成唯識論掌中樞要 1.165

1.165

准此中云：三相俱唯現行，現可見故，執持勝故，從勝為相。第八三相，《攝論》第二卷：以種為因相，諸法因緣故；現行為果相，二種所生故。現、種俱為自相；現、種俱為自體故。又說「唯現行」，所藏處名所藏故；論本之文本意如此；又說自相、因相通釋第八現行及一切種子能藏、所藏故。自相體通，一切種相應更分別故；因相亦通，其果相唯第八現、種，除餘種子，非異熟故。第四說：三相俱取現行及一切種，與轉識互為因果故。《攝論》云：「言熏習所生諸法，此從彼，異熟與轉識更互為緣」，因故，果相亦通也。又「諸法於識藏，識於法亦爾」等，在因具三相，佛果唯自相、因相，無果相，非熏，非異熟故。若准《攝論》頌，不唯異熟名果相，但從他生名果相。佛果現行可名果相，自種生故。前解為勝，望他為因果故。問：三藏闕一不名阿賴耶；三持闕一不名執持？答：本以執藏解藏，闕此便失其名；本各以執持名持，闕一猶名執持。又三境有差別，闕一境尚名能持；藏者所藏之用，闕一不名賴耶。問：第七闕三中一之義，應不名末那？答：言末那然通有染義，差別義，無尚名末那，有思量故。

According to what is stated here: the three characteristics are all solely active states, because they are presently visible, because their holding is superior, and the characteristic is designated based on the superior. Regarding the three characteristics of the eighth, fascicle two of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: taking the seed as the causal characteristic, because it is the cause and condition of all phenomena; active states as the fruitional characteristic, because they are produced by the two kinds [of seeds]. Both active states and seeds constitute the intrinsic characteristic, because both active states and seeds are its own entity. It also says 'solely active states', because the place of being stored is called what is stored; such is the original intent of the text of the root treatise. It also states that intrinsic characteristic and causal characteristic are explained commonly as the active eighth consciousness and all seeds, because they are both that which stores and that which is stored. The entity of the intrinsic characteristic is common, so all seeds' characteristics should be further differentiated; the causal characteristic is also common, but its fruitional characteristic is solely the active eighth and its seeds, excluding the remaining seeds, because they are not vipāka. A fourth explanation says: the three characteristics all take active states and all seeds, because they serve as mutual cause and fruit with the pravṛtti-vijñānas. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'As for the phenomena produced by perfuming, these from those, vipāka and the pravṛtti-vijñāna are mutually conditions for each other'—because of being causes, the fruitional characteristic is also common. Furthermore: 'Phenomena are stored in consciousness, and consciousness is also stored in phenomena,' etc. In the causal state, it possesses all three characteristics; at the Buddha-fruit, it possesses only the intrinsic characteristic and causal characteristic, lacking the fruitional characteristic, because it is neither perfumed nor vipāka. If one conforms to the verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is not only vipāka that is named fruitional characteristic; merely arising from another is named fruitional characteristic. The active state at the Buddha-fruit can be named fruitional characteristic, because it arises from its own seeds. The former explanation is superior, because [the characteristics] are cause and fruit with respect to others. Question: If lacking one among the three storages, it is not named ālaya; if lacking one among the three holdings, is it not named holding? Answer: Originally, 'storage' was explained through 'grasping and storing' (ādāna-ālaya); lacking this, it loses its name. Originally, each 'holding' was named after upholding; lacking one, it is still named holding. Furthermore, the three cognitive objects have differences; even lacking one cognitive object, it is still named capable of holding. 'Storage' is the function of being stored; lacking one, it is not named ālaya. Question: If the seventh lacks one meaning among the three, should it not be named manas? Answer: Although the term manas generally carries the meaning of being defiled and the meaning of distinction, even without [one], it is still named manas, because cogitation is present.