成唯識論掌中樞要 1.36

1.36

復有難言：「有情雖有種種界性，乃至勝妙界性，而言無有無根有情，如是無涅槃法，何故不爾？或應許有無根有情」。應詰彼言：「諸無根者，為是有情，為非有情。若是有情外無根物，應是有情。假設為難，非他所許。若非有情，而言何不許有無根有情者，不應道理。性非無根，何得例難」。

Again, there is an objection that says: 'Although sentient beings have diverse realms, up to superior realms, it is said that there are no sentient beings without faculties. Why is the absence of the dharma of nirvāṇa not like this? Or else one should allow that there are sentient beings without faculties.' One should cross-examine them, saying: 'Are things without faculties sentient beings, or are they non-sentient beings? If they are sentient beings, then external things without faculties should be sentient beings. Setting up a hypothesis as an objection is not accepted by the other. If they are non-sentient beings, then saying "Why not allow that there are sentient beings without faculties?" is unreasonable. The nature is not devoid of faculties; how can it be used as a parallel objection?'