成唯識論掌中樞要 1.140

1.140

第三、外救云：聲上非即異聲之名等。量云：聲上屈曲，定異所依實有；色蘊上屈曲故；如長、短等。此有三過：一、闕無同喻，不分別彼此長等故；二、若以大乘長等為喻，同喻中無所立過，大乘長等非異所依實有體故；三、若以自長等為喻，因中有彼法差別，相違過。異所依實有中，異所依別處實有，異所依同處實有等，為法差別。量云：聲上屈曲，定不異所依別處實有；色蘊上屈曲故；如長、短等，或文字等。處攝不別故，故知名等，實為無用。

Third, the opponent rescues their position, saying: 'Names and the like on sound are not distinct from sound.' Their inference states: 'The modulations on sound are definitely real entities distinct from their support; because they are modulations upon the form aggregate; just like long, short, and so forth.' This has three fallacies: first, lack of a homologous example, because one does not distinguish between one's own and the other's [notions of] length and so forth; second, if one takes length and so forth according to the Mahāyāna as the example, there is the fallacy of lacking the probandum in the homologous example, because according to the Mahāyāna, length and so forth are not real entities possessing substance distinct from their support; third, if one takes one's own length and so forth as the example, there is the fallacy of contradiction with a distinction of the property in the reason. Within 'real entities distinct from their support', being a real entity distinct from the support in a different locus, or being a real entity distinct from the support in the same locus, and so forth, constitute distinctions of the property. The [counter-]inference states: 'The modulations on sound are definitely not real entities distinct from their support in a different locus; because they are modulations upon the form aggregate; just like long, short, and so forth, or like written characters and so forth.' Since their inclusion among the āyatanas is not distinct, one therefore knows that names and the like are truly useless.