成唯識論述記 7.43

7.43

The Commentary states: From here down is the fourth [opinion], whose text again has three parts. The previous position is not correct: volition, wisdom, and ideation are not entanglements, nor are they of that nature. Combining this as the reason (hetu), there is a twofold refutation: First, it refutes the view that a portion of defiled volition and wisdom of the desire realm is remorse, and a portion of defiled volition and ideation is sleep: they cannot be entanglements, because they are volition, wisdom, and ideation, just like other instances of volition, wisdom, and ideation—namely, those of the two higher realms in their entirety, and the wholesome and indeterminate portions of the desire realm; or just like other defiled volitions and so on—meaning that apart from sleep and remorse, the other defilements of the desire realm and the defilements of the two higher realms are all not [these] entanglements. This refutes taking the defiled portion as the entanglements. Second, it refutes taking a portion of wholesome and indeterminate volition and wisdom of the desire realm as remorse, and a portion of volition and ideation as the reality of sleep. The general objection states: 'The portions that constitute remorse and so forth are not defiled volition, wisdom, or ideation; they are not of the nature of those two dharmas of remorse and so forth, because they are volition, wisdom, and ideation, just like other instances of volition, wisdom, and ideation of the higher realms.' This logical formulation (anumāna), following the text, is complete with its thesis (pakṣa); taking volition, ideation, and their natures within the thesis, it also functions as the reason. Another explanation is: Your defiled remorse and sleep should not be volition, wisdom, or ideation, because they have the nature of entanglements, just like shamelessness and so forth. Pure and indeterminate remorse and sleep are also not volition, wisdom, or ideation, because they are of the nature of that remorse and sleep, just like defiled remorse and sleep. Since the reality of defiled remorse and sleep has already been established as not being volition and so forth, they can serve as a similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), as logic permits. However, in this text, the property to be proven in the thesis is 'not volition, wisdom, or ideation', and the reason is complete as in the text; this explanation precisely conforms to and synthesizes them into a single formulation.