成唯識論掌中樞要 2.37

2.37

Refuting Bhāviveka's fallacious inference: the pakṣa has a defect where a portion of the viśeṣya is unestablished. As discussed regarding the middle way and the paramārtha-satya, there is also the flaw of partially contradicting one's own thesis, which is unestablished, as explained in the commentary. In the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta 'like an illusion', based on saṃvṛti-satya there are two interrogations: if like the actual entity of an illusion, it is not dependently originated, hence the sādhana is unestablished; if like the illusory appearance, in this school it is not empty, hence the sādhya is unestablished. Based on paramārtha-satya, in both his school and our school all dharmas are ineffable, neither empty nor non-empty, neither dependently originated nor not dependently originated; how could one use sky-flowers and the like as examples? The sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta also has the flaw where both are unestablished; hence it is called a fallacious inference.