成唯識論述記 4.447

4.447

The Commentary states: The essence of this [nutriment] is the sāsrava mental factor of volition (cetanā); only when it is conjoined with the mental factor of desire (chanda) is it the essence of nutriment, because volition conjoined with other factors lacks the mark of hoping. If it hopes for an agreeable object, this extends to both the future and the present. However, works like the Abhidharmasamuccaya state that desire takes the future as its object and there is no desire for the present, so that desire does not decrease and does not take all three times as its object. Now, in speaking of 'hoping', hope encompasses uniting with it across all three times; what is there to prevent this desire from taking all three times as its object? If it takes the past as its object, how does it differ from mindfulness (smṛti)? Mindfulness merely recollects without hoping to unite with that phenomenon. If that is so, mindfulness should also take the future as its object; yet the category of mindfulness has no such flaw, and its objective support is also without error.