成唯識論述記 8.6

8.6

However, fascicle thirty-eight of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only has the three kinds of ten causes, and the entity of the five fruits is not subsumed under the bases; the Abhidharma-samuccaya only has the names of the ten causes and is also not comprehensive; fascicle eighteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā first has the ten causes and later distinguishes the bases of causes; fascicle five of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra distinguishes the bases of causes without separately explaining the causes. Fascicle thirty-eight [of the Yogācārabhūmi] and the Prakaraṇāryavācā state: 'Conforming to all dharmas, names come first, hence ideation; ideation comes first, hence speech—this is the cause of nominal expression (anuvyavahāra-hetu) for those dharmas.' The drift of the treatise text there seems to take the three dharmas of name, ideation, and speech, which express all dharmas, as the entity of the cause. However, the present text correctly explains their intention: it only takes speech generated by dharmas and the three dharmas of name and ideation as the entity of this cause. Why is this? Because it only says that this cause is established based on the basis of speech, so speech alone is the intrinsic nature. Were it not so, it should say that this cause is established based on the basis of name, ideation, and expression. Here, all dharmas are taken as the fruit, and name and ideation together with speech are the supporting causes; speech is precisely the cause that expresses all dharmas. Speech is of the nature of voice/words. Speaking generally of the nature of speech, it has vocal karma across the three natures as its substance: only the Buddha's is wholesome, while the rest are all indeterminate. However, because it possesses indicative expression, speech can be spoken of as wholesome or unwholesome, yet in reality it has two natures. Although names are distinctions of speech, because they lack indicative expression, they are not like speech. Speech is of the nature of karma, and except for the Buddha, all names are indeterminate. Or it may be that in the Mahāyāna, apart from sound there is no separate entity, so names indeed pervade the three natures; it is only that by using the three characteristics and acquisition as analogies to object that they share the same basis, one cannot say that characteristics are coexistent causes unlike names, since in Mahāyāna the meaning of coexistent causes is universally pervasive.