成唯識論掌中樞要 2.130

2.130

《瑜伽》第八說有七倒，謂：想倒、見倒、心倒，及淨、樂、我、常。彼四妄想分別是想倒；於彼妄想所分別中忍可、欲樂、建立、執著是見倒；於所執著貪等煩惱，名心倒。煩惱有三：一、倒根本，謂無明；二、倒自性，謂薩迦邪見、邊執見一分、見、或取及貪；三、倒等流，謂邪見及邊執見一分，恚、慢及疑。薩迦邪見是無我我倒；邊見一分是無常常倒；見取是不淨淨倒；或取是於苦樂倒；貪通二種，通淨、樂二倒故，一會如《疏》。又解此隨順門故，二取收，不說。見、戒有所依緣及二義不具，非二取攝。若單緣見及俱緣同時五蘊，並前後伴類為勝、能淨是見取；若單緣俱時及前後五蘊，並一切法為勝、能淨，或勝、非淨，或能淨、非勝，並緣見及俱緣同時五蘊為勝、非能淨，為能淨、非勝，皆非見取。戒取亦爾。若緣見增，隨順戒劣，亦名見取；戒增，隨順見劣，亦名戒取；若緣二俱增，行相亦俱增者，必非二取，二取不相應故。但是法執染惠，非二見攝。二見攝者必推求深，行相獨勝故，不作如前等解，便違此及《瑜伽》等文，二義不具。設二義具非見、戒者，非名所目，故非二取。

The eighth [chapter/fascicle] of the Yogācārabhūmi says there are seven inversions, namely: inversion of perception, inversion of view, and inversion of mind; and purity, pleasure, self, and permanence. Those four false conceptual discriminations are the inversion of perception; accepting, desiring, establishing, and clinging within that which is conceptually discriminated by those false conceptions is the inversion of view; the defilements such as craving toward what is clung to are called the inversion of mind. Defilements have three types: first, the root of inversion, which is ignorance; second, the essential nature of inversion, which is satkāyadṛṣṭi, a portion of extreme view, [wrong] view or grasping, and craving; third, the outflow (niṣyanda) of inversion, which is wrong view and a portion of extreme view, hostility, conceit, and doubt. Satkāyadṛṣṭi is the self-inversion of non-self; a portion of extreme view is the permanence-inversion of impermanence; view-attachment is the purity-inversion of impurity; [precept-]grasping is the pleasure-inversion of suffering; craving applies to two kinds, because it applies to both purity- and pleasure-inversions—this reconciliation is as explained in the Commentary. Another explanation: because this is an access according to compliance, it is subsumed under the two attachments and is not mentioned. If view and precept have bases and conditions and lack the two meanings, they are not subsumed under the two attachments. If one solely conditions a view, and also conditions the simultaneously associated five aggregates, together with the prior and subsequent companion classes, taking them as supreme and capable of purification, that is view-attachment. If one solely conditions the simultaneous and prior and subsequent five aggregates, together with all dharmas, as supreme and capable of purification, or supreme but not purifying, or purifying but not supreme; or conditions a view and the simultaneously associated five aggregates as supreme but not purifying, or purifying but not supreme: none of these is view-attachment. Precept-attachment is also like this. If the conditioning of the view is predominant and compliance with the precept is inferior, it is also called view-attachment; if the precept is predominant and compliance with the view is inferior, it is also called precept-attachment; if both are conditioned with equal predominance and the mental modes are also equally predominant, it definitely cannot be either of the two attachments, because the two attachments do not associate together. It is merely defiled discernment of dharma-clinging, and is not subsumed under the two views. That which is subsumed under the two views must investigate deeply and its mental mode must be singularly predominant. If one does not explain it as before, one would contradict this text and the Yogācārabhūmi, etc., as the two meanings would be incomplete. Even if the two meanings are complete, if it is not view or precept, it is not what the name designates, and hence is not the two attachments.