成唯識論述記 8

English (machine translation) 8

Language: English

8.2

Treatise: These four conditions [...] are established based on fifteen bases.

The Commentary states: Regarding the answer on conditions, there are two parts: above, the four kinds of conditions that can produce discrimination have already been explained; below, proceeding collaterally, it explains the bases of conditions and establishes the ten causes. Herein there are three parts: first, 'These four conditions based on the fifteen bases...', which shows that the previous four conditions are stated as ten causes based on the fifteen bases, raising the question to introduce the text below; second, the direct answer; third, the general conclusion: the collateral discourse being finished, the main discourse should be explained. This is the first part, showing that the four conditions completely encompass dharmas, but by distinctive meaning they are established differently. In the answer below there are four parts: first, clarifying that the ten causes are established based on the fifteen bases; second, distinguishing the mutual subsumption between the ten causes and the two causes; third, clarifying the establishment of the four conditions and their bases, and their mutual subsumption with the ten causes and two causes; fourth, clarifying how many fruits are obtained by the four conditions, bases, etc. Alternatively, it is explained that here the main thesis is stated, saying that by distinctive meanings of the four conditions, they are established as ten causes based on the fifteen bases; in the explanation below, first, the ten causes are established based on the fifteen bases; next, on which bases the four conditions are established, etc.; and finally, distinguishing the obtaining of fruits. The mutual subsumption between the ten causes and the two causes is merely a matter of reasoning and a collateral meaning of the ten causes, so it is not a distinct section.

8.4

Treatise: 1. The basis of speech [...] the nature of speech generated.

8.5

The Commentary states: This reveals the substantial entity of the basis. The expression 'basis' (āśraya-pada / sannidhisthāna) is not an entity distinct from the cause: speech is itself the basis; this is a karmadhāraya compound, and so it is below. It is of one substance with the cause. However, 'basis' has the sense of 'in/upon', both being the seventh case [locative]; that is, upon the substance of speech, the meaning of the cause of nominal expression, etc., is established. As fascicles five and thirty-eight of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fascicle eighteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle four of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Madhyāntavibhāga all distinguish this cause.

8.6

However, fascicle thirty-eight of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only has the three kinds of ten causes, and the entity of the five fruits is not subsumed under the bases; the Abhidharma-samuccaya only has the names of the ten causes and is also not comprehensive; fascicle eighteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā first has the ten causes and later distinguishes the bases of causes; fascicle five of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra distinguishes the bases of causes without separately explaining the causes. Fascicle thirty-eight [of the Yogācārabhūmi] and the Prakaraṇāryavācā state: 'Conforming to all dharmas, names come first, hence ideation; ideation comes first, hence speech—this is the cause of nominal expression (anuvyavahāra-hetu) for those dharmas.' The drift of the treatise text there seems to take the three dharmas of name, ideation, and speech, which express all dharmas, as the entity of the cause. However, the present text correctly explains their intention: it only takes speech generated by dharmas and the three dharmas of name and ideation as the entity of this cause. Why is this? Because it only says that this cause is established based on the basis of speech, so speech alone is the intrinsic nature. Were it not so, it should say that this cause is established based on the basis of name, ideation, and expression. Here, all dharmas are taken as the fruit, and name and ideation together with speech are the supporting causes; speech is precisely the cause that expresses all dharmas. Speech is of the nature of voice/words. Speaking generally of the nature of speech, it has vocal karma across the three natures as its substance: only the Buddha's is wholesome, while the rest are all indeterminate. However, because it possesses indicative expression, speech can be spoken of as wholesome or unwholesome, yet in reality it has two natures. Although names are distinctions of speech, because they lack indicative expression, they are not like speech. Speech is of the nature of karma, and except for the Buddha, all names are indeterminate. Or it may be that in the Mahāyāna, apart from sound there is no separate entity, so names indeed pervade the three natures; it is only that by using the three characteristics and acquisition as analogies to object that they share the same basis, one cannot say that characteristics are coexistent causes unlike names, since in Mahāyāna the meaning of coexistent causes is universally pervasive.

8.7

Treatise: Based precisely on this basis, the cause of nominal expression is established.

8.8

The Commentary states: This shows that the cause of expression is established based on the basis of speech; it is not an entity distinct from it, but establishing the meaning based on the substance.

8.9

Treatise: That is to say, relying on this speech [...] because one expresses various meanings.

8.10

The Commentary states: This explains the meaning of establishing the cause of expression based on speech. That is, expressing all dharmas gives rise to names to grasp their characteristics, and only then does speech arise; namely, relying on this speech, following seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing, or following those matters seen, etc., one expresses various meanings; therefore, the cause is established based on speech.

8.11

Treatise: This means that the expressive is the cause of that which is expressed.

8.12

The Commentary states: This explains the meaning of cause. In contrast to what is it a cause? This very expressive speech is the cause of all dharmas that are expressed. Ancient masters who said that all expressed dharmas are the entity of this cause are incorrect; if that were so, speech would be taken as the fruit. Regarding seeing, hearing, etc., they are reconciled as in fascicle ninety-three, fascicle one of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Shiyao. 'Conforming' (sui) has the sense of following along; that is, following matters seen, heard, etc., one gives rise to words and speech. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other texts are all identical to this text. However, as for the contaminated, indeterminate cause of nominal expression, its fruit extends to all conditioned, unconditioned, contaminated, and uncontaminated dharmas; this is the karmadhāraya sense, because the indeterminate is itself the cause. When the indeterminate is taken as the fruit, the speech that expresses indeterminate matters is the cause of the indeterminate, which is a tatpuruṣa compound. If according to the former interpretation the cause is only contaminated and indeterminate, according to the latter interpretation it extends to being subsumed under the contaminated, the uncontaminated, and the three natures. Its defiled and purified forms of this cause can be understood by analogy with this.

8.13

Treatise: There are treatises which state that this [...] because speech arises subsequently.

8.14

The Commentary states: This reconciles the contradiction. Regarding 'name, ideation, and views': it is stated in the Abhidharma-samuccaya: 'Due to conforming to names, etc.' That is the text of its commentary. This cause takes the three dharmas of name, ideation, and views as its self-nature. That is, the two dharmas of ideation and views grasp objective marks and give rise to attachment in accordance with expressive names: ideation can grasp marks, and attachment arises from views. Arising in accordance with names, having grasped marks and formed attachments, speech subsequently arises; thus, taking the three dharmas as the cause, the generated speech is its fruit.

8.15

Treatise: If one relies on that explanation [...] is the basis of speech.

8.16

The Commentary states: If one relies on that text, the nature consists of the three dharmas; the three dharmas serve as the basis for speech and are called the basis of speech. 'Basis of speech' is also a tatpuruṣa compound. If one relies on this interpretation, it shows that this cause consisting of name, ideation, and views is the basis of speech, because the three dharmas are the entity of the cause. Question: Why do the two treatises contradict each other? Answer: The intentions of the two treatises are different. Although the treatise does not reconcile them, the present interpretation explains: if according to the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, taking all dharmas as the fruit and speech as the cause, this is in terms of that which is expressed being the fruit of that which expresses—that is, explaining cause and fruit through the expressive and the expressed. Asanga in the Abhidharma-samuccaya takes coming-into-being as cause and fruit, namely relying on name, ideation, and views to give rise to speech; therefore they do not contradict each other, each being based on one perspective. Hence the Abhidharma-samuccaya states: 'The agent of nominal expression.' That which nominally expresses is speech; the agents of nominal expression are name, ideation, and views. Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi is formulated in terms of pervading all dharmas to express objects, taking speech as the cause; the Abhidharma-samuccaya relies solely on defiled aspects generating one another, taking speech as the fruit. They do not contradict each other.

8.17

Treatise: 2. The basis of receiving [...] the nature of what can receive and what is received.

8.18

The Commentary states: "Guan" (contemplating / viewing) means facing; "dai" (relying / waiting) means depending upon. That is to say, this cause covers both that which experiences (the experiencer) and that which is experienced. However, only when experiential capacity and object of experience are depended upon is it this [cause]; otherwise, it is not. But when someone says: "Its substance is solely the three feelings," that is incorrect, for one also depends upon food and the like to seek eating and so forth. That is, using the food depended upon as the cause for desire; if one depends on sentiment and desire before seeking food and drink, one takes feeling as the cause of food. However, the basis of experiential reception covers both that which experiences and that which is experienced; it cannot be called merely desire, because desire is not all-pervasive and is not of the nature of feeling. That is, viewing this [basis]—whether it be the experiencer or the experienced—and experiencing that result of what is experienced or what experiences, or [its] arising, staying, completion, or attainment: what is thus depended upon serves as the cause for what is produced, and so on. Furthermore, the Great Śāstra and others all state that depending upon this, one either seeks or takes; that is, the feeling depended upon is the cause for what is sought, and so forth. Fascicle thirty-eight and others state: "Because one depends upon feet, with feet as the cause, there is the activity of coming and going." This is not necessarily taking feeling as the cause, because what is depended upon is not feeling. Moreover, this treatise states: because it covers what is experienced. Thus, whether what is depended upon is the experiencer or the experienced, all are subsumed under this cause. There is taking the experiencer as cause and the experiencer as effect, as in depending upon suffering to experience pleasure; there is taking the experiencer as cause and the experienced as effect; there is taking the experienced as cause and the experienced as effect; and there is taking the experienced as cause and the experiencer as effect: these are four distinct alternatives. This is because the phenomena experienced are also named "experiential reception." Now, regarding the experiencer, we take only the mental factor of feeling (vedanā), because, first, it is constantly pervasive throughout all minds, and second, it has the distinction of five stages. Phenomena such as the object-determining [mental factors] are not constantly pervasive throughout all minds; the four beginning with attention (manaskāra) lack the five stages; although contact (sparśa) possesses these, it does not appropriate what is experienced to oneself in the manner of feeling, and therefore it is not taken. Among what is experienced, it covers all phenomena, only excluding the phenomena of seed-causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya), because this cause is remote. Only remote interdependence constitutes this cause, just as a seed toward a sprout, or an internal seed toward an active manifestation, are neither of them this cause. If it were not so, below it ought to be said that one attains the outflow-equal result (niṣyanda-phala); since it is not attained, only what is remotely interdependent attains it; that is, what is immediately depended upon is subsumed under inducing, leading, and so forth. Question: Why is it that the causal condition is subsumed under leading and giving rise to, and also subsumed under definitive differentiation and so forth, yet when the reliance-cause is spoken of as reliance, it is furthermore subsumed under leading and the like—what fault would there ultimately be in this? Answer: It is not so. Because the name is remote: what is named "reliance" must be non-immediate, whereas causes such as definitive differentiation share a common name. Another explanation: If immediate interdependence is also this cause, below regarding this result, it is merely based on what is remote without mentioning what is immediate; therefore, it does not speak of attaining an outflow-equal result, and so on; this explanation is superior. Another explanation: "Relying upon sentiment and desire" has the sense of viewing and regarding: the object must depend on the sentiment, and the sentiment must depend on the object; only then is it of the nature of the experiencer and the experienced. As for a seed toward a sprout, it is not an experiencer and experienced of sentiment, so it is not this cause. Question: If so, why is it said that with feet as cause there is the activity of coming and going? Answer: It is also because it is an internal phenomenon depended upon by sentiment. Phenomena such as seeds and sprouts as causal conditions are not depended upon by sentiment; when depended upon by sentiment, they are not causal conditions; thus what was said before is the correct meaning. Since within what is experienced, what is depended upon is taken as the cause, a sprout depending on a seed may also be this cause. Now, concerning an indeterminate cause: if it is indeterminate as cause, the cause is only defiled (sāsrava), while an indeterminate effect covers defiled, undefiled, the three natures, and other phenomena; if the effect is indeterminate and serves as cause for an indeterminate, the cause covers the three natures, defiled, and undefiled, while the effect is solely indeterminate. The remaining defiled and other states should be understood according to this.

8.19

Treatise: Based on this position, the reliance-cause (apekṣā-hetu) is established.

8.20

The Commentary states: This shows establishing the cause based on the basis.

8.21

Treatise: That is, relying upon this [...] the reliance-cause of that.

8.22

The Commentary states: The intended meaning of the Great Śāstra and others is the same as this; this reveals that the reliance-cause and effect operate in four positions, only excluding the immediate causal condition.

8.23

Treatise: Third, the basis of habit-energy [...] because it is remote from its own result.

8.24

The Commentary states: This refers to the stage where internal and external seeds have not yet matured; that is, all sāsrava and anāsrava seeds, internal and external seeds, that have not yet been moistened by the power of good friends and the like, by craving and affection, or by water, earth, and so on, are called bases of habit-energy. Because when they are not yet moistened, they can only lead to their own remote results. Regardless of identity or difference, because their natures correspond, it is called "one's own result." Now, among pure causes, it serves as a remote cause for the pure phenomena that realize nirvāṇa. Let it not be that seeing the Great Śāstra and others stating that this cause realizes nirvāṇa as a pure cause, one then says this result is an unconditioned phenomenon. The unconditioned is remote and not produced by a cause, and the treatise does not speak of attaining the result of disconnection (visaṃyoga-phala). Now this cause is immediate: the cause and effect of these three natures follow the nature of the cause; because the causal condition immediately produces through sovereign production, it can lead to outflow-equal and sovereign results. Or, among defiled causes, it may also differ in nature from the effect, as in the cause of maturation (vipāka-hetu), where the effect is solely indeterminate while the cause covers good and evil. If it is an indeterminate cause, the effect is solely indeterminate; if it is an anāsrava cause, the effect is solely anāsrava; if good or unwholesome are the cause, the effect covers the three natures; if it is an indeterminate cause, the cause covers the three natures, while the effect is solely indeterminate. This should be contemplated in accordance with reason. The Great Śāstra and others are identical.

8.25

Treatise: Fourth, the basis of moistened seeds [...] because it is close to its own result.

8.26

The Commentary states: That is, when the aforementioned seeds have been moistened by the power of good friends and the like, they are called the moistened basis, because they can give rise to close results, as when a pure cause serves as a causal condition for close bodhi. Here, it only differs from the former in being moistened versus unmoistened, having no separate substance; the nature of the result and so forth are entirely identical to the former, and the Great Śāstra and others are also identical.

8.27

Treatise: Fifth, the basis of immediate cessation [...] equal-and-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya).

8.28

The Commentary states: That is, the equal-and-immediate condition of citta and caitasika phenomena, taking citta and caitasika phenomena as results. This condition is distinguished as before: whatever the nature of the cause, the result covers the three natures, each being only its own consciousness, because its substance consists solely of citta and caitasikas.

8.29

Treatise: Sixth, the basis of cognitive objects [...] objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya).

8.30

The Commentary states: Its substance covers all phenomena; its result is solely citta and caitasikas; sāsrava, anāsrava, and so forth cover both cause and effect. If one takes the future as cause, the result is not present, and it would not be that the cause is prior and the result posterior; now this is also not so, because the nimittabhāga is present and its sense resembles the future, while there is no real future; hence, there is no objective condition that lacks a result. In fascicle thirty-eight, it states that this equal-and-immediate condition and objective condition are solely with respect to all citta and caitasikas.

8.31

Treatise: Seventh, the basis of faculties [...] the six faculties upon which [consciousness] relies.

8.32

The Commentary states: Its substance is the six faculties, covering the eight consciousnesses and taking the five faculties as substance; the results are solely citta and caitasikas. The natures of the results of the preceding three results are all identical, and the causes may be understood by analogy. However, as for the immediate condition, it serves as a condition in the present, not in the past, because the past does not exist; that is, the present possesses efficacious capacity, being able to open the way and guide phenomena so that the future may arise; when it enters the past, its function only then becomes apparent, because the result is present and the position has been vacated.

8.33

Treatise: Eighth, the basis of activity [...] the other auxiliary present conditions.

8.34

The Commentary states: This refers to the activity of the action performed and the instruments of action, as adzes, axes, and the like possess functions of chopping, felling, and so forth. "Excluding seeds, the other auxiliary present conditions" means that, excluding internal and external seeds producing active manifestations, seeds producing seeds, active manifestations producing seeds, and immediate auxiliary conditions, all the other remote auxiliary conditions of all phenomena are included.

8.35

Treatise: Ninth, the basis of human effort [...] the other active present conditions.

8.36

The Commentary states: This refers to the activity of the action performed and of the agent; that is, among what was excluded before, taking the immediate auxiliary conditions of human effort that are currently acting. The breadth and narrowness of its result are the same as the preceding activity, because activity and human effort necessarily share the same action performed. Immediate ones are not taken because they are not causal conditions. The results of these two cover sāsrava, anāsrava, and the three natures; the causes are also like this. However, when these two and the preceding five have an indeterminate as cause, excluding the immediate condition and the basis of faculties, the results of the other bases cover sāsrava and anāsrava; the results of those two are solely sāsrava, because those two sāsrava causes are indeterminate and do not produce the anāsrava; this is explained according to the six consciousnesses.

8.37

If it is the immediate condition of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, an indeterminate as cause has results covering the anāsrava. Since the seventh has sāsrava faculties and the sixth has anāsrava, when serving as cause for an indeterminate, excluding the immediate condition and faculties, the remaining causes cover sāsrava, anāsrava, and the three natures. This is discussed according to the six consciousnesses. If according to the seventh consciousness, the sāsrava can arise immediately following the anāsrava, then for an indeterminate cause, its immediate-condition cause also covers the anāsrava; within the faculties, distinctions should be made, because physical faculties and mental faculties differ from each other. However, human effort and activity here are spoken of solely in terms of the efforts of sentient beings and persons, and therefore below it says only that they attain the result of human effort (puruṣakāra-phala), without mentioning attaining the result of disconnection and the like; now they are also taken broadly, not merely for internal sentient beings. Activity and human effort are both in the third declension (instrumental case): in Sanskrit, karaṇa is the activity of an instrument, while kartṛ is the activity of an agent; hence the two differ. However, the Great Śāstra, fascicle thirty-eight, says: "Only excluding seeds, all the remaining conditions are named 'embracing' (parigraha)." This is assisting and accomplishing embracing; therefore, causal conditions are excluded. For example, when the eye-consciousness arises, taking the eye faculty and seeds as the basis of human effort, and the equal-and-immediate condition, objective condition, and so forth as the basis of activity, because the faculty is somewhat more immediate; this is spoken of taking phenomena as human effort; if taking a designated person as human effort rather than phenomena, one should understand it by analogy to this. With respect to a person toward a grain sprout, the person is human effort, while earth, water, and so forth are activity, because activity is more remote than human labor. If according to Yogācāra fascicle thirty-eight, within indeterminate causes all possess human effort: all take earth, water, and so forth as human effort, and the sun and hoeing as activity.

8.38

Treatise: Tenth, the basis of true view [...] can assist, induce, and realize.

8.39

The Commentary states: This refers to all anāsrava views serving as causes for all unconditioned and conditioned phenomena; excluding the cause and effect of views that perfumed themselves into seeds, toward the rest all are this cause. Because causal conditions that induce are subsumed under the inducing cause, they can assist co-arising anāsrava conditioned phenomena to share in what is performed or cause them to increase; therefore, toward subsequent conditioned anāsrava phenomena, they can induce. That is, the preceding induces the subsequent phenomena; "can realize" means serving as a cause for the unconditioned; this reveals the superior result.

8.40

Treatise: Generally based on these six [...] to accomplish the anāsrava.

8.41

The Commentary states: The preceding six bases are the substance of the embracing cause (parigraha-hetu). Because the preceding five bases remotely embrace, they accomplish the sāsrava phenomena of the three realms. If the six combine to remotely embrace, they accomplish anāsrava phenomena; that is, the sixth basis does not extend to the sāsrava. Assisting and accomplishing causal conditions is named "embracing"; therefore, causal conditions that immediately give rise to phenomena are excluded. Hence the Abhidharma-samuccaya states: "Just as fields, water, manure, and the like, with respect to grain producing sprouts and so forth, although produced from their own seeds, increase their power; this is called the embracing cause." However, according to what is appropriate, there are five or six; not all sāsrava phenomena are equipped with all five; when citta and caitasikas arise, they are equipped with all five bases, but non-citta and caitasikas lack them; here, the first five cover indeterminate causes, while the latter one does not; according to what is appropriate, the three natures should be contemplated.

8.42

Treatise: Eleventh, the basis of conformity [...] unconditioned phenomena.

8.43

The Commentary states: This means that phenomena of the three natures are also open to being untainted. Conditioning factors of both actual activity and seeds can comply with superior grades of phenomena of the same category. The words 'same category' exclude different categories from being the cause, referring solely to their own nature. However, the words 'superior grades' exclude acting as a cause for an inferior grade of one's own category. Fascicle 5 and other passages of the Great Treatise (*Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*) say: 'The indeterminate acts as a cause for the wholesome and defiled.' This refers to their respective individual seeds in the root consciousness; yet with respect to actual activity, their nature is also the same. That is, it also acts as a cause for nirvāṇa, as in the Great Treatise and elsewhere. Actual activity inducing seeds, seeds inducing actual activity, actual activity inducing actual activity, and seeds inducing seeds—all are this cause. Discussing this in terms of nature, it is narrow; discussing this in terms of realm, it is broad, according to the case. Treatises such as the *Prakaraṇāryavācā* state: 'Phenomena of the desire realm act as causes for the three realms and the untainted; phenomena of the form realm act as causes for untainted phenomena of the form and formless realms; phenomena of the formless realm act as causes for the formless realm and the untainted; untainted phenomena act as causes for untainted phenomena.' They do not speak of them acting as causes for lower phenomena. When looking from the result toward its own category, its nature must be the same, but its attachment to realms may differ.

8.44

Treatise: 12. The basis of differentiated functions [...] up to [...] the fruits of their own vehicle.

8.45

The Commentary states: This refers only to their own nature; even if it involves a different nature, they must correspond. That is, wholesome karma determinately leads to the eighth consciousness of humans and gods, not to the bad destinies, because they correspond. Therefore, having a distinct nature that does not correspond does not act as a cause. That is, phenomena of their own realm act as causes for their own realm; within their own realm, their own nature acts as a cause for their own nature; within their own nature, matter acts as a cause for matter; within matter, the internal acts as a cause for the internal; within the internal, the nourished acts as a cause for the nourished; and so forth. The same applies to seeds of one's own vehicle with respect to the conditioned and unconditioned fruits of one's own vehicle. That is, the cause of purification. Discussing this in terms of realm, it is narrow; discussing this in terms of nature, it is broad. It is the same in the Great Treatise and others. Because the result is easy [to understand], it is not stated, meaning that regarding conditioned things, the cause can produce the result; and if regarding unconditioned things, the cause can realize that result. When the differentiated power and its own nature correspond, it is called 'determinate'; because it is not shared with others, it is called 'distinct'.

8.46

Treatise: 13. The basis of conjunction [...] up to [...] a single undertaking.

8.47

The Commentary states: Taking the previous six causes as its nature, it does not include conventional expression, because that is distant. Conventional expression and phenomena do not combine with each other because their power is distant; hence it is not taken as its nature. Since the cause is identical to the previous ones, its results are also like that. With respect to results of production and so forth, it is conceived in terms of a single undertaking. The cause applies to both the tainted and the untainted, uniformly based on what was said before.

8.48

Treatise: 14. The basis of obstacle [...] up to [...] occurrences such as arising.

8.49

The Commentary states: Within this contradictory and non-contradictory, the causes apply to both the tainted and the untainted, and the results are also like that. It prevents the conditioned untainted from arising, and prevents the unconditioned from being revealed. However, the cause of apprehension and the subsequent three causes are like those in Fascicle 5 of the *Yogācāra*, all speaking of results such as arising and abiding. They do not mention others because the other causes are narrow, while these four are broad. Yet the Great Treatise and the *Prakaraṇāryavācā* only have the latter three, stating a single result such as arising; in the cause of dependence there are none. Here, dependence is broad, whereas in that treatise it is only formulated with reference to passion and desire, so its nature is narrow. Chapter 38 explains obstacles solely based on arising, relying on the most prominent and obvious aspects. Among the six types of contradiction, this is the most prominent, so it does not contradict it either. Here, the indeterminate, defiled, and wholesome should all be understood accordingly. Although the mark of destruction in the Mahāyāna does not depend on a cause, the contradictory cause acts as a productive cause for later and later phenomena; being contradictory to the preceding phenomena, it is called a contradictory cause, not because it acts as a cause for the destruction of preceding phenomena.

8.50

Treatise: 15. The basis of non-obstacle [...] up to [...] occurrences such as arising.

8.51

The Commentary states: Reversing the above basis of obstacle, its characteristics can be understood.

8.52

Treatise: Such ten causes [...] up to [...] are subsumed under the auxiliary cause.

8.53

The Commentary states: Below is the second section, on the mutual subsumption of the two causes, in which there are two distinct explanations by two masters. In the first master's [view] there are two parts: first, citing the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*; second, citing the text of the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*. In citing the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* there are three points: 1. citing the text; 2. explaining it directly; 3. establishing the rationale. After citing the text: the productive cause is immediate, while the auxiliary cause is distant. The first explanation differs greatly from ancient [interpretations], while the second is largely the same.

8.54

Treatise: This means that the traction [...] up to [...] are called producing seeds.

8.55

The Commentary states: Below is the direct explanation: first explaining the productive [cause], then explaining the auxiliary [cause]. It says that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* speaks of the traction cause, excluding karmic impressions and external indeterminate causes; and it is the same within the generative cause, which also excludes karma and so forth, because they are not direct causes (*hetupratyaya*). The question is asked: How is it known that there are karmic seeds within the generative cause? The text of the treatise states in two places that this cause is a productive cause, and does not mention that it has the sovereign condition (*adhipatipratyaya*).

8.56

Answer: This is not so. There is also a text now, namely Fascicle 10 of the Great Treatise: 'It asks there: If the various factors [of dependent origination] do not have a direct cause with respect to one another, why is it said that the twelve factors are established based on direct cause? The answer is: It is spoken of based on the traction, generative, and bringing-forth causes subsumed under the sovereign condition, not that there are direct causes.' Therefore, we know that within this generative [cause] there are also seeds that are not direct causes. Moreover, logically speaking, if the unmoistened seeds already contain karma and are also in the traction [cause], why would moistened karmic seeds not be in the generative cause? Furthermore, who in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and elsewhere says that the generative cause mentioned there is [only] this cause? It is indeed like this text. Its bringing-forth cause takes seeds inducing their own seeds, and seeds inducing actual activity, which are direct causes, excluding actual activity inducing seeds and inducing actual activity, seeds of different categories, and nirvāṇa and so forth, because those are not direct causes. The determinate-difference cause is also like this: it only takes those that act as direct causes, excluding those that induce their own vehicle, as well as resultant, sovereign, and equal-emanation results. Alternatively, it also takes those in the bringing-forth [cause] where actual activity can perfume seeds as direct causes, which are also subsumed under the two productive causes such as bringing forth, because there are two explanations below. The joint-operation and non-contradictory [causes] subsume the preceding causes as their nature. That is, within the combined six causes, all seeds that are direct causes prior to being moistened and not yet completed are all called traction seeds, distantly pulling their own results; that is, the entirety of the traction cause and minor parts of four causes, excluding the generative cause. If they have already been moistened and onward, they are all called already matured; that is, the entirety of the generative cause and minor parts of four causes, excluding the traction cause; these are this generative cause, because they can immediately produce and generate results.

8.57

How is this known?

8.58

Treatise: Because within those six causes [...] up to [...] the two positions.

8.59

The Commentary states: Among the six causes, there are all [types of] direct causes subsumed under the productive cause. Since these two kinds of seeds are direct causes, those among the six causes that are direct causes are all subsumed under this. If not, the subsumption of direct causes would not be exhaustive. Question: If so, actual activity perfuming to form seeds is also included in direct causes; why is it not subsumed here? Is this also not fully logical?

8.60

Treatise: Although there is actual arising [...] up to [...] is omitted here and not mentioned.

8.61

The Commentary states: This objection is incorrect! It excludes the traction and generative causes, because these two causes are solely seeds. As in the preceding six causes, within the four causes such as bringing-forth, actual activity that can produce seeds acts as a direct cause; because it is mostly interrupted and unlike the nature of seeds that is constantly continuous, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* omits it and does not mention it. This is speaking from a single perspective without exhausting the reasoning. Another explanation is given.

8.62

Treatise: Or, because it directly establishes the result [...] up to [...] seeds of grain, barley, and the like.

8.63

The Commentary states: Because this actual activity directly establishes the result, it is also called a seed and is subsumed under generating seeds, as it immediately produces the result. Why is actual activity also called a seed? There is a precedent here, such as conventionally speaking of actual grains, barley, and so forth as seeds. Since that is so, this is also like that. Among these six causes, which cause is it subsumed under? It is subsumed under the remaining four causes.

8.64

The above has completed the explanation of the subsumption under the productive cause; below clarifies that the remaining causes are subsumed under the auxiliary cause.

8.65

Treatise: The remaining causes, namely [...] up to [...] are subsumed under the auxiliary cause.

8.66

The Commentary states: This means that the entirety of the first conventional expression, the second dependence, the fifth apprehension, and the ninth contradictory [causes], as well as the phenomena that are not direct causes within the preceding six causes, are all the remainder of the two causal seeds of the unmoistened producing stage and the moistened matured stage mentioned before; that is to say, these four in their entirety and minor parts of six [causes] are the auxiliary cause. This auxiliary cause also has two types: immediately antecedent and objective-support conditions. Now speaking in a general summary, they are merely sovereign conditions; it is not that there are no slight differences, which will be understood below.

8.67

The above has set forth the causes and revealed their numerical mutual subsumption; below it sets forth the rationale.

8.68

Treatise: It is not that these two seeds [...] up to [...] because there are seeds of direct cause.

8.69

The Commentary states: It is not that these two kinds, traction and generative, belong solely to the entirety of the two causes of traction and generative among the ten causes. Why is this? Within these two there are non-direct causes, so if they subsumed them completely, it would be too broad, because the productive is a direct cause; and within the remaining four causes such as bringing-forth, there are seeds of direct cause, so if they subsumed only the two, without subsuming [the rest], it would be too narrow.

8.70

Treatise: Nor is it that solely those eight [...] up to [...] because there are seeds that are not direct causes.

8.71

The Commentary states: Nor is it that, excluding the generative and traction [causes], the remaining eight causes in their entirety are called the remaining causes. Why is this? Within the four [causes] there are direct causes, so subsuming them completely would be too broad, because auxiliary causes are not direct causes; and within those two causes of generative and traction there are also seeds that are not direct causes, namely karmic seeds and so forth. If only the eight causes were called the remainder, not subsuming [these] would be too narrow, because there are non-direct causes in them that would not be subsumed under the auxiliary. The text of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* does not exhaust the reasoning; therefore, in this matter, it is all as I explain.

8.72

Next, reconciling the text of the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* in Fascicle 5.

8.73

Treatise: The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* says [...] up to [...] the remainder are subsumed under the auxiliary.

8.74

The Commentary states: In this there are three points: 1. citing the text; 2. explaining it directly; 3. establishing the rationale. This cites that text. 'The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*'—the 'ādi' includes *savicāra* and so on. Directly below is the direct explanation.

8.75

Treatise: The intention of this text is to say [...] up to [...] fruits of their own category.

8.76

The Commentary states: Because the productive cause is a direct cause, as said before, within the six causes, whether actual activity or seed, whether already moistened or not yet moistened, whatever mutually acts as a direct cause is called a generative cause, and all are subsumed under the productive. Whether actual activity or seed, when moistened or unmoistened, all can produce and generate fruits of their own category. The words 'fruits of their own category' show that they are seeds and actual activities of direct cause, excluding seeds and actual activities that are not direct causes.

8.77

Treatise: These remaining causes are all subsumed under the auxiliary.

8.78

The Commentary states: Because the auxiliary is distant, outside of the direct-cause seeds within these six causes, and the entirety of the other four causes, all are called auxiliary causes, because their distant substances are identical. How is this known?

8.79

Treatise: It is not that this generative [...] up to [...] because there are seeds of direct cause.

8.80

The Commentary states: Below is the establishment of the rationale. It is not that this generative cause in the text of the *Savitarka-vicāra* belongs to the fourth generative cause among the ten causes. If it were solely the single generative cause, phenomena that are not direct causes within the generative [cause] would make the subsumption too broad if completely included. Furthermore, within those five causes such as traction, whether actual activity or seed, because there are direct causes, not subsuming them would be too narrow.

8.81

Treatise: Nor is it that solely those nine [...] up to [...] because there are non-direct causes.

8.82

The Commentary states: It is not that, setting aside the generating cause (saṃjanana-hetu), those [other] nine causes are named the 'remaining causes.' If one were to take only the nine, there are also cause-conditions (hetu-pratyaya) among the nine, while auxiliary means (upāya) are distant and indirect. If [the remaining causes] subsumed the nine completely, that would be too broad; and since within the generating cause there are also things that are not cause-conditions, if they were subsumed under auxiliary means, it would not be exhaustive and would also be too narrow. If cause-condition subsumed only the generating [cause], it would subsume the karmic seeds of the dominant [cause], which is too broad; if it did not subsume the other five cause-conditions, the five cause-conditions would not be exhausted, which is too narrow. If auxiliary means definitely subsumed the nine causes, then those among the five causes that possess cause-conditions would also be subsumed under auxiliary means, which is the fault of being too broad; and not subsuming the karmic seeds of the generating [cause] would be the fault of being too narrow. Therefore we know that the drift of the text is as I have explained. Here, by implicit abbreviation (yinglue), the text takes 'not subsuming exhaustively' and 'being too narrow' for its explanation while implicitly including the aspect of being too broad; all of the above should be understood accordingly. Question: Why is it that in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* cause-conditions are divided into two, with the productive cause also being called the project-seeds, and although there are two names, it still does not completely subsume active cause-conditions; whereas in the *Vitarkādi-bhūmi*, a single generating cause subsumes both active states and seeds completely? Answer: Because [the former] is discussed solely with respect to seeds in terms of being moisturized versus unmoisturized, it had to be divided into two. That which can produce an effect in its substance is a cause-condition; without dividing into moisturized and unmoisturized, the *Vitarkādi-bhūmi* presents only a single generating [cause], which also does not conflict. Here the first master's analysis is concluded.

8.83

Treatise: Or, [what is spoken of in] the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* … are just the other eight.

8.84

The Commentary states: Under the second master, the two texts are explained in two interpretations. In each of these two, there are again two parts: first, the correct explanation; second, the resolution of objections. This is the first. The two kinds of seeds spoken of in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are just the projecting and generating causes among the ten causes, subsumed according to their names; the remaining causes are just subsumed by the other eight among the ten causes. Below, he resolves the objection himself.

8.85

Treatise: Although within these two causes … they are specifically stated because they are superior and prominent.

8.86

The Commentary states: Although within the projecting and generating causes there are also things that are not productive causes (since karmic seeds and the like are not productive causes), the seeds that are cause-conditions within these two causes: first, directly establish the essence [of the effect]; second, receive fruits without end. Because they are superior, they are specifically spoken of as productive causes, and their subsumption under dominant karmic seeds is not mentioned.

8.87

Treatise: Although within the remaining causes … they are specifically stated because [the dominant aspect] is predominant and prominent.

8.88

The Commentary states: Although within the eight causes, four causes contain what are not auxiliary causes—namely, seeds that are cause-conditions and the like—nevertheless, because in all four causes and in parts of the [other] four, the dominant [aspect] is predominant, the treatise specifically says they are auxiliary causes. That is, the former productive cause conceals the dominant, and the latter auxiliary cause conceals the cause-conditions; neither is completely clear, and so [the phrasing] does not fully express the underlying principle.

8.89

Treatise: [In the section on the stage] with vitarka and the like … are just the other nine.

8.90

The Commentary states: The following text also has two parts, which should be understood by analogy with the preceding. What is there spoken of as the generating cause is subsumed by the fourth cause, the generating cause, among the ten causes; the words 'the remaining causes' mean the remaining nine causes. Why is this so?

8.91

Treatise: Although within the generating cause … it is specifically stated because it is direct and prominent.

8.92

The Commentary states: Below he resolves the objection, stating: Although the generating cause contains karmic seeds and the like that are not subsumed under cause-condition, because in contrast to the projecting cause it has already been moisturized, it attains its fruit proximately. With respect to its own causes, nominal seeds (nāmaparyāya-bīja) share the same nature as their fruits, and because they are direct and prominent, it is specifically spoken of. Abbreviating the projecting cause and the karmic seeds within its own causes, they are not mentioned, and the generating cause is specifically said to be the productive cause; for having already finished being moisturized, it is only then called 'generating,' and hence relative to the projecting [cause] it is proximate.

8.93

Treatise: Although within the projecting [cause] … it is not stated because the direct [aspect] is concealed.

8.94

The Commentary states: Although we know that the projecting cause in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* also contains seeds of cause-condition that are productive causes, yet relative to the generating [cause] it is distant; because it has not yet been moisturized, and having committed evil deeds one does not immediately receive [retribution], and because it is distant, the karmic seeds are prominent while the characteristics of direct nominal seeds are concealed. Consequently, its seeds of cause-condition are not mentioned, and karmic seeds are spoken of as projecting. Therefore, the projecting cause is not mentioned [as productive], and in principle there is no contradiction.

8.95

Treatise: The remaining are subsumed under auxiliary means; this should be understood by analogy with the above.

8.96

The Commentary states: Although within the remaining four causes there are also cause-conditions, nevertheless, all four causes and minor parts of five causes are subsumed under auxiliary means. As stated above, because the dominant [aspect] is predominant, they are specifically spoken of as not being productive causes. In actual principle this is also a case where the text does not fully express the underlying principle.

8.97

Third, the four conditions in reliance on the fifteen bases, and their mutual subsumption with the ten causes and two causes.

8.98

Treatise: How are the four conditions that have been spoken of … with the ten causes and two causes?

8.99

The Commentary states: At the beginning of the fascicle it was stated: In reliance on the fifteen bases, due to distinctions in meaning, the ten causes are established. Although above there were two texts, they only established the ten causes in reliance on the fifteen bases, and the mutual subsumption between the ten causes and two causes; they did not clarify the establishment of the four conditions in reliance on the fifteen bases, or their mutual subsumption with the ten causes and two causes. Hence this question is raised. Herein, first is the question; next is the answer. In the answer, it first answers which bases the conditions rely upon; thereafter it analyzes their mutual subsumption with the causes.

8.100

Treatise: The treatise states that the cause-condition … the dominant [condition] is established.

8.101

The Commentary states: The first part has two sections: first citing the text, and thereafter the correct explanation. This cites fascicle five of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Fascicle eighteen of the *Prakaraṇāryavācā* is the same.

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成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese