成唯識論述記 7.561

7.561

The Commentary states: This is an opponent asking. This first takes the five objects of form as non-existent, which has already been universally established, and therefore poses this objection: "External form is genuinely non-existent, so it may well not be an object of internal consciousness; another's mind is genuinely existent, so how is it not one's own conditioned object?" The intent here is to force one's own mind to directly condition another's mind. Here, if it does condition it directly, then the mind apprehends an external object; if it does not condition it, why is it that it exists yet is not conditioned directly? How could it be called knowledge of another's mind? The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also has this objection, which states: "If one cannot know it, why is it called knowledge of another's mind? If one can know it, consciousness-only should not be established."