成唯識論述記 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.2

Treatise: The twenty [secondary afflictions] have already been expounded. […] What are their characteristics?

The Commentary states: Below, in the fifth section, half a verse is used to explain the sixth [category], the indeterminate mental factors. First, it concludes the preceding and introduces the following to begin the treatise; second, it quotes the verse to answer. This is the first part.

7.4

Treatise: The verse states: […] investigation and analysis, both each being twofold.

7.5

The Commentary states: The first two characters indicate the general name of this category; the next five characters list their individual names; the last three characters reveal the meaning of indeterminate.

7.6

Treatise: It says: […] because they are indeterminate in all respects.

7.7

The Commentary states: In the prose commentary, the passage has two parts: first, explaining the verse; second, analyzing the meaning. In the explanation there are three parts: first, explaining the derivation of the name 'indeterminate'; second, explaining their individual substantial entities; third, explaining the phrase 'both each being twofold'. What is indicated here is the first part. Regarding 'they are indeterminate in all respects regarding the wholesome, defiled, and so forth': One explanation reveals the meaning of indeterminate, because these are indeterminate in terms of realm, nature, consciousness, and so forth. A second explanation differentiates them from the preceding faith and so forth, greed and so forth: these apply across the three natures, and because their moral nature is indeterminate, and their categories are not single, the word 'and so forth' is used. If so, they should be subsumed under the omnipresent factors.

7.8

Treatise: Because they are not like contact and so forth, which are definitely omnipresent in all minds.

7.9

The Commentary states: Because in the five, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses and in the two higher realms, they are entirely or largely absent. Here contact is cited first because its function comes first, as explained previously. Since they are not determinate as defiled or wholesome, and are not omnipresent in all minds, they ought to be specific-object factors.

7.10

Treatise: Because they are not like desire and so forth, which are definitely omnipresent across all stages, the name 'indeterminate' is established.

7.11

The Commentary states: These are restricted in their realm bondage, and are also not omnipresent in the uncontaminated; this merely cites 'stages', so they are not specific-object factors. Because they are not identical with the preceding other five categories of dharmas, the name 'indeterminate' is established.

7.12

Treatise: Regret means remorse [over bad deeds] […] taking posterior regret as its nature.

7.13

The Commentary states: From here down is the second part, explaining them individually, which has two sections: first, explaining regret and torpor; second, explaining investigation and analysis. Each has two parts: first individual, then general. The individual part has two. Regarding 'regret means remorse': taking the entity to be the cause, this is what the various treatises call remorse (kaukṛtya). Remorse is not [yet] regret; the essential nature of regret is posterior regret, as is clear from the text. What constitutes the entity of remorse? Remorse (e) is regret (hui), which means disliking what has been done; when one arouses a mind of dislike toward what has been done and then regrets it afterward, only then is it the nature of regret. If what was done is bad (e) and it is called 'bad action' (e zuo), then the entity of regret would be purely wholesome, because one only regrets bad deeds. If disliking what was done is itself [regret], why would its entity not be regret, rather than being said to be the cause of regret? If one first dislikes what was done and only then gives rise to regret, and 'bad action' is not regret, what is its entity? This point should be considered. Here there is an explanation: this is solely revulsion (nirvid). If so, revulsion should apply across the three natures; why then is it solely wholesome? In this school it is not so; for the Sarvāstivādin Nyāyānusāra masters, the entity of revulsion is purely wholesome, and if one agreed with them, the aforementioned difficulty would arise. Some say: revulsion is an inspecting mind or mental factor, and has no separate substantial entity; in the Mahāyāna, revulsion applies across the three natures, which does not contradict the meaning. If so, upon what are wholesome, defiled, and neutral revulsion established? Fascicle 6 above stated: among the wholesome, revulsion is a portion of non-greed; by analogy with that, defiled revulsion is in entity anger, because by hating and resenting that, one becomes revulsed by the wholesome. Desiring higher bad dharmas is greed, and being revulsed by lower bad dharmas is also a portion of anger. If so, what is neutral revulsion established upon? It is neutral desire (chanda): toward what was done, although one does not give rise to desire, toward not doing it one does give rise to desire, hence it is called revulsion. Just as faith and lack of faith are only wholesome and defiled and have no neutral counterpart, and neutral 'faith' is merely aspiration, so it should be here too. The causes of regret are precisely the preceding two dharmas of revulsion and desire; yet saying that 'bad action' applies across the three natures is speaking from the perspective of the effect, because regret applies across the three natures. Or another explanation says: what was done is the objective domain, and disliking what was done is the meaning of regret. Here, saying 'action' refers to what was done; because it can give rise to regret, it is the cause of regret. 'Cause' means the objective domain; relying on the cause of action, one relies upon it to give rise to regret. Because the term 'bad action' generally speaks of that objective domain, it is stated overall that 'bad action' is the cause of regret; in fact, the badness is itself regret. Another explanation holds that wholesome remorse is shame (apatrāpya), because it resists evil; unwholesome remorse is shamelessness (ahrīkya), because it has no regard for the virtuous and good; neutral remorse is prajñā, because it is subsumed under the prajñā of deportment and arts. Another explanation holds that across all three natures, its entity is prajñā, because it discriminates and calculates what was done. Stating that one first does not do it and only later regrets it refers to prior and posterior cause and effect, or it means that although they are simultaneous, they are spoken of as prior and posterior conceptually; nevertheless, the mind is able to arise only due to the objective domain.

7.14

Treatise: Its function is to obstruct calming (śamatha).

7.15

The Commentary states: This is not the mark of calming among the five hindrances, because the mark of calming applies across concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā), and calms a depressed mind. The calming spoken of here is śamatha, which can keep the mind stably settled, rather than depressing it.

7.16

Treatise: This is naming the cause after the effect […] because one first dislikes what was done and only later feels posterior regret.

7.17

The Commentary states: Bad action is the cause; the entity of regret is the effect; calling regret 'bad action' is naming it after its cause. Disliking what was done first reveals its cause; feeling posterior regret later clarifies its effect, as has been explained above.

7.18

Treatise: Regretting what was previously not done […] 'this is my bad action.'

7.19

The Commentary states: Now it is shown that taking non-existence as an intentional object also gives rise to remorse. Saying 'what was done' does not require that one must regret a real deed that was previously done to call it remorse, for regretting what was previously not done is also remorse. It is like feeling posterior regret and saying: 'That I previously did not perform such an action is my bad action.' Such a matter was done on my bad part; 'action' (zuo) means placing (cuo)—it is that I badly placed this matter. In common parlance, 'place' and 'act' are different words for the same thing. Fascicle 11 of the Yogācārabhūmi explains this extensively in the same way. Fascicle 1 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'Taking longing and regret toward what has been done and what has not been done as its entity; its obstructive activity is also said to obstruct śamatha', which precisely agrees with this.

7.20

Treatise: Torpor means sleep […] taking darkness and condensation as its nature.

7.21

The Commentary states: By this single name, the compound term in the teachings is designated. This makes the body not self-determined, so that one sleeps even while sitting, and is not conscious even when shaken by others. This makes the mind extremely obscure and condensed as its nature, because it is unclear and heavy.

7.22

Treatise: Its function is to obstruct insight (vipaśyanā).

7.23

The Commentary states: This refers to vipaśyanā. This specifically obstructs insight; it is not like [torpor] among the hindrances which can obstruct uplifting (pragraha), where uplifting applies across concentration and wisdom and elevates the mind. The Prakaraṇāryavācā is identical to this.

7.24

Treatise: In the state of sleep […] functioning through only one sense-gate.

7.25

The Commentary states: This explains the aforementioned 'lack of self-determination': the body lacks self-determination and cannot control itself, and the mind lacks self-determination. Regarding 'the mind is extremely obscure and feeble, functioning through only one sense-gate': there is solely the one mental consciousness and none of the five consciousnesses; because it operates obscurely and feebly, there is no moment of clarity. This is said to distinguish it from other minds which also have the five consciousnesses, have obscurity and dullness, but lack moments of clarity.

7.26

Treatise: 'Darkness' distinguishes it from absorption […] it is not devoid of substantial entity and function.

7.27

The Commentary states: Although it is focused and subtle, it is not the same as meditative absorption, for this is purely dark; thus 'darkness' distinguishes it from absorption. Other distracted minds, though having darkness, are not condensed, but are also heavy. 'Condensed' distinguishes it from the waking state, because the waking state is broad. Fascicle 11 of the Yogācārabhūmi also states: 'It takes darkness and condensation as its nature.' However, in common parlance it is said, 'You are asleep', even at times when one is mindless, calling that sleep as well. Alternatively, fearing that the Sautrāntikas might designate it nominally upon the aggregate as a whole or in parts, the word 'causes' is inserted. By stating that it has a substantial entity, it possesses functions such as causing the body and so forth to lack self-determination, thereby demonstrating that sleep is not devoid of substantial entity and function.

7.28

Treatise: There are mindless states […] because it is associated with the mind.

7.29

The Commentary states: In worldly convention and in the sacred teachings, periods of mindlessness are also called 'sleep' (middha), but this is merely a metaphorical designation. This is precisely what the treatise means when it speaks of 'mindless sleep'. Because it is induced by sleep and resembles the time when sleep arises, it is also called sleep. How do we know that sleep separately exists and is not simply mindlessness? Because it is like the other hindrances (nīvaraṇa); the other hindrances are necessarily mental factors (caitasika) and therefore are not phenomena without substantial reality. Speaking of the five hindrances: first, the hindrance of sensual desire (kāmacchanda); second, the hindrance of ill-will (vyāpāda); third, the hindrance of torpor and sleep (styāna-middha); fourth, the hindrance of restlessness and remorse (auddhatya-kaukṛtya); fifth, the hindrance of doubt (vicikitsā). 'Hindrance' means covering and obscuring the mind so that wholesome states do not arise. Sensual desire for sensory objects impedes delight in leaving the household life; ill-will toward admonition for transgressions impedes awakening to correct practice. Torpor and sleep impede calming (śamatha) because they induce sinking; restlessness and remorse impede energizing (pragraha) because they induce distraction; doubt lacks decisiveness and thus impedes the state of equanimity (upekṣā). These five hindrances collectively can impede three stages: first, delight in leaving the household life; next, cultivation of correct practice; and finally, entry into correct concentration, where they impede the cultivation of calming, energizing, and equanimity, respectively. If one were to say that it is also called a hindrance merely by reason of cause and condition, and is not necessarily a mental factor, then it should be like the other entanglements (paryavasthāna), which are exclusively mental factors. There are eight kinds of entanglements: torpor, sleep, restlessness, remorse, envy (īrṣyā), stinginess (mātsarya), shamelessness (āhrīkya), and unconscionableness (anapatrāpya). They repeatedly grow strong and entangle the mind, acting as obstacles to the cultivation of wholesome factors. The first two impede calming; the next two impede energizing; envy and stinginess impede equanimity because they repeatedly disturb the mind regarding self-interest and the welfare of others within the gates of stinginess and jealousy. Impeding equanimity among the hindrances is not the same as this: that refers to the mind in concentration, where neither calming nor energizing, being impartial, is called equanimity, and doubt can impede this; here it is based on the two benefits [of self and other], where being impartial is called equanimity. Hence they do not contradict each other. Shamelessness and unconscionableness impede the cultivation of morality (śīla); one who possesses these two violates all precepts without shame, and therefore these hindrances and entanglements neither increase nor decrease.

7.30

Treatise: Some say: These two [...] are simply portions of delusion (moha).

7.31

The Commentary states: Below is the general explanation of the two [remorse and sleep], in which there are four opinions overall. This is the opinion of the first master: they have no separate substantial reality; their reality is simply delusion. How is this known? Because Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 55 and elsewhere, states that they are secondary afflictions (upakleśa) and portions of delusion; the Abhidharma-samuccaya says the same. When it is said that they 'pervade the three moral natures' (trisvabhāva), they take as their reality however many minds and mental factors are in that collection, and hence they pervade the three natures, whereas delusion exists only within defilement.

7.32

Treatise: Some say: It is not so. [...] and are subsumed as portions of delusion.

7.33

The Commentary states: Since they also pervade the wholesome, if they were exclusively delusion, how could their substantial reality in wholesome states be the total aggregate of mind and mental factors? One should say that when these two are defiled, they take delusion as their substantial reality, and when wholesome, they are non-delusion (amoha), being established as opposites. When fascicle 55 and elsewhere say that they are secondary afflictions and subsumed as portions of delusion, this is based on the aspect of their defiled part. Therefore, when the Abhidharma-samuccaya says that they pervade the wholesome and so forth, it reveals that they are not determinately portions of delusion. As the first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā explains remorse: taking regretful longing with regard to wholesome and unwholesome deeds—whether defiled or undefiled—as its substantial reality; it does not mention the indeterminate (avyākṛta) because that is a general statement. The wholesome and defiled take non-delusion and delusion as their respective realities, and in the indeterminate it is the aggregate total, which is why it is said to pervade the indeterminate.

7.34

Treatise: Some say: This explanation [...] because they are not of the nature of non-delusion.

7.35

The Commentary states: From here down is the third [opinion], whose text has four parts. 'Some say: It is not so': because the Abhidharma-samuccaya as well as fascicles 55 and 58 all state that they pervade the three natures, why should the defiled and pure be based on separate individual factors, while the indeterminate is not based on a separate factor but is established on the aggregate? Furthermore, the nature of the indeterminate is neither delusion nor non-delusion, and therefore they must separately exist.

7.36

Treatise: One should explain that remorse [...] deeds performed.

7.37

The Commentary states: Remorse takes the two dharmas of volition (cetanā) and wisdom (prajñā/mati) as its substantial reality. Why does it take wisdom and volition as its nature? Because it clearly understands what was done, it takes wisdom as its reality; because it deliberates upon what was done, it takes volition as its reality. It is not based on others because their capacity is inferior.

7.38

Treatise: Sleep takes the combined application of [...] the marks of the objects of dreams.

7.39

The Commentary states: Sleep takes the two dharmas of volition (cetanā) and ideation (saṃjñā) as its substantial reality. Why is this? Because it wills and conceives the manifold objects of dreams. Because of this, it is also established based on other [factors]. How is it known that these two individually depend [on them]? Because these two dharmas have no separate substantial reality: first, through reasoning, as explained above; second, through the teachings, one therefore knows that they have no separate substantial reality.

7.40

Treatise: Because the treatises both describe them as [...] they are described as portions of delusion.

7.41

The Commentary states: Because Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 55 states that these two exist conventionally (saṃvṛti-sat), they are imputed to have an intrinsic nature. That defiled portion is similar to delusion and is its outflow (niṣyanda), like faithlessness (aśraddhyā) and so forth: although its reality separately exists, it is still described as a portion of another factor; this reconciles the treatise statement that they are portions of delusion, which is why they are called conventionally existent. The Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'Dreams take the two dharmas of desire (chanda) and ideation (saṃjñā) as their substantial reality.' That [treatise] speaks in terms of the predominant ones, whereas this [treatise] speaks in terms of those that pervade the mind, because not all dreaming minds possess desire.

7.42

Treatise: Some say: Their explanation [...] because they are entanglements and of that nature.

7.43

The Commentary states: From here down is the fourth [opinion], whose text again has three parts. The previous position is not correct: volition, wisdom, and ideation are not entanglements, nor are they of that nature. Combining this as the reason (hetu), there is a twofold refutation: First, it refutes the view that a portion of defiled volition and wisdom of the desire realm is remorse, and a portion of defiled volition and ideation is sleep: they cannot be entanglements, because they are volition, wisdom, and ideation, just like other instances of volition, wisdom, and ideation—namely, those of the two higher realms in their entirety, and the wholesome and indeterminate portions of the desire realm; or just like other defiled volitions and so on—meaning that apart from sleep and remorse, the other defilements of the desire realm and the defilements of the two higher realms are all not [these] entanglements. This refutes taking the defiled portion as the entanglements. Second, it refutes taking a portion of wholesome and indeterminate volition and wisdom of the desire realm as remorse, and a portion of volition and ideation as the reality of sleep. The general objection states: 'The portions that constitute remorse and so forth are not defiled volition, wisdom, or ideation; they are not of the nature of those two dharmas of remorse and so forth, because they are volition, wisdom, and ideation, just like other instances of volition, wisdom, and ideation of the higher realms.' This logical formulation (anumāna), following the text, is complete with its thesis (pakṣa); taking volition, ideation, and their natures within the thesis, it also functions as the reason. Another explanation is: Your defiled remorse and sleep should not be volition, wisdom, or ideation, because they have the nature of entanglements, just like shamelessness and so forth. Pure and indeterminate remorse and sleep are also not volition, wisdom, or ideation, because they are of the nature of that remorse and sleep, just like defiled remorse and sleep. Since the reality of defiled remorse and sleep has already been established as not being volition and so forth, they can serve as a similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), as logic permits. However, in this text, the property to be proven in the thesis is 'not volition, wisdom, or ideation', and the reason is complete as in the text; this explanation precisely conforms to and synthesizes them into a single formulation.

7.44

Treatise: One should say that these two [...] they are called conventionally existent.

7.45

The Commentary states: This demonstrates the correct doctrine: each has a separate substantial reality, because their mental aspects (ākāra) are distinct from other factors such as volition, just as factors like greed separately have their own substantial reality; the remorseful nature of remorse, etc., is absent in other factors. When Yogācārabhūmi states that they are 'conventionally existent', it is because they are spoken of as portions of delusion, and following the marks of delusion they are called conventionally existent, just as torpor and the like are called portions of delusion, the meaning of which is as explained before.

7.46

Treatise: Investigation (vitarka) means seeking [...] operates subtly as its nature.

7.47

The Commentary states: Because their mental aspects are similar, they are explained together in one place. 'Investigation' means seeking, namely the investigation-conceptualization (vitarka-vikalpa) among the seven conceptualizations, etc., using a single term for a compound name; the rest below may be understood accordingly. 'Causing the mind to be hurried': pressed and hasty. Regarding 'object of mental speech': 'mind' refers to the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), because it comprehensively apprehends objects. There are three explanations for this: first, from metaphor, namely the mental consciousness and its associated factors, because they can grasp objects, are similar to spoken words; second, from the object, spoken words are of the nature of sound, whereas this 'speech' is the nature of what is grasped by the mind, taking its name from speech, it is simply called mental speech; third, from the result, because based on the mind speech and so forth can be produced, it is called mental speech. The object grasped by the mind is called the 'object of mental speech'; this also applies generally to all mental factors, yet mind is predominant, and being superior it is spoken of singularly. Now this object pervades all phenomena. Fascicle 5 of the Great Treatise [Yogācārabhūmi] states: 'Taking objects such as names as its objective support,' it also takes the referents of spoken names and so forth as its objective support. Here, however, it merely mentions the object of mental speech, which completely subsumes all phenomena without mentioning spoken names and the like. That treatise's subsumption of phenomena was incomplete, as names do not express things such as Nirvāṇa, as can be known in the discussion of evaluation (vicāra).

7.48

Treatise: Both of these take [...] serving as their support as their function.

7.49

The Commentary states: If body and mind are at ease, calm relaxation is their activity; if body and mind are not at ease, hurried haste is their activity. Both pervade volition and wisdom; or volition is called ease because it is relaxed and subtle, having the nature of deliberating; wisdom is called unease because it is hasty and coarse, having the nature of discerning. The presence of ease and unease in body and mind before and after depends entirely upon investigation and evaluation, hence they are called their support.

7.50

Treatise: Both employing volition and wisdom [...] because their conceptual categories are distinct.

7.51

The Commentary states: What does not deeply infer is investigation; what deeply infers is evaluation. The Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Pañcaskandhaka, and so forth all speak of 'the object of mental speech', while fascicle 5 of the Great Treatise speaks of 'objects such as name-bodies (nāmakāya)'. Furthermore, when it is said that not deeply inferring is called volition and deeply inferring is called wisdom, this has two meanings: First, volition does not infer at all, which is termed 'not deeply inferring'—not that it infers subtly—because its meaning is defined as the opposite of wisdom; as the Abhidharma-samuccaya states: 'because it does not infer.' Second, it is said: although volition is not like wisdom in having deep inference, it also has shallow inference; thus in the previous fifth fascicle, in proving that the seventh consciousness lacks investigation and evaluation, it spoke of shallow and deep inference. The Abhidharma-samuccaya's 'does not infer' means that it does not deeply infer. However, when the Abhidharma-samuccaya correlates them in this order, it reverses the sequence, but it is not contradictory to this.

7.52

Treatise: If they were separate from volition and wisdom [...] because they cannot be found.

7.53

The Commentary states: If investigation and evaluation were separate from the two factors of volition and wisdom, there would be no categorical distinction in either their reality or their function. This is identical to fascicles 5, 55, and 58 of the Great Treatise, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Pañcaskandhaka.

7.54

Treatise: 'The two are each twofold' means [...] the distinctions between the two categories.

7.55

The Commentary states: From here down is the third section explaining 'the two are each twofold'. Because investigation and evaluation are stated last, and because their mental aspects are similar: investigation and evaluation constitute the first 'two', and defiled and pure constitute the latter 'two'; the text is easy to understand.

7.56

Treatise: Some say: This explanation [...] entanglements and dormant dispositions (anuśaya).

7.57

The Commentary states: First it refutes the previous master, and then sets forth its own interpretation; the refutation of the other can be understood. Setting forth the correct interpretation: the aforementioned greed and so on, anger and so on, have fundamental afflictions (kleśa) and secondary afflictions (upakleśa), which constitute the first 'two'. Below it explains the latter 'two': each possesses the two natures of unwholesomeness and indeterminacy. Alternatively explained: or again, these two each have the two aspects of manifest entanglements and seed-based dormant dispositions.

7.58

Treatise: Some say: Their explanation [...] the two refer to investigation and evaluation.

7.59

The Commentary states: In the third [interpretation], Sthiramati (Ānhui) asserts that the previous one is not correct. Because the phrase 'the two are each twofold' occurs only after the four indeterminate factors, it is not explaining the preceding defiled dharmas. One should say that the first 'two' indicates two kinds of 'two': first, the two of remorse and sleep; second, the two of investigation and evaluation. How is this known? In Sanskrit, dvayam and dvaye are distinct. Dvayam merely means 'two': within a single noun it denotes one kind of 'two', referring generally to two, which is just one single pair. Now the Sanskrit text reads dvaye, which within a dual noun denotes the meaning of two kinds of 'two'. Therefore, a single expression of 'two' reveals two kinds of 'two', differing from the earlier dvayam. If it were not so, what other reason would there be? A single word 'two' denotes two kinds of 'two' because the declensions (vibhakti) are distinct.

7.60

Treatise: These two pairs [...] reveals the two pairs.

7.61

The Commentary states: By virtue of this reasoning, the single word "two" indicates two kinds of pairs. These two pairs may be understood as the text explains. Why are they made into two pairs? Because the categories of these two are distinct from each other. How are they distinct? First, the distinction in categories of bound realms; second, the distinction in categories of relying upon volition (cetanā) or discernment (prajñā); third, the distinction in categories of provisional or real; fourth, the distinction in categories of the time of abandoning; fifth, the distinction in categories of arising or not arising in higher stages; sixth, the distinction in categories of factors [of dhyāna] or non-factors; seventh, the distinction in categories of the natures of entanglements (paryavasthāna) or hindrances (nīvaraṇa); eighth, the distinction of verbal action or non-action; ninth, the distinction in gates of engaging meditative concentration or distraction; tenth, the distinction in categories of engaging the untainted. Because of these distinctions between the two pairs, the single word "two" indicates two kinds of pairs. This concludes the explanation of the first word "two" in the verse. As for the second "two":

7.62

Treatise: "These each have two…" up to "…because they are secondary afflictions."

7.63

The Commentary states: This means that each of these has two: first, defiled; second, undefiled. This means that each of these four dharmas is defiled or undefiled, while the two neutral ones are assigned accordingly. Why is this phrase stated? Because, unlike the wholesome and defiled states discussed earlier, which each belong exclusively to a single nature and do not extend across defiled and wholesome, [these do]. Another explanation is: this statement is solely to exclude [the assumption of exclusive] defilement, for Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 55 and elsewhere explain them as secondary afflictions; fearing they might be thought, like the previous ones, to be exclusively defiled, it therefore sets down the phrase extending to "two".

7.64

Treatise: "In order to show the meaning of indeterminate…" up to "…it is profoundly useful."

7.65

The Commentary states: Third, furthermore, in order to demonstrate that their nature is indeterminate, the phrase "two each of two" is set down here. Therefore, these two words do not explain the dharmas distinguished previously; they are profoundly useful because they are able to distinguish [these four] from what came before.

7.66

Below is the second section: distinguishing the various gates. First there are twelve gates, and later [others] are distinguished following these examples.

7.67

Treatise: "Among the four, investigation and examination…" up to "…because it is spoken by the Noble One."

7.68

The Commentary states: The first is provisional versus real. Investigation and examination are both provisional, because fascicle 55 and elsewhere definitively state that they are provisional.

7.69

Treatise: "Regarding regret and torpor, there is an opinion…" up to "…because they are conventional existents."

7.70

The Commentary states: Among the previous four positions, this is the doctrine of the first three masters. The first is that they are provisional, because fascicle 55 states that they are conventional existents (saṃvṛti-sat). Question: Why does it say of investigation and examination that they are "provisional", while of these two it says "conventional"? Because what they are contrasted with is distinct.

7.71

Treatise: "There is an opinion that these two…" up to "…they are definitely provisionally existent."

7.72

The Commentary states: Below is the second master: they are definitely real. How is this known? Fascicle 55 only says that investigation and examination are provisionally existent; it does not state that these two are provisionally existent, and hence we know they are really existent. If so, why does it say they are conventional existents? That was spoken in accordance with external characteristics, because they are described as portions of delusion. It is not that saying they are "conventional" thereby demonstrates they are provisional, just as with torpor and the like, as established previously.

7.73

Treatise: "Furthermore, it is like internal seeds…" up to "…because they are conventional existents."

7.74

The Commentary states: Below, it is established by an analogy. Fascicle 52 states: seeds of internal dharmas—as distinguished from wheat, beans, and the like—are real in substance. Its use of the word "conventional" there is merely due to a difference in contrast; it does not mean that whatever is called "conventional" is definitely provisional in all cases. If it were not so, internal seeds would suffer the fault of being provisionally existent. Provisional dharmas are like non-existents and are not cause-and-condition (hetu-pratyaya); they do not distinctly possess substance apart from consciousness, yet like mind and mental factors they are called conventional, while their substance remains non-provisional. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya also contains this explanation, because what is provisional cannot be a cause.

7.75

Treatise: "Among the four, investigation and examination…" up to "…because gross and subtle are distinct."

7.76

The Commentary states: Below is the second gate: association among themselves. The two dharmas of investigation and examination are definitely never concurrent with each other; their substances are both volition and discernment, and their categories are both deliberation. It is impossible for dharmas of identical substance and identical function that are mutually contrary in grossness and subtlety to arise side by side, because gross and subtle are distinct, just as with higher and lower sensations (vedanā) and the like. Question: If investigation and examination cannot arise concurrently, how does the Mahāyāna speak of three stages: "with investigation and with examination," etc.? For when examination arises, the simultaneous mind and mental factors would mean that the desire realm has a stage "with examination and without investigation"; if only investigation arises, the simultaneous mind and so forth should be called "with investigation and without examination"; if neither arises, the simultaneous mind and so forth should be called the stage "without investigation and without examination"—thus your three stages would all fail to be established. Because the two do not arise together, there could be no such stages. To answer this question, the treatise next states:

7.77

Treatise: "Relying upon investigation and examination…" up to "…therefore there is no confusion."

7.78

The Commentary states: This is the same as what is stated in Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 4, and fascicle 56 also has this passage. Relying on whether the two dharmas of investigation and examination have defilement, they are termed the stage with investigation and examination and so forth; the distinction of the three stages is established with reference to defilement, not relying on actual manifestation. This excludes [actual manifestation], since it is accepted that they can manifest even when born in the fourth dhyāna. Nor does it rely on their seeds, which excludes [seeds], since their seeds still exist even when born in the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The three stages are distinguished based on the presence or absence of defilement; therefore these three stages do not incur the fault of confusion. However, one subdues the defilement of investigation to enter the intermediate [dhyāna] with examination and without investigation. If not, it would be indistinguishable from the desire realm; when examination and the like are absent in the desire realm, the defilements of examination and the like have not yet been abandoned. This is just as when a person is in the desire realm: though not yet detached from one or many grades of desire, when practicing the contemplation of impurity they also subdue greed and desire, and upon emerging from the contemplation later, they may or may not regress. The same is true here. Although the first dhyāna and the intermediate stage are of the same bound realm, one must subdue the defilement of investigation before attaining the meditative concentration of the stage with examination and without investigation; later, upon emerging from the contemplation, one may or may not regress and give rise to the defilement of investigation. Nor is it that one must abandon one or many grades of the defilements of the first dhyāna before attaining that concentration, because there is slight suppression and restraint; it is not abandonment by grades. Untainted meditative concentrations relying upon this stage, as well as the dharmas of those three stages where defilement has already been abandoned, belong to this category and are therefore also named after this stage. If it were not so, it would result in failing to subsume all dharmas. There are further differing interpretations, as explained in the Cheng weishi lun shuyao.

7.79

Treatise: "Both with the previous two…" up to "…the meaning of mutual association."

7.80

The Commentary states: Investigation and examination can both associate with regret and torpor; the first two can associate with themselves and with the latter two, because their modes of activity (ākāra) are not mutually contrary. However, there is no sense in which all four dharmas can occur side by side at a single time.

7.81

Treatise: "All four do not with…" up to "…because they are not dharmas of the five."

7.82

The Commentary states: The third is the gate of association with consciousnesses. The seventh and eighth are as explained before. Regret and torpor accompany only the sixth consciousness, because they are not dharmas that accompany the five consciousnesses. Why is this? These two can arise only through forceful reflection and preparatory effort, and are not spontaneously produced. Fascicle 1 of the Great Treatise states: dreaming is an unshared activity of the mental consciousness; and when remorse (kaukṛtya) first arises, it must necessarily arise in association with the faculty of grief (daurmanasya).

7.83

Treatise: "There is an opinion that investigation and examination…" up to "…because there are investigation and examination."

7.84

The Commentary states: This is the first master. Although there is no dispute concerning regret and torpor, the two dharmas of investigation and examination also accompany the five consciousnesses, as well as that mental consciousness, because the treatise states that the five consciousnesses have investigation and examination. Lower in fascicle 56, it states: Question: When born in the second dhyāna or higher stages, eye and other consciousnesses with investigation and examination are presently manifest; why is this stage without investigation and without examination? If they are not presently manifest, how could one experience the objects of that stage through the material sense faculties there? That treatise states that the five consciousnesses have investigation and examination.

7.85

Treatise: "Furthermore, it states that investigation and examination…" up to "…refers to the five consciousnesses."

7.86

The Commentary states: The end of fascicle 5 of the Great Treatise states that investigation and examination are just the seven conceptual discriminations (vikalpa): namely, with-mark, without-mark, spontaneous, searching, observing, defiled, and undefiled, heading the list with "with-mark" and so on. The very end of the second fascicle of the Samuccaya states: "Spontaneous discrimination refers to the five consciousnesses." This master takes conceptual discrimination to be in the five consciousnesses, not that the substance of the five consciousnesses is itself conceptual discrimination. The former was proof by text; this is proof by reasoning. Since spontaneous conceptual discrimination exists in the five consciousnesses, we know that investigation and examination are not absent from the five consciousnesses. Moreover, the second fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in refuting the Sthavira position that the material object in the heart is the mental faculty, accepts that the five consciousnesses possess svabhāva[-vikalpa]; although there is no text stating that svabhāva is investigation and examination, the Abhidharmasamuccaya calls it spontaneous discrimination. Hence we know that the five consciousnesses also possess investigation and examination; this not only extends across Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, but is also sound in principle.

7.87

Treatise: "There is an opinion that investigation and examination…" up to "…because they are unshared dharmas."

7.88

The Commentary states: This is the second master. The text has four parts: first, stating the thesis; second, citing proof; third, reconciling contradictions; fourth, general conclusion. This is the statement of the thesis: they are only in the mental consciousness. There are three citations of proof: First, fascicle 1 of the Great Treatise states that the seven conceptual discriminations—such as searching discrimination and observing discrimination—totaling fifteen kinds, are unshared activities of the mind. Fascicle 5 of the Great Treatise states that the seven conceptual discriminations are the specific differences of investigation and examination, and fascicle 1 states that these are unshared by the mind; hence we know that investigation and examination are exclusively in the mental consciousness.

7.89

Treatise: "Furthermore, it states that investigation and examination…" up to "…because they accompany pain and pleasure."

7.90

The Commentary states: This is the second proof. That fifth fascicle further states, concerning the association of investigation and examination, that the investigation and examination of hell are exclusively sorrowful activities; contacting disagreeable objects, they induce pain along with grief, operating to disturb the mind. The investigation and examination of humans and devas are mostly grief and the like, and a small portion are joy and the like; all investigation and examination in the first dhyāna accompany only the sensation of joy. That text treats them separately, whereas here it discusses them generally across the five destinies of humans, devas, and so forth. Furthermore, that text states that they associate only with the two dharmas of grief and joy, and has never said that they arise concurrently with the two dharmas of pain and pleasure; hence we know that the five consciousnesses definitely lack investigation and examination. If so, then since it does not mention equanimity (upekṣā), investigation and examination would not accompany it; if not mentioning accompaniment by pain and pleasure means the five consciousnesses definitely lack investigation and examination, then not mentioning accompaniment by the sensation of equanimity would mean investigation and examination both lack equanimity.

7.91

Treatise: "Because the sensation of equanimity is pervasive…" up to "…accompany pain and pleasure."

7.92

The Commentary states: Because the sensation of equanimity is pervasive in its association, that treatise does not need to mention it. Pain and pleasure are not pervasive in their concurrence; for what reason would the treatise fail to mention them? Since it does not state that they have pain and pleasure, we know that the five consciousnesses lack them. Question: If not mentioning accompaniment by pain means the five consciousnesses lack investigation and examination, then does not mentioning accompaniment by pleasure mean the first dhyāna lacks investigation and examination?

7.93

Treatise: "Although the first dhyāna…" up to "…it is collectively called joy."

7.94

The Commentary states: The first dhyāna has mental pleasure, yet it is not separate from joy; it is just a single sensation of joy that is conceptually spoken of as pleasure. As explained in the seventh fascicle of the Samuccaya, fascicle 57 [of Yogācārabhūmi], Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicle 2, and elsewhere, by virtue of this meaning it is collectively called by the name of joy, which thereby subsumes that pleasure. In the investigation and examination of the desire realm, the joy and pleasure of the lower stages exist separately in consciousness and are distinct in substance; why are they not stated separately? The former master asks: In your places of unadulterated suffering, where it accompanies mental pain, for what reason is that also not mentioned? Could it be that because it is not mentioned, it does not accompany pain?

7.95

Treatise: "Although in places of unadulterated suffering…" up to "…it is collectively called grief."

7.96

The Commentary states: Pain in that mental ground is similar to grief because it involves conceptual discrimination; hence it is collectively called grief, which thereby subsumes that pain. In the other destinies, grief and pain are each in separate locations and their dynamics are not similar; for what reason would they not be mentioned? This is the position of the master who maintains that there is painful sensation in the mental consciousness.

7.97

Treatise: "Furthermore, it states that investigation and examination…" up to "…because their objects are meaning."

7.98

The Commentary states: This is the third proof. That fifth fascicle states that investigation and examination take as their objects the three dharmas of nominal sets (nāmakāya) and the like, as well as the expressed meanings; the five consciousnesses do not take nominal sets and their expressed meanings as their objects. By the above teaching and reasoning, we know that the five consciousnesses definitely lack investigation and examination.

7.99

Treatise: "However, as for the statement that the five consciousnesses…" up to "…it does not mean that they are associated with them."

7.100

The Commentary states: From here down, there are two reconciliations of contradictory passages; this is the first. When the fifty-sixth fascicle and other texts say that the five vijñānas possess vitarka and vicāra, they mean that they mostly arise due to them, not that they are associated with them. That is to say, when that passage states that one born in the second dhyāna or above gives rise to a lower vijñāna, it means that those five vijñānas—perhaps excepting the instantaneous citta and so forth—can only arise because they are necessarily induced by the manovijñāna accompanied by vitarka and vicāra; it does not mean that the five vijñānas are accompanied by vitarka and vicāra. This illustrates that the five arise from that manovijñāna. If in the desire realm, when the ear-consciousness arises instantaneously during absorption, although the manovijñāna shares the same object, it does not rely on being induced by a manovijñāna accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, because the higher absorption also arises simultaneously with the ear-consciousness of the lower realm. At other times, the five vijñānas are mostly induced by that manovijñāna with vitarka and the like to give rise to the five vijñānas of their own bhūmi, because vitarka and vicāra are also present in the first dhyāna. Thus, "showing that they arise due to them" and "mostly arising due to them" are two distinct senses, which are combined into a single statement. The statement "showing that they arise due to them" directly reconciles the treatise passage cited by the former master. "Mostly arising due to them" collaterally reconciles passages—supposing there are any—in treatises stating that vitarka and vicāra exist from the first dhyāna downwards: when the instantaneous five vijñānas arise in the desire realm, although the manovijñāna shares the same object, they are not necessarily induced by the manovijñāna, as in the case of the ear-consciousness within absorption. When Mahāmaudgalyāyana entered the absorption of the sphere of nothingness and heard sounds such as those of elephants, could his manovijñāna have possessed vitarka and vicāra? If according to the Sarvāstivādins, one hears sound after emerging from absorption, then no such event occurs, as was explained at length in the fifth fascicle above. By analogy with the desire realm, in the second dhyāna and above there are also instantaneous five vijñānas that do not rely on an inducing manovijñāna with vitarka and vicāra, because the object arrives forcefully; whereas their flow of identical type is definitely caused by an intentional citta that is defiled or pure. Now these are treated together. Therefore it is said, "to show that they mostly arise due to them, because of excluding the instantaneous citta." Another explanation: When one gives rise to the eye-consciousness and so forth in the first dhyāna and the desire realm, because these are dharmas of their own bhūmi, their arising is spontaneous; although the five vijñānas arise only when induced by the manovijñāna, the manovijñāna does not necessarily need to be accompanied by vitarka and vicāra—they "mostly arise due to them." For one born in the second dhyāna and above, when one gives rise to the eye-consciousness and so forth, because these are not dharmas of that [higher] bhūmi, they must rely on the guidance of a manovijñāna associated with vitarka and vicāra to arise—they "definitely arise due to them."

7.101

Treatise: What is stated in the Samuccaya […] is associated vitarka and vicāra.

7.102

The Commentary states: In the second fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā], "spontaneous discrimination refers to the five vijñānas," which differs from what is stated in the first fascicle of the Great Treatise. The Abhidharma says: "The spontaneous is precisely the five vijñānas." The Great Treatise says that the spontaneous is the vitarka and vicāra associated with the manovijñāna that accompanies the five. For this reason, the Great Treatise states that it is an unshared activity of the manas, because vitarka and vicāra are absent in the five vijñānas. If spontaneity in the five vijñānas were itself vitarka and vicāra, how could it be an unshared activity of the manas, since it would also exist in the five vijñānas? It merely states that vitarka and vicāra have seven discriminations; it does not state that all seven discriminations are vitarka and vicāra. Thus there is no fault. One should further understand by analogy: Question: As for discrimination of self-nature (svabhāva-vikalpa), the Saṃgraha says, "It exists in the five vijñānas"; the second fascicle of the Abhidharma says, "Self-nature has marks (sanimitta)," and having marks is vitarka and vicāra; hence we know that having marks exists in the five vijñānas and is also not unshared by the manas. How are they distinguished? Answer: That Saṃgraha text speaks in accordance with the approach of the Nyāyānusāra: "It exists in the five vijñānas, because there are no vitarka and vicāra in the five vijñānas." The Abhidharma says, "The discrimination of self-nature is subsumed under having marks, not included under the spontaneous"; hence we know that the five vijñānas lack discrimination of self-nature. Another explanation: The five vijñānas also have it, taking the Saṃgraha as correct. Discrimination of self-nature also has two kinds: the first is precisely the five vijñānas; the second is vitarka and vicāra associated with the manovijñāna. Because it is vitarka and vicāra associated with the manovijñāna, the Abhidharma says that self-nature has marks, that having marks is an unshared activity of the manas, and that self-nature is not subsumed under the spontaneous; because of the five vijñānas, it is said that the five vijñānas have discrimination of self-nature, which is not vitarka and vicāra; thus there is also no fault.

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成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese