成唯識論述記 6.526

6.526

The Commentary states: Below is the specific explanation. Now this extreme view subsumes forty-seven of the sixty-two views: namely, the four doctrines of universal eternity, down through those associated with this view holding neither ideation nor non-ideation; up through this, the forty views are eternalist views, and the seven doctrines of annihilation are annihilationist views, because all mentally take the self as having eternity or annihilation. The word 'and so on' takes in the fourteen unanswerable questions (avyākṛtavastu). Among the four eternal [doctrines] and so on, eternal and so on are eternalist views, while impermanent and so on are annihilationist views, excluding the four of finite and infinite, which are false views (mithyādṛṣṭi). Among the four regarding the Tathāgata after death, 'also exists' and so on are eternalist, while 'neither exists' and so on are annihilationist; the identity or difference of the life-principle and the body are views of a self. Furthermore, universal eternity, partial eternity, and so on include those that take other realms as annihilated, etc., which is widely explained under the topic of taking other realms as object. These sixty-two views are purely conceptually arisen, because fascicle fifty-eight says so. That text also states: taking Brahmā as eternal is a false view, which does not arise subsequent to the view of a self. Now, this arises subsequent to the view of a self and is subsumed under extreme view. Moreover, as for this extreme view, later in this treatise, except for collectively grasping the aggregates, the rest do not take other realms as object. Even if it arises subsequent to the view of a self, how could taking Brahmā as eternal, etc., be an extreme view? The root of extreme view is also the conceptually discriminated view of a self; how could the separately grasping view of a self also arise taking other realms as object? This should be carefully examined and reconciled as in the section on taking other realms as object below and the Separate Notes. The sixty-two views are widely explained as in the Brahmajāla Sūtra of Sixty-two Views, the fourteenth chapter 'Brahmajāla' in the Dīrgha Āgama, fascicles 199 and 200 of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and fascicles 6, 7, 8, 58, and 87 of the Yogācārabhūmi. Here, 'viewpoints' (dṛṣṭigata): 'point' means intention, or that which is arrived at, or standpoint. 'Prior limit' (pūrvānta): giving rise to discriminative views based on the past is called the prior limit; giving rise to discriminative views based on the future is called the posterior limit (aparānta). If discriminative views are generated based on the present, this is indeterminate: it may be called the prior limit, because it is prior to the future and is the cause of the future; or it may be called the posterior limit, because it is posterior to the past and is the fruit of the past.