成唯識論述記 6.90

6.90

The Commentary states: We now refute their thesis. It cannot be that because at a later time there are defilement, delusion, etc., or wholesome faith, etc., that categories of those must constantly exist at present to serve as causes for the later ones. If one says that subsequent delusion, etc., also have preceding delusion, etc., as their causes, then mindfulness is not present in all minds, just like delusion, etc. If [one objects]: 'Just as the self-cognition part (svasaṃvittibhāga) serves as the cause for subsequent recollection, from which one knows that it also existed previously, so mindfulness should be likewise'—this is not so! For citta, having accepted the existence of its entity previously, one further posits a function upon it; here, we already do not accept that an entity of mindfulness exists previously for subsequent mindfulness, etc., to arise; how could one draw an analogy from citta to mindfulness?