does not directly rely on this consciousness. In an indirect sense it may rely on it, but here it speaks of the direct sense. This is the first master.

4.56

[Treatise:] Or this speaks only [of nirvāṇa, because it is what is directly sought].

4.57

[The Commentary states:] This is the second view. As the teaching cited earlier states, it directly upholds only untainted seeds, and nirvāṇa is what is sought.

4.58

[Treatise:] Or this speaks of both, [because both factors are subsumed under the category of cessation].

4.59

[The Commentary states:] This is the third view: because both factors are subsumed under the category of cessation. The intention here is to say that not only is the path return and nirvāṇa cessation, but the path is that which can return, and nirvāṇa is that which is returned to, hence nirvāṇa is also subsumed under the category of return. Cessation is the substance of cessation, and the path also conforms to it in severing defiled factors; because it can conform to cessation, it is also said to be subsumed under the category of cessation. Both the path and nirvāṇa may be called return, and both may be called cessation; hence it says both are subsumed under the category of return and cessation. They are subsumed under that category, but are not its substance. How is it known that both are spoken of here?

4.60

[Treatise:] The word "nirvāṇa" [indicates what is attained, and "attainment" reveals the path that can attain it].

4.61

[The Commentary states:] That is, the word "nirvāṇa" in the verse indicates nirvāṇa and so forth. That is, pointing generally to the above, one knows that both are spoken of.

4.62

[Treatise:] By means of the path capable of severing, [one severs transmigration and attains nirvāṇa].

4.63

[The Commentary states:] This means that by means of return, one severs the preceding transmigration and attains nirvāṇa; therefore both are taken.

4.64

[Treatise:] What can sever and what is severed, what can realize and what is realized, [operate relying on this, and it performs the function of support for them].

4.65

[The Commentary states:] Third is the general conclusion. The path that can sever, the defilements that are severed, the path that can realize, and the cessation that is realized all rely on this consciousness; hence it performs the function of support for return and cessation. The single word "sever" applies to both that which can sever and what is severed; the single word "what is" applies to both what is severed and what is realized. The verse should be interpreted in accordance with the three views here. Next is the second explanation.

4.66

[Treatise:] Furthermore, in this verse, [the first line shows the substance of this consciousness, and the remaining three lines show that it serves as the support for defiled and pure factors].

4.67

[The Commentary states:] Within this there are three parts: first, a general structural analysis of the verse; next, a distinct explanation of it; and finally, a general conclusion. This first part is the general structural analysis: the first line reveals that the substance of this consciousness does not just now begin to exist, but has existed since beginningless time, bringing out the intrinsic substance of the consciousness, namely the seed-consciousness; the latter three lines reveal that this consciousness serves as the general and distinct support for defiled and pure factors. That is, the line "support of all phenomena" is the general support for both defiled and pure factors. It is the active consciousness, or both are active, by virtue of the meanings of realm, nature, and cause. Which are the defiled and pure? "Due to this there are the various realms" refers to the defiled factors that rely; "and the attainment of nirvāṇa" refers to the pure factors that rely; these are the distinct supports for the two factors, defiled and pure. The support of the second line belongs to the general support. The phrase "due to this there is" belongs to the two distinct supports, since it applies to both defiled and pure. Or it belongs to that which can support and that which is supported, because it applies to both that which can have and that which is had. Which are the defiled factors?

4.68

[Treatise:] Defiled factors [refer to the two truths of suffering and origin, namely rebirth, karma, and defilement].

4.69

[The Commentary states:] Below is the distinct explanation. This refers to the two truths of suffering and origin, all defiled factors: that to which one goes is the truth of suffering, and that which can go is the truth of origin, namely rebirth, karma, and defilement. This is an explanation by distinct marks; yet rebirth, karma, and defilement all apply to both suffering and origin. Furthermore, in the Mahāyāna there is suffering that is not origin, namely rebirth as various indeterminate vipāka factors and so forth, which is solely the truth of suffering. Although in explaining the distinctions of defilement it speaks only of the realms, it also applies to that which can go to the realms, hence it takes the truth of origin. Which are the pure factors?

4.70

[Treatise:] Pure factors [refer to the two truths of cessation and the path, namely nirvāṇa and the path].

4.71

[The Commentary states:] This refers to the two truths of cessation and the path, namely all untainted conditioned and unconditioned factors. The truth of cessation is that which is realized; the truth of the path is that which can realize. Here it takes only untainted factors as the substance of the truth of the path. It does not take defiled factors in the path of preparation and the path of accumulation, because they do not realize cessation. As stated before, the permeation of hearing applies to both defiled and untainted, which agrees with the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

4.72

[Treatise:] Both rely on [this consciousness, for if it were otherwise, the principle would not be established].

4.73

[The Commentary states:] Third is the general conclusion. Both defiled and pure factors exist relying on this, because the evolving consciousnesses cannot exist continuously from beginningless time to serve as the general and distinct support for defiled and pure factors. This concludes the above.

4.74

[Treatise:] Or again, the first line [shows the substance of this consciousness, and the remaining three show that it serves as the support for the three intrinsic natures].

4.75

[The Commentary states:] Within the third explanation there are two parts: first, the structural analysis; next, the matching. This is the first. Or again, the first line reveals that the substance of this consciousness is continuous from beginningless time, and the latter three reveal that it serves as the support for the three intrinsic natures. Having provided this general structural analysis, below it is specifically matched.

4.76

[Treatise:] Namely, the other-dependent, [the imagined, and the consummate natures, as should be understood respectively].

4.77

[The Commentary states:] "Namely, the other-dependent" is the second line, "support of all phenomena," which refers to defiled and untainted conditioned phenomena. Because this contains the seeds of all phenomena, it is spoken of as the support. The imagined nature is the third line, "due to this there are the various realms," meaning that because grasping arises, the realms consequently exist, and one is born into those realms; or grasping arises taking the realms as cognitive object, and since this arises from them, it is of that nature; or realm means the realm of views, because the two graspings arise. The consummate nature is the fourth line, "and the attainment of nirvāṇa," which refers to untainted conditioned and unconditioned phenomena. The four pure phenomena constitute the consummate nature, because nirvāṇa and attainment are spoken of separately. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state that the ālayavijñāna is the support for defilement and purity, saying that the other-dependent nature is also the support for the imagined, consummate, and other-dependent natures. The root of the other-dependent nature is precisely this consciousness. Next, matching the three lines, it should be understood in this way. However, by reasoning, if the four lines of the verse are explained distinctly as the four noble truths—origin, suffering, cessation, and path—it does not contradict the principle, because the realm is precisely that to which the three vehicles go, the principle of the truth of cessation. This concludes the explanation of the first sūtra. As for the agreements and differences in the explanation of this in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, consult that text accordingly; however, these three interpretations are not found in that treatise.

4.78

[Treatise:] If in this verse [it were not this consciousness, none of these could be established].

4.79

[The Commentary states:] This is the general conclusion.

4.80

[Treatise:] In that same sūtra [it is said in verse: / "The realm from beginningless time / is the equal support of all phenomena; / because this exists, there are all realms / and the attainment of nirvāṇa / has not been revealed to the foolish, / lest they imagine it as a self"].

4.81

[The Commentary states:] This is the second verse in the Abhidharma-sūtra. Since it will be extensively explained below, it is not explained here.

4.82

[Treatise:] Because this root consciousness [possesses all seeds, it can store all defiled factors].

4.83

[The Commentary states:] The following explanation has three parts: first, it combines and explains the upper two lines; next, it explains the third line; and finally, it explains the fourth line. This is the first part: taking the word "because" from the first line, the word "consciousness" and the phrase "all seeds" from the second line, and adding the three words "this root possesses," it states: "Because this root consciousness possesses all seeds." Then, going back to take "stores" from the first line, it adds the two words "can thus" before it; and within the two words "all phenomena" it adds the word "defiled," thus yielding "it can store all defiled factors."

4.84

[Treatise:] Relying on this, the name ālaya is established.

4.85

[The Commentary states:] Below, the second part takes the third line as a general conclusion: relying on this, the name ālaya is established; therefore it is named ālaya. That is, it takes "that which stores" to explain the storehouse consciousness, not only "that which stores" to explain ālaya, because after the eighth ground and beyond it is not named the storehouse consciousness. Here, in contrast to the treatises on the primal nature and so forth, it merely adduces "that which stores" to explain the meaning of storehouse. This correctly explains the meaning of the name ālaya; next it excludes non-Buddhist attachments. Non-Buddhist attachments claim: when the unmanifest nature of the three qualities is about to undergo transformation, it is called the primal nature, transforming into the twenty-three principles such as the great principle and the rest, fully as narrated before. Although they posit cause and effect, its substance is definitively one and permanent. Now, the ālayavijñāna...

4.86

[Treatise:] It is not like the primal nature [of non-Buddhists, because its substance is not one with all phenomena].

4.87

[The Commentary states:] This refutes the Sāṃkhya positing of the primal nature, wherein the substance of the intrinsic nature itself arising in function is called the primal nature. It is not one like theirs; this ālayavijñāna and the fruits of all phenomena are neither identical nor different, and in contrast to them, it says its substance and nature are different.

4.88

[Treatise:] For both that which relies and that which is relied upon arise and perish.

4.89

The Commentary states: Dharmas and consciousness, as what depends and what is depended upon, both arise and cease. It is not permanent like their [pradhāna], and therefore it differs from what is posited by the Sāṃkhya. However, the text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is more difficult than this, though its underlying meaning is extremely close. Yet it turns back to conclude with the words 'therefore it is called the ālayavijñāna'.

4.90

Treatise: [Because it mutually stores and is stored] with defiled dharmas […] it is called the ālayavijñāna.

4.91

The Commentary states: The verse only refuted the pradhāna as a cause, interpreting 'ālaya' solely based on 'being able to store', and not in terms of [being grasped as] a self. Here, 'mutually storing' agrees with the text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. However, as for sentient beings grasping it as a self, this is not in the verse, but is an addition based on its intended meaning, because grasping it as a self is precisely what is termed 'ālaya'; possessing this meaning, it is called ālayavijñāna. Alternatively, the words 'therefore it is called the ālayavijñāna' distinctly reveal the meaning of 'ālaya'—that is, its mutually storing and being stored with defiled dharmas, etc. The previous explanation concluded the first two lines; this further reveals the distinct meaning of ālaya, and hence differs from the former. As for 'to the excellent, I disclose it':

4.92

Treatise: Bodhisattvas who have already entered the path of seeing […] to them it is properly disclosed.

4.93

The Commentary states: This is the fourth line below. Bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis are called 'the excellent'; because they tally with vijñapti-mātra, they are able to realize and understand the ālayavijñāna, and do not give rise to denigration or conceptually constructed ātmagrāha. Therefore, I, the World-Honoured One, properly disclose it to them. Having already attained it in their own stage, to make them once more clearly comprehend it purely, it is now further shown to them. Not having yet attained subsequent bhūmis, to make them advance in cultivation, it is now disclosed to them. Question: If so, if it is not spoken to those prior to the bhūmis, how can they hear of it? What would they practice and cultivate, so that upon later entering the bhūmis they attain true vijñapti-mātra?

4.94

Treatise: Alternatively, for all bodhisattvas […] it is therefore also spoken to them.

4.95

The Commentary states: Without regard to whether they are bodhisattvas on the bhūmis or prior to the bhūmis, all are called 'the excellent', and the Buddha speaks of it to all of them. Although those prior to the bhūmis are not yet able to realize and understand it, they can faithfully understand without giving rise to denigration, and aspire to the fruit of the āśrayaparavṛtti of this consciousness; therefore it is also spoken to them. 'I' is the World-Honoured One's self-designation. 'Disclose' should be understood by analogy with the previous explanation regarding either self or dharmas, since it is not said that those prior to the bhūmis are identical to those on the bhūmis. The second fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only has the first explanation and lacks the latter explanation, differing slightly from this.

4.96

Treatise: The evolving consciousnesses do not have such a meaning.

4.97

The Commentary states: This concludes generally. Only the eighth consciousness stores all dharmas and is the seed-consciousness, called ālayavijñāna. Because the World-Honoured One explains it only for the excellent, the six consciousnesses are not so; by turning this around, it can be understood. The third verse is a verse from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra; the fifty-first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and so on are identical to this text.

4.98

Treatise: The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra says: […] 'Lest they should conceptually construct and grasp it as a self.'

4.99

The Commentary states: The prose explains it itself.

4.100

Treatise: Because it is able to hold fast […] it is called the ādānavijñāna.

4.101

The Commentary states: This explains it with three meanings; the Mahāyānasaṃgraha has two, lacking the first [concerning] seeds. In reference to seeds, it is called 'holding fast' (zhichi), keeping seeds from being lost, since there is no sensation. Material sense faculties and their bases are called 'appropriating' (zhishou), keeping the faculties from decaying and generating sensation. Taking initial conception and subsequent continuity of life is called 'grasping' (zhiqu), grasping various existences. Or, serving as the support of seeds and grasping them as an object is called 'holding fast'; grasping material sense faculties and so on to give rise to sensation is called 'appropriating'; and subsuming the initial conception of life is called 'grasping'. In reference to external bases, it is not called ādāna, as it lacks the meanings of holding fast, etc. This explains the meaning of ādāna ('holding fast'), while the meaning of vijñāna ('consciousness') is as usual. The previous, middle, and subsequent verses all do not explain 'consciousness'; possessing these three meanings, this consciousness is called ādāna, concluding the upper four characters of the first line, then taking up the fourth character 'consciousness' and concluding the upper three characters.

4.102

Treatise: Sentient beings without nature […] therefore it is called extremely subtle.

4.103

The Commentary states: Among the five gotras, sentient beings without gotra cannot plumb the depths of its source; therefore, it is said to be 'extremely profound'—this applies only to ordinary persons. As for the rest, those with determinate gotras of the two vehicles, whether ordinary persons or noble ones, cannot penetrate it—meaning they cannot realize it—and therefore it is called 'extremely subtle'. 'Penetrating' means truly realizing and attaining it by the anāsrava path. Because they do not realize it—not because it is not spoken to them—it is said that they 'do not penetrate'. Śrāvakas who are not ignorant of the Dharma also faithfully hear it, yet they do not cultivate it; thus there are those who are born into the formless realm, enter the cessation attainment, and so on. It is not that the Buddha does not speak of it to those with the Mahāyāna gotra, whether noble or ordinary, nor to those with indeterminate gotras among the two vehicles, whether ordinary or noble. If it were also not spoken to ordinary persons of the determinate Mahāyāna gotra, who then would practice and cultivate the contemplation of true vijñapti-mātra? How could we ourselves have heard of this consciousness? If it were not spoken to those of the two vehicles who have turned their minds, whether ordinary or noble, they should not be called 'those who have turned their minds', and would not practice the contemplation of vijñapti-mātra, the contemplation of the trisvabhāva, and so forth. It is only those excluded here to whom the Buddha does not speak to bring about their realization; it is not that he does not speak to those who are not excluded. From this one should know that the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks generally of ordinary persons and the two vehicles because the principle was not yet settled, and because of the aforementioned fault. This finishes explaining the first line of the verse; next below, it explains the second line.

4.104

Treatise: It is the true seed of all dharmas.

4.105

The Commentary states: This directly brings out the substance of this consciousness in actual functioning; because seeds are causes, this refers to the upper four characters.

4.106

Treatise: Struck by conditions, they immediately arise […] just like a torrent.

4.107

The Commentary states: This directly brings out the function of consciousness, expounding it through a metaphor, directly giving rise to the treatise text 'constant without interruption, just like a torrent'. The second line is finished; next below, the third and fourth lines are explained together. First, it explains the two words 'ordinary' and 'foolish' in the third line, then takes up the fault of fearing they would give rise to conceptual construction in the fourth line, and refers back up to 'I, the World-Honoured One, do not disclose it.'

4.108

Treatise: 'Ordinary' means without gotra; 'foolish' means those inclined to cessation.

4.109

The Commentary states: That is, those excluded previously.

4.110

Treatise: Lest they should, toward this […] [I] do not disclose it.

4.111

The Commentary states: If they give rise to conceptually constructed views of self and dharmas, the ordinary fall into bad destinies, and the foolish are obstructed from the noble path, since the ordinary have no noble path, while the foolish can produce noble [realization]; thus each is spoken of from a distinct perspective. Fearing such faults, I, the World-Honoured One, do not disclose it to them. Yet even if it is not spoken to them, the seventh consciousness of the ordinary and the foolish constantly takes the eighth as an object, and the two views of grasping it as a self and dharmas still arise. Why not speak of it to the ordinary and foolish? This refers to a monk of the Saṃmatīya school in the country of Lāḍha in South India named Prajñāgupta (translated here as Huizang, a disciple of Sthiramati and preceptor to three generations of emperors), who composed seven hundred verses denigrating the Mahāyāna, arguing in his treatise in this manner: 'If it were spoken by the Buddha, why is there this contradiction?'—dismissing the principles of the Mahāyāna as not being good teaching. This fails to grasp the meaning, claiming that it should not be unspoken. Their seventh consciousness only gives rise to innate view of self, which does not cause rebirth in bad destinies nor yet obstruct the noble path. If it were spoken to them, it would increase the conceptually constructed views of self and dharmas of the afflictive and cognitive hindrances. The sixth consciousness arising would obstruct the generation of the noble path and lead to birth in bad destinies; therefore it is not spoken to them. Why would it unleash the innate view of self of the seventh? The latter is only veiled-unindeterminate, while the former is unwholesome; hence the previous distinction in explaining it. Yet you do not understand the faults of the two kinds of delusion—innate and conceptually constructed—and make this challenge groundlessly. This was precisely the distinction made by our Great Master [Xuanzang] in refuting evil views, which the masters of the West all revered. Later, King Śīlāditya summoned Prajñāgupta three times, wishing him to debate with our Great Master, but he declined and refused to come: once he declined on the ground that he could not ride a horse; once he declined on the ground that the carriage was too hot. When [the king] again sent a female elephant to welcome him, he declined on the ground of old age. From afar, he sighed in deep reverence and submission to the Great Master, for his wisdom exhausted the depths of the ocean and his learning plumbed the mysterious source, so that his words became models for a thousand ages. Now, observing that both the ordinary and the foolish are foolish regarding the Dharma, therefore it is not spoken to them. If they are not foolish regarding the Dharma, even if of determinate nature, it is spoken to them. Then there is an objection: Just as non-Buddhists and others, though ādāna is not spoken to them, also have conceptually constructed [views of] self and dharmas that obstruct [virtue] from arising, why is it not spoken to them? This is not so. They falsely project a self and sink into bad destinies; one hopes that they will cultivate non-self and be able to eliminate it. If one were now to speak of it to them, it would contrarily increase their grave illness: they would then grasp it as a distinct, real substance, conceptually construct self and dharmas, and deeply increase [their fall into] bad destinies; therefore it is not spoken to them. Although there are those with gotra who could hear and faithfully understand, because their faculties are not yet mature, it is also not spoken to them, just as the Dharma of the One Vehicle is spoken of only when the faculty of faith has matured. Here the treatise is formulated in terms of the five gotras in full, not in terms of a small portion; hence it does not say that. Although there are those with gotra whose faculties are not yet mature who would give rise to denigration, the profound and subtle meanings are not spoken to others.

4.112

Treatise: Only the eighth consciousness has such characteristics.

4.113

The Commentary states: This is the third general conclusion. Next below is the fourth verse, which is the third sūtra.

4.114

Treatise: The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also says this.

4.115

The Commentary states: 'Laṅkā' is the name of a mountain in Siṃhala (Sri Lanka). 'Entering' means that in the past the Buddha entered there to teach the Dharma to the king of that place and spirits, hence it is called 'entering'. This is the Buddha's answering verse in the second fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra, and the verse in the first fascicle of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra: 'Just as waves upon the great sea / arise because of fierce winds; / surging billows stir across the boundless expanse / without ever having a time of cessation; / so too is the ocean of the storehouse consciousness: / stirred by the wind of objects, / waves of the various consciousnesses / surge up and arise in evolution.' However, that sūtra's verse differs slightly from this one; its transliteration 'Lengjia' was not precise.

4.116

Treatise: Just as the ocean encountering wind-conditions […] evolves with functions manifest before it.

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