成唯識論述記 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.2

[Treatise:] The marks previously outlined [...] their distinctive marks.

The Commentary states: From here below, the six categories of mental factors (caitasika) are re-explained. In this, there are two parts: first, stating what is explained to generally encourage the arising of the teaching; second, explaining [them] accordingly. This is the first. Within the explanation, the main text has two parts: first, specifically elucidating the mental factors with five verses; second, generally investigating whether mental factors and the mind (citta) are one or different. Within the first, there are five sections: first, one verse distinguishes two categories; next, one verse distinguishes the wholesome (kuśala) category; next, half a verse distinguishes the affliction (kleśa) category; next, two verses distinguish the secondary affliction (upakleśa) category; finally, half a verse distinguishes the indeterminate (aniyata) category. Within distinguishing two categories with one verse, there are two parts: first, a question introduces the śāstra's topic; second, the question is answered accordingly.

6.4

Treatise: Now, as for the first two categories, what are their characteristics?

6.5

The Commentary states: This is the initial question.

6.6

Treatise: The verse says: [The first are contact, attention, feeling, discrimination, and volition. / The next are specific-sphere factors, namely desire, resolve, mindfulness, / Concentration, and discernment; their cognitive referents / And functions differ.]

6.7

The Commentary states: Below, the second section specifically answers the question. The first line of the verse clearly illuminates the first category; its characteristics have already been distinguished above under the fundamental consciousness (mūlavijñāna), and are now briefly noted. The next three lines explain the second category; within this, there are two parts: the upper two lines elucidate the name of the second category; the lower one line explains the meaning of "specific sphere" (viniyata-viṣaya). In the prose below, following what is clarified in the verse, it is divided into two sections. In explaining the omnipresent (sarvatraga) factors, there are two parts: first, generally explaining the first line of the verse; second, explaining the meaning of "omnipresent".

6.8

Treatise: It means that among the six categories, the first [five factors are contact and so forth, as explained at length above].

6.9

The Commentary states: This generally explains the first line of the verse; it now explains the word "first" and the words "contact" and so forth. The intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and activity (kāritra) of these five omnipresent factors have already been explained at length above in the third fascicle under the eighth consciousness. What was stated in that fascicle—that the meaning of "omnipresent" would be explained later—is now explained here.

6.10

Treatise: How should the characteristics of these omnipresent factors be known?

6.11

The Commentary states: Below there are three parts: first, a question; next, an answer; finally, a conclusion, explaining the meaning of "omnipresent" stated in the verse. First, the Sarvāstivādins and others ask why there are only five omnipresent factors; the Sautrāntikas and others ask whether there are five real entities that are omnipresent.

6.12

Treatise: Because the sacred teachings and correct reasoning serve as valid criteria (pramāṇa).

6.13

The Commentary states: Below, the answer has two parts: first, general; next, specific. This is the general answer: because they are known through the two gates of teaching and reasoning.

6.14

Treatise: Herein, as for the teaching: [The sūtras say: contact provides the support, and feeling, discrimination, and volition arise; these four are omnipresent.]

6.15

The Commentary states: This is the specific answer; first, answering with teaching; later, answering with reasoning. Fascicle 56 of the Yogācārabhūmi also quotes this sūtra to refute the Sautrāntikas and others. What is accepted by both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna is the Āgama-sūtra, and what was mentioned previously is also called the Sūtra on Arising and Ceasing; this is the first sūtra. Why does it only speak of four here, citing contact as the support? As the third [fascicle] stated above: Why does the Yogācārabhūmi only state that contact serves as the support for the three dharmas of feeling, discrimination, and volition? Because it cites the aggregates that are superior. That is to say, contact produces the three aggregates, while attention is temporarily concealed and not mentioned, since it is subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha. If so, by what reasoning is it known that attention must be present?

6.16

Treatise: Moreover, a sūtra says: [If the root is undamaged, the sphere is present, and attention arises, then consciousness can be generated.]

6.17

The Commentary states: This is the Hastipadopama-sūtra.

6.18

Treatise: Other sūtras further say: [Contact, feeling, discrimination, volition, and attention are always conjoined and not separated, and so forth. Therefore, attention is also omnipresent.]

6.19

The Commentary states: Because sūtras further state it, namely the Sūtra on Arising and Ceasing. As cited in the third fascicle under the eighth [consciousness's] omnipresent factors, combining the Prakaraṇāryavācā, quoting the sūtra which says: "always in harmony together," etc.; and fascicle 55 also says: the four immaterial aggregates are always in harmony together, etc.; thus the various sūtras and treatises do not contradict each other. Being inseparable and conjoined is called "in harmony" (sāmagrī); therefore we know attention is also omnipresent, and is also [omnipresent like] the preceding four.

6.20

Treatise: Such sacred teachings serving as true proof are not just one.

6.21

The Commentary states: Fascicle 3 of the Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi) explains: "the root is undamaged, the sphere is present," etc. Fascicle 55 also states: "The five omnipresent mental factors arise universally with all minds." The third [fascicle] is also like this; the Pañcaskandhaka and the Śatadharmā both state this; hence the true proofs are not just one. What is cited in fascicle 55 is a sūtra, while the others are treatises; this is proof from teaching.

6.22

Treatise: As for reasoning: when consciousness arises, [it necessarily relies on the three coming together, and contact is the coming together; without contact, the mind and mental factors would be dispersed and unable to contact a single sphere together.]

6.23

The Commentary states: Below, proof from reasoning is cited. When the consciousnesses arise, they necessarily take spheres as cognitive objects and rely on roots; this is called having the harmony of the three (tri-saṃnipāta). The harmony of the three definitely produces contact, and it is also due to contact that there is the harmony of the three. Furthermore, if there were no contact, the mind and mental factors would be dispersed and unable to be in harmony to contact a single sphere together. Now, since there is the harmony of the three and the mind and mental factors are in harmony contacting the sphere together, contact must definitely exist and be definitely omnipresent.

6.24

Treatise: Attention guides the mind [to direct it toward its sphere; without attention, the mind would not arise, and thus mind would not exist.]

6.25

The Commentary states: The nature of attention can alert the mind and mental factors, causing them to turn toward their own sphere. If this were absent, the mind would not arise. Because it would not arise, the actual functioning (samudācāra) of the mind would not exist, not that its seeds (bīja) would not exist.

6.26

Treatise: Feeling can experience [the favorable, unfavorable, and neutral spheres, displaying characteristics such as joy, sorrow, and neutrality; without feeling, there would be no experience of any one of these.]

6.27

The Commentary states: The three characteristics of joy and so forth are matched in order to the three spheres—favorable, unfavorable, and neutral; they are the three feelings. The rest of the text is obvious.

6.28

Treatise: Discrimination can determine [the characteristics of the sphere's boundaries; without discrimination, there would be no apprehension of the characteristics of the sphere's boundaries.]

6.29

The Commentary states: It means, for example, grasping that this is blue and not non-blue as the cognitive object, and the boundary from its location as much or little, large or small, and so on. The meaning of "determine" is positing, formulating, and so forth. If there were no discrimination, one could not grasp these boundary characteristics of the sphere, whether much or little as a cognitive object; therefore discrimination definitely exists.

6.30

Treatise: Volition causes the mind to grasp [the characteristics of correct causes and so forth, impelling the mind to function; without volition, the mind would not perform actions; therefore volition definitely exists.]

6.31

The Commentary states: It can grasp the correct causes and so forth. "And so forth" includes the incorrect and mutually incompatible characteristics, as explained in the third fascicle; therefore it is omnipresent.

6.32

Treatise: From this it is proven [that these five are omnipresent; the remaining mental factors are not omnipresent, and their meanings will be explained below when we arrive at them.]

6.33

The Commentary states: Concluding what has been clarified above is the third passage. Now, refuting the Sautrāntikas and others who say there are no separate mental factors, this clarifies that these five all arise whenever mind arises, as cited and proved in fascicle 1 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. As for the remaining five—desire and so forth—sūtras do not state their omnipresence, and reasoning shows they do not arise universally; hence they are subsumed under the specific-sphere factors. The natures and activities of the five dharmas of contact and so forth are directed to the explanations in the third fascicle above. The meaning of the remaining ones not being omnipresent will be understood below; this concludes the preceding and introduces what follows. This completes the explanation of the first line of the verse.

6.34

Next, explaining the following three [lines] comprises two texts: first, distinguishing them through five gates; second, extending the principle to the remaining gates.

6.35

Treatise: Next are the specific-sphere factors, namely desire... up to discernment.

6.36

The Commentary states: First, listing the names and explaining the meaning of "specific-sphere," explaining the first three words of the second line. The two words below and the entire third line are explained separately as the text proceeds.

6.37

Treatise: Because the objects and spheres they cognitive-relate to [are specific, they are called specific-sphere; and because they are explained next to the first category.]

6.38

The Commentary states: Explaining the fourth line and explaining the word "next," explaining the designation "specific-sphere." Now, the four distinct spheres can be understood one by one; fascicle 55 states: the four spheres of desired, determined, accustomed, and observed are distinct. Next, specifically explaining the five, the second part sets forth their entities (svabhāva); within the entities there are two parts: first, setting them forth specifically; second, generally denying their omnipresence.

6.39

Treatise: What is desire (chanda)?

6.40

The Commentary states: From here below, each has two parts: first, a question; next, an answer; this is the question. Within the answer there are three parts: first, explaining entity and activity; next, expanding the preceding text; finally, refuting divergent tenets. This is the question.

6.41

Treatise: It has the nature of hoping for a desired sphere; [it has the activity of serving as the support for diligence.]

6.42

The Commentary states: Now, regarding "the support for diligence (vīrya)": as stated below and in fascicle 10 of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, etc., which all say: "Faith is the support for desire; desire is the support for zeal (vīrya)," this is the sequential support for entering the Buddha's Dharma. However, since desire pertains to all three moral natures (trisvabhāva), then only wholesome desire serves as the support [for vīrya]. Now, another explanation is that diligence means exertion: when afflicted dharmas exhibit indolence (kausīdya) and exert effort in committing evil, that is also diligence; in indeterminate dharmas, diligence is desire and resolve. If one speaks of "zeal" (vīrya), zeal is exclusively wholesome; diligence pertains to all three moral natures, all having desire as their support, not only wholesome diligence. The text below says that desire can give rise to correct exertion; the former explanation is superior. Three masters explain below; what is stated here is the first general intention.

6.43

Treatise: Some say: "desired" [means a delightful sphere; only toward a delightful sphere is desire generated, because there is hope.]

6.44

The Commentary states: A delightful sphere refers to delightful matters, both contaminated (sāsrava) and uncontaminated (anāsrava), toward which desire is only then generated. This is based on what is delightful to sentiment; therefore it pertains to all three moral natures, not only to truly delightful uncontaminated dharmas. Toward delightful things, one desires to see, desires to hear, desires to perceive, and desires to know; thus there is hope, which is the "desired sphere" among the four spheres.

6.45

Treatise: Toward loathsome things, [before encountering them one hopes not to meet them, and having encountered them one hopes to be separated from them; how could there not be desire?]

6.46

The Commentary states: This is an outsider's question. That is, regarding suffering, impure things, and so forth, toward those not yet attained, one hopes not to meet them; toward those already encountered, one hopes for separation from them; how could there not be desire? Since desire can arise toward loathsome things, why say that desire arises only toward delightful things?

6.47

Treatise: This merely takes as its cognitive object [the state of not encountering what has not yet been met and being separated from what has already been met; this state is delightful, not a loathsome thing.]

6.48

The Commentary states: The author of the treatise answers: This does not take loathsome things as its cognitive object. This desire only seeks the state of not meeting what has not yet been met and being separated from what has already been met among loathsome things. The delightful essence—whether in one's own body, the non-meeting and subsequent state of separation are delightful; if desiring an external sphere, this state is precisely arising by taking a delightful thing as a cognitive object, not a loathsome thing.

6.49

Treatise: Therefore, toward loathsome [and neutral spheres, desire does not arise at all. Even toward delightful spheres, if there is no hope, no desire arises either.]

6.50

The Commentary states: Loathsome situations pertain to all six consciousnesses, or only the sixth. Neutral spheres pertain to all eight consciousnesses; desire does not arise at all toward them, because one does not delight in them and they are not delightful. Although a sphere is delightful, if there is no hope, no desire arises either. This is only in the first six consciousnesses, such as when wrong views deny cessation, the path, and so forth, there is also no desire.

6.51

Treatise: Some say: "desired" [means a sphere that is sought; whether the sphere's intrinsic nature is delightful or loathsome, as long as one seeks to unite with or be separated from it, desire can arise. Toward neutral spheres, desire does not arise at all. Even toward sought spheres, if there is no hope, no desire arises either.]

6.52

The Commentary states: The second master. "Desired" means a sphere that is sought; whether the sphere's intrinsic nature is delightful or loathsome, as long as on that delightful thing, when not yet attained one hopes to unite with it, and when already attained one wishes not to be separated from it; and on a loathsome thing, when not yet attained one wishes not to encounter it, and having encountered it one wishes to be separated from it—in all these desire can arise. Thus the treatise merely says: "seeking union, separation, etc.," where "etc." includes those; namely, by taking both of these as cognitive objects, desire can arise; the rest of the text can be understood. Therefore its scope is broader than the first, and only the first seven consciousnesses or only the sixth have this desire. Toward neutral spheres, desire does not arise at all; this pertains to all eight consciousnesses, or only the first six and the eighth, because the seventh consciousness is constantly seeking.

6.53

Treatise: Some say: "desired" [means a sphere one wishes to observe; toward a sphere one wishes to observe, desire can arise. Toward spheres that are not what one wishes to observe, there is completely no desire.]

6.54

The Commentary states: The third master. "Desired" means a sphere one wishes to observe; not only seeking union or separation, but merely wishing by attention, whichever consciousness wishes to observe and so forth, desire arises in all of them. This is only in the first six consciousnesses, or only the sixth; the seventh and eighth in the causal state lack the intentional wish to observe, because they arise spontaneously (svarasataḥ). The entirety of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, as well as a portion of the sixth consciousness such as the karmically retributive mind (vipāka-citta), which merely cognize spontaneously through the force of causes and spheres, have completely no desire arising; in all the rest, desire arises.

6.55

Treatise: By this principle, desire is not an omnipresent factor.

6.56

The Commentary states: A conclusion. Among these three, the third is superior, because its sphere is slightly broader. That is, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses having no desire arises by principle, which precisely accords with the opinion of the fourth master among the first seven consciousnesses above.

6.57

Treatise: Some say: it is necessary that by [the power of desire hoping for a sphere, the mind and mental factors grasp the cognitive object; thus desire is the root of all dharmas.]

6.58

The Commentary states: From here below, refuting tenets. The Sarvāstivādins say: It is necessary that through the power of desire hoping for a sphere, the mind and mental factors can grasp their cognitive objects. If there were no hope, how could they grasp the sphere? Thus desire is omnipresent to all minds, and "desire is the root of all dharmas" proves the meaning of desire being omnipresent.

6.59

Treatise: That statement is incorrect. [Because it is attention that alerts the mind and mental factors to grasp the cognitive object.]

6.60

The Commentary states: Now refuting that it is incorrect. The mind and so forth grasping the sphere is the functional power of attention alerting the mind and mental factors to grasp the cognitive object, as already explained above. The sacred teachings only state that attention can generate consciousness; they do not say that desire can generate mind. Therefore we know that attention causes the mind and so forth to grasp the sphere; what need is there to rely on desire?

6.61

Treatise: As when it is said that all dharmas [arise from desire, this is said regarding wholesome and unwholesome dharmas, just as it is said that all dharmas are produced from craving.]

6.62

The Commentary states: This is an objection, saying: The sūtra also says that craving is the root of all phenomena; can it be that all cittas exist on account of craving? If you say that, just as craving does not universally generate citta, how could [the sūtra] say that desire is the root of all phenomena? The tenth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra cites this sūtra at length, up to the point of saying: 'Liberation is its firm core; its culmination is nirvāṇa.'

6.63

Treatise: Therefore, it is said that desire has the function of serving as the basis for diligence [in all undertakings].

6.64

The Commentary states: What is stated in the sūtra refers to all undertakings initiated by desire, because desire is their root; since it applies to phenomena of the three natures, diligence is always present. From this passage we know that at the very beginning of entering the Dharma, it is through the desire for wholesome phenomena that one is able to produce energetic striving. Through energetic striving, one assists in bringing to completion all wholesome undertakings of desire; this is what is meant by saying that desire is the root of all wholesome phenomena. Just as it is said that faith is the root of the Dharma, being solely a wholesome cause, so too, by principle, it should be with desire as the root of phenomena. The fifteenth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya states that all phenomena have desire as their root, up to liberation as their culmination, and so forth. Therefore, both the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Prakaraṇāryavācā state: 'Its function is to serve as the basis for diligence.' Desire applies across cognition of the three times, because it observes with the intention to direct attention; it does not pertain solely to the future. With respect to the preceding three masters, it can be understood by examining how each addresses the three times.

6.65

Treatise: What is resolve (adhimokṣa)? [It has the nature of holding decisively to an object that has been determined, and its function is to make one incapable of being drawn away.]

6.66

The Commentary states: The structural division of this text and so forth is completely identical to that for desire.

6.67

Treatise: That is, through the power of perverse, correct, [or neutral teaching, reasoning, or experiential realization], one cannot be drawn away [from it].

6.68

The Commentary states: This means that this resolve is produced through the power of perverse teaching, perverse reasoning, perverse experiential realization, etc., or through the power of correct teaching, etc., or through the power of teaching, reasoning, and experiential realization that are neither perverse nor correct—namely, an ordinary intentional object—judging and decisively holding to the object grasped: 'this thing is thus, it is not not thus.' Alternatively, 'teaching' means instruction or verbal discourse, [arising] solely from repeated practice. 'Reasoning' means that there is this principle, which does not refer specifically to the real principle of the four noble truths; that is, it subsumes all empirical facts and true principles, such as the principle that 'this wood is wood,' and so forth up to all phenomena likewise. 'Experiential realization' means cultivating dhyāna, or cittas such as the direct perception (pratyakṣa) of the various consciousnesses that can judge decisively—all these possess resolve. Because, through these principles, an endorsement is produced, even if there are different conditions, one cannot be drawn away so as to generate doubt again in this mind.

6.69

Treatise: Therefore, regarding objects of hesitation [or objects that have not been determined, resolve does not arise at all. For this reason, it is not subsumed under the omnipresent mental factors].

6.70

The Commentary states: That is, in a mind of doubt, there is no arising of resolve whatsoever; this means that in defiled minds it is absent in a small portion. In a mind that does not judge decisively, there is likewise no resolve; thus it pervades the three natures.

6.71

Treatise: Some say that whenever the mind [and its associates grasp an intentional object, because there is no obstruction], all possess resolve.

6.72

The Commentary states: The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Other masters say...' Now, the explanation here refers to a divergent master of the Sarvāstivāda. The divergent theories of various Abhidharma texts state: 'When the mind grasps an intentional object, because there is no obstruction, all possess resolve.' This means they do not follow the Mahāyāna position that determining and endorsing the object is called resolve, since in a doubting mind that is entirely absent. Our school [the Sarvāstivāda opponent] merely says: 'That there is no thing obstructing the mind, allowing the mind to cognize the intentional object, is precisely resolve; therefore, it is subsumed under the omnipresent mental factors.'

6.73

Treatise: What they say is unreasonable. [If unobstructedness were resolve, all other dharmas should be resolve because they do not obstruct; or if being unobstructed were resolve, then the mind and mental associates themselves would be resolve, because they are unobstructed.]

6.74

The Commentary states: As for what you call 'unobstructed': if that which can refrain from obstructing is called resolve, then all dharmas other than the mind and mental associates are capable of not obstructing, because as dominant conditions (adhipati-pratyaya) for the mind and mental associates, none of them obstruct. If it is that which is unobstructed, then the mind and mental associates are all that which is unobstructed; therefore it says 'the mind, etc.', with 'etc.' including the mental associates—why would it be only a single dharma! If they defend their position by saying: 'It is solely through the superior power of resolve that it gives rise to the mind, etc., so that they are not obstructed.'

6.75

Treatise: Superior initiation is due to the sense-faculties and attention (manaskāra).

6.76

The Commentary states: The superior cause of initiation is the power of the two dharmas of the sense-faculties and attention; what does it have to do with resolve? If they defend their position by saying: 'The sense-faculties and attention, by their own power, are incapable of superiorly initiating the various minds and mental associates; it is also through the power of this resolve that those sense-faculties and attention are able to initiate them.'

6.77

Treatise: If on account of this [resolve they are initiated, then resolve would also depend on another dharma, and there would be the fault of infinite regress].

6.78

The Commentary states: Resolve should also, by itself, lack the power to be a superior initiator, and should again depend on other dharmas before it can superiorly initiate; because it is a mental factor; just like your attention. If you accept that resolve again depends on another, there would be the fault of infinite regress. If resolve does not depend on another, attention, etc., should likewise be so. Therefore, it is solely endorsement that is the characteristic mark of resolve; hence, it cannot arise in a doubting mind. If they say: 'When the mind arises, [resolve] is definitely present, but its mark is subtle and hidden'—how would one know this? If, because it exists in other states, you infer by analogy that it also exists here, then since vitarka and vicāra exist in other states, they should also exist in the higher stages. If one says that it cannot be known merely because its marks are hidden, this is a great fault; thus resolve arises only with respect to a determined object.

6.79

Treatise: What is mindfulness (smṛti)? [It has the nature of clearly remembering and not forgetting an object that has been previously experienced, and its function is to serve as the basis for concentration (samādhi).〕

6.80

The Commentary states: Therefore, among the four requisites of the Dharma (dharmapada), mindfulness is the cause of concentration.

6.81

Treatise: That is, by continually remembering and keeping in mind the virtues, faults, [or neutral qualities of an object previously experienced, one makes the mind clearly retain it without forgetting, so that it can induce concentration].

6.82

The Commentary states: This re-explains its functional operation. Regarding the object previously experienced: in mindfulness there is either that which has already experienced that entity, or that which has not attained the entity itself but only experienced its category. Just as when an anāsrava mind cognizes a defiled mind, etc., the close, direct grasping is called cognizing that entity; if it grasps distantly without arriving at it, it is generally called that category—the latent defilements cognizing other realms and so forth are all subsumed therein. When post-attainment wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) cognizes conditioned anāsrava phenomena and so forth, it is called recollecting that entity; when it cognizes tathatā and so forth, it is called cognizing its category, its name, and so forth. When non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) cognizes tathatā, it is called cognizing that entity; when it first arises in a single moment, it is called cognizing that category—though not previously experienced, because its name was previously experienced, and because one practiced that contemplation in the preparatory stage (prayogamārga), it is called the previously experienced entity, and also called that category. Causing the mind to clearly retain this generates concentration because of its great increase, and because concentration is focused exclusively; that is, only wholesome mindfulness generates correct concentration. If it is mindfulness in a distracted mind, it does not necessarily generate concentration.

6.83

Treatise: Toward objects that have never been experienced, [no mindfulness ever arises; and toward objects that have been previously experienced, if one does not produce clear memory, no mindfulness arises either].

6.84

The Commentary states: This explains what has and has not been experienced, whether entity or category; toward things such as nirvāṇa, no mindfulness arises at all, and this applies to the three times. When mindfulness arises cognizing them, it is mostly in the past, but it also recollects the future, because it is conjoined with various objects previously experienced. If one has previously heard the name of nirvāṇa, etc., spoken and gives rise to mindfulness, this is also called giving rise to mindfulness by having previously experienced the category of that object. If one has not heard it at all, and the mind is distracted and lax in cognizing, then no mindfulness arises.

6.85

Treatise: Even toward an object previously experienced, [if one does not produce clear memory, no mindfulness arises; therefore, mindfulness is not subsumed under the omnipresent mental factors].

6.86

The Commentary states: Instances of this kind are not singular. Although one has heard of nirvāṇa, etc., and the objects of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, because there is no clear memory, no mindfulness arises either.

6.87

Treatise: Some say that whenever the mind arises, [there is definitely mindfulness, because it serves as the cause of subsequent recollection].

6.88

The Commentary states: However, the Sautrāntika masters do not say that it is omnipresent. It is only the Sarvāstivādin master in the tenth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra: regarding the statement that when there is loss of mindfulness or a disturbed mind, there is no mindfulness, and therefore it is not omnipresent, they reply that because at a later time there is recollection, it is clear that there is mindfulness at present serving as the cause for subsequent mindfulness.

6.89

Treatise: What they say is unreasonable. [Lest because there is subsequent defilement, delusion, etc., one should also say that they existed previously.]

6.90

The Commentary states: We now refute their thesis. It cannot be that because at a later time there are defilement, delusion, etc., or wholesome faith, etc., that categories of those must constantly exist at present to serve as causes for the later ones. If one says that subsequent delusion, etc., also have preceding delusion, etc., as their causes, then mindfulness is not present in all minds, just like delusion, etc. If [one objects]: 'Just as the self-cognition part (svasaṃvittibhāga) serves as the cause for subsequent recollection, from which one knows that it also existed previously, so mindfulness should be likewise'—this is not so! For citta, having accepted the existence of its entity previously, one further posits a function upon it; here, we already do not accept that an entity of mindfulness exists previously for subsequent mindfulness, etc., to arise; how could one draw an analogy from citta to mindfulness?

6.91

Treatise: It is because the preceding citta and caittas [grasp an intentional object and perfume a seed, that this serves as the cause of subsequent recollection].

6.92

The Commentary states: When the mind, etc., have grasped an intentional object, their perfumed capacity residing in the fundamental consciousness is sufficient to serve as the cause for having recollection at a later time; why would present mindfulness be required to directly produce subsequent mindfulness? Alternatively, because saṃjñā is superior in grasping images, it is fully sufficient as a cause to produce subsequent mindfulness; why wait for present mindfulness for subsequent mindfulness to arise?

6.93

Treatise: What is concentration (samādhi)? [It has the nature of causing the mind to focus exclusively on an object being observed and remain undisturbed, and its function is to serve as the basis for wisdom.]

6.94

The Commentary states: That it can generate wisdom is stated from the perspective of the majority of cases. Or it is stated from the perspective of the purified portion, not meaning all cases, just as after concentration a deluded mind may arise.

6.95

Treatise: That is, observing the virtues, faults, [or neutral aspects of an object, causing the mind to focus exclusively on it and remain undisturbed, so that decisive wisdom arises].

6.96

The Commentary states: The mind focuses exclusively on a single object; cognizing in reliance on the teaching, it realizes and understands the intentional object, and the mind then becomes bright and pure. Due to this, anāsrava wisdom arises, capable of knowing the characteristics of virtue, fault, and so forth in the intentional object. In terms of the four requisites of the Dharma, concentration can generate wisdom, but it does not necessarily have to be so in every instance.

6.97

Treatise: The statement that the mind focuses exclusively [means that it is directed toward the object one wishes to observe, not that it cognizes only a single object].

6.98

The Commentary states: This expression 'focuses exclusively' does not mean that the concentrated mind cognizes only a single thing. Rather, according to the intentional objects onto which the mind is directed, be they few or many, or at a single moment toward a particular place where one wishes to direct the mind, when it deeply grasps the intentional object, concentration can then arise; it is not necessary that across earlier and later moments it cognizes only one object.

6.99

Treatise: Otherwise, the path of seeing [with its sixteen minds observing different objects would lack samādhi].

6.100

The Commentary states: In the conditioned path of seeing (ākāra-darśanamārga), which consists of sixteen minds observing objects, there would have to be no samādhi, because [under their view] earlier and later moments would necessarily have to cognize only a single object. Since each and every thought-moment has its mind abiding and operating on one object, deeply grasping the intentional object, concentration is present.

6.101

Treatise: If one does not bind the mind [to an object one wishes to observe, or if the mind is distracted, concentration does not exist; therefore, it is not omnipresent].

6.102

The Commentary states: That is, in a distracted mind that does not focus exclusively, no concentration arises. Although the seventh consciousness also cognizes distinct objects, because it operates on objects without focusing the mind exclusively and does not grasp deeply, it is not conjoined with concentration, as was explained previously in fascicle five. Therefore, that and this do not contradict each other, because here shifting objects is also called concentration, provided it can grasp deeply.

6.103

Treatise: Some say that at that time [there is also concentration, but its marks are subtle and hidden; they should state their true reasoning].

6.104

The Commentary states: Masters of the Nyāyānusāra and others say that at the time of a disturbed mind, etc., concentration also arises, but its marks are subtle, hidden, and difficult to know. Now we cross-examine them: 'They should state their true reasoning.' 'True' means authentic and real; stating its existence in empty words cannot be established by principle. They must provide real, factual words so that I may know it exists.

6.105

Treatise: If concentration could cause [the mind to be harmonious and universally directed toward one object, so that whenever a citta arises it is present, that would be the function of contact (sparśa)].

6.106

The Commentary states: If they defend their position by saying: 'Concentration can cause the mind and associates to harmonize and together proceed toward one object, and since it is present whenever a citta arises, it is omnipresent'—this principle is also incorrect, because this is the function of contact (sparśa). Contact can harmonize the citta and caitta dharmas, not letting them separate, having them share the same cognitive object.

6.107

Treatise: If you claim that this concentration [causes the mind to stay on one object for a moment, that is not right, because a single moment of mind naturally has no meaning of shifting].

6.108

The Commentary states: Furthermore, if you say: 'It causes [the mind] to be able to abide on one object for the duration of a kṣaṇa without changing its object, and therefore it is subsumed under the omnipresent factors'—this principle is also incorrect. A single moment of mind, etc., naturally has no meaning of changing with respect to a single object; why would concentration be required for this? It is not as if a single thought-moment, having cognized this, could again cognize that. They might say: 'That is not so; the nature of the mind, etc., is unfixed, and it cannot abide on a single object for just one moment; hence the sūtra states: "The mind is like a monkey, difficult to restrain." Therefore, if in a single moment it abides on one object, this exists due to the mental factor of concentration.' Question: Suppose there were no concentration, would a single moment of mind also shift its object or not? They say: 'If without concentration the mind could abide on one object, then without greed, etc., the mind would naturally become defiled.' This analogy is incorrect. Focused attention on an intentional object must exist due to concentration, but why should the mind's mere abiding on an object depend on concentration? One cannot say that just as without greed, etc., the mind does not become defiled, likewise when concentration, etc., are absent, the mind does not engage in cognitive deliberation. Cognitive deliberation is already established by the mind itself; how could it rely on other dharmas? The mind's abiding on an object for a kṣaṇa is also like this. If when engaging in deliberation it necessarily abides on an object, it is only for deeply grasping the object that it relies on concentration to be capable. Hence, the mind and associates do not depend on concentration to be able to abide on an object within a single thought-moment.

6.109

Treatise: If you say that through concentration [the mind is caused to grasp an object, that is not right, because it is attention (manaskāra) that causes it to grasp the intentional object].

6.110

The Commentary states: They further defend their position by saying: 'Causing the mind to grasp an object is called concentration.' We refute them again, saying: Causing the mind to grasp an object is the function of attention, not due to the power of concentration, as has already been stated previously. If needed, the defenses in fascicle eleven of the Nyāyānusāra are very extensive.

6.111

Treatise: Some say that this concentration [has no distinct real entity, and is merely one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā)].

6.112

The Commentary states: This master of the Sautrāntika school [reasons that] because among the three trainings in the sūtra, it is spoken of as the training in mind (cittasikṣā), and among the limbs of dhyāna, it is spoken of as one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā), therefore it does not exist apart from mind.

6.113

The Treatise: That is not a sound proof... because it is spoken of in those terms.

6.114

The Commentary states: We now refute this, saying it is not so. It is called 'training in mind' because it is based on collecting the mind; it is called 'one-pointedness of mind' because it causes the mind to abide on one object—thus it is spoken of as mind, but its substance is not itself mind.

6.115

The Treatise: Because the faculties, powers, trainings, and limbs... are not themselves mind.

6.116

The Commentary states: This is because they are separately stated among the five faculties, the five powers, the seven limbs of awakening, and the eight limbs of the path. Concentration is not itself mind, just as mindfulness, wisdom, and so forth [are not]. For that school, the substance of factors such as mindfulness and wisdom is volition (cetanā), yet they are not themselves mind; therefore they are used as an example. The formal inference (anumāna) here can be understood from the text, and is also expounded extensively in fascicle eleven of the *Nyāyānusāra*.

6.117

The Treatise: What is wisdom?... Its operation is cutting off doubt.

6.118

The Commentary states: This speaks of superior wisdom, which is why it says 'cutting off doubt.' Since wisdom is also present at the same time as a doubting mind, this will be known below.

6.119

The Treatise: 'Contemplation' means [examining] virtues and faults... it is not subsumed under the omnipresent factors.

6.120

The Commentary states: This explains the meaning of its operation, showing that it is not omnipresent. However, as for its absence in a foolish and darkened mind, it is not absent in all fools, because those with wrong views have a predominance of delusion. Here it is only when one is foolish and also darkened that it is absent in the mind; in those who are foolish but not darkened, it may perhaps exist. The eighth consciousness is darkened but not foolish, and it also lacks wisdom.

6.121

The master of the *Nyāyānusāra* says:

6.122

The Treatise: Some say that at that time... how does one dear to the gods know?

6.123

The Commentary states: [They claim that] its characteristics are merely subtle and hidden, and that it is also present at that time. Now one should ask him: how does one dear to the gods know?

6.124

The Treatise: Because the Abhidharma speaks of it as a universal mental factor (mahābhūmika-dharma).

6.125

The Commentary states: The one dear to the gods salvages his position by saying: The *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Ṣaḍdharaṇaskandha* are both our authoritative tradition, collectively called the Abhidharma, and the Abhidharma speaks of it as a universal mental factor.

6.126

The Treatise: The Abhidharmas of the various schools... cling to them as a valid authority?

6.127

The Commentary states: We should now object: The Abhidharmas of the various schools mutually contradict each other and were not spoken by the fundamental Buddha. How can you cling to that Abhidharma as a valid authority? This is a general rejection of all the schools.

6.128

The second major section refutes that they are omnipresent.

6.129

The Treatise: Only the five, contact and so forth... should not obstinately cling [to it].

6.130

The Commentary states: Only the five are omnipresent, as in the sūtra cited earlier. The mention of ten is not from a sūtra, so one should not obstinately cling to it. One must rely on the root sūtras, not on derivative treatises. Having differentiated them, it next concludes generally.

6.131

The Treatise: However, the five, desire and so forth... like faith, greed, and so on.

6.132

The Commentary states: In this formal inference, the five factors—desire and so forth—are definitely not omnipresent, because they are not the five, contact and so forth, just like faith, greed, and so on. The third major section clarifies whether the five, desire and so forth, arise singly or together.

6.133

The Treatise: There is an opinion that when these five... the other four are necessarily present.

6.134

The Commentary states: This master's intention states that when these five—desire and so forth—arise, if one arises, the other four are necessarily present. Only when mutually assisting one another does their operation occur, so the five must arise together. If one does not arise, none of the other four arises; this is the view of Sthiramati. In the West, they collectively questioned this treatise, saying: 'Treatises say that four objects are able to generate desire and so forth; how could these five definitely arise together? Furthermore, if there is an object that has not been previously experienced, and merely hearing of its supreme renown gives rise to longing desire, how could there be mindfulness? Because there is no concentrated focus, how could there be concentration? Since one does not determine whether it is right or wrong, there is also no resolve; therefore they definitely cannot be concurrent.' That master replies that the four objects generating desire and so forth is spoken in terms of the predominance of the mental modes of the five, desire and so forth; that is, desire is merely predominant regarding an agreeable object, so it is spoken of specifically, but it is not that the subtle forms of the other four are truly absent therein, hence they must mutually assist each other.

6.135

The Treatise: There is an opinion that it is not fixed... because they lack the latter two.

6.136

The Commentary states: The arising of the five, desire and so forth, may be concurrent or not concurrent. How this is known: fascicle three of the *Yogācārabhūmi* speaks of the four universals, and states that these five kinds lack the latter two [universals]. The third is time, and the fourth is concurrence; because they are not necessarily concurrent. If one says that their mental modes do not increase concurrently and therefore that text does not say they are concurrent, since the substances of the five would both be present, it should have spoken of it there.

6.137

The Treatise: Furthermore, it is said that these five... because they are not definitely concurrent.

6.138

The Commentary states: Fascicle fifty-five states: These five, desire and so forth, arise in dependence on four objects: the agreeable, the determined, the previously practiced, and the contemplated. The four objects that are grasped and the grasping factors—desire and so forth—are not concurrent. The treatise says that these five arise depending on the four objects; if the objects are not necessarily concurrent, desire and so forth are not necessarily concurrent. Because the objects grasped and the grasping factors are each not definitely concurrent, they do not necessarily assist each other. How is this meaning explained?

6.139

The Treatise: It should be said that among these five... only recollective mindfulness arises.

6.140

The Commentary states: When these five—desire and so forth—take the four objects as conditions, sometimes one arises: toward an agreeable object, only desire arises. Since the object has not been repeatedly practiced, no mindfulness arises; since the object is not determined, there is no resolve; since it is not an object of contemplation, there is neither concentration nor wisdom. Since this agreeable object is distinguished in this way, the remaining three objects can be understood by analogy.

6.141

The Treatise: Or toward an object of contemplation... there is concentration but no wisdom.

6.142

The Commentary states: Toward the fourth object, only concentrated focus arises. Question: Since the objects of concentration and wisdom are identical and the two must be concurrent, how could they arise separately? Answer: Those of the foolish and darkened kind, who are extremely deluded, in order to gather in and restrain their coarse and agitated minds, focus intently and bind their mindfulness, without discerning the principles of phenomena; they merely learn to fix the mind on the space between the eyebrows and so on. At this time, they have no wisdom at all, and worldly people all know that they have concentration without wisdom. If so, why is this object called 'an object of contemplation'? For the word 'contemplation' refers to the object of wisdom, since the root treatise states that concentration taking an object of contemplation as its condition must be the object of wisdom.

6.143

The Treatise: At the preparatory stage... taking the object of contemplation as its condition.

6.144

The Commentary states: This foolish person, at the preparatory stage of restraining the mind, has a slight degree of hearing and reflecting: either following a teacher's tradition, he hears the instruction to restrain the mind at the space between the eyebrows, or alone searching the sūtras and treatises, he sees the phrase about restraining the mind, having a slight degree of discernment. However, when restraining the mind, he merely abides on the object and binds his mind between the eyebrows, unable to discern. The object that is the condition for this concentration, based on the preceding preparatory stage, is called 'an object of contemplation.'

6.145

The Treatise: Or based on the majority... their kinds are indeed numerous.

6.146

The Commentary states: This is the second explanation: or, objects of contemplation mostly have concentration and wisdom concurrent. Although this foolish person lacks the mental factor of wisdom, following the majority of others, the object of concentration is called 'an object of contemplation.' Just as in the desire realm, the gods who forget through play, because of excessive indulgence and attachment, focus intently on a single object; and the gods corrupted by anger glare at each other with sidelong glances, concentrating their minds to the point of death. Moreover, some give rise to greed, or anger toward others, and so forth, having only concentrated focus without discernment, also because of a predominance of delusion; their kinds are not one. For those with such great delusion and darkness, because there is only concentration, one concentration arises toward what is contemplated.

6.147

The Treatise: Or toward an object of contemplation... running scattered and investigating.

First 147 of 998 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese