成唯識論掌中樞要 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by Kuiji, Translation-Monk of Dacien Temple

2.3

Fascicle Fifty-one states: up until it is not yet severed; when severed, it is entirely severed without remainder, not severed by parting from bondage.

In explaining 'touch', there are three parts: first, a brief presentation; second, an extensive differentiation; third, refutation. Within the extensive differentiation, there are two parts: first, expanding upon the preceding. Where the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of being associated with feeling, conception, volition, and so forth, it resolves contradictions below. Within expanding upon the preceding, there are two parts: first, expanding on its essence; later, expanding on its activity. From 'Since it seems to accord with giving rise to the mind...' downward is this. Within expanding on its essence, there are two parts: first, expanding on the alteration through the discrimination of the three harmonious coming-together; later, expanding on 'having the nature of causing the mind and mental factors to touch the object and harmonizing everything' downward is this. Within the first, there are again two parts: first, individually explaining the three harmonious coming-together, discrimination, and alteration; later, reconciling with the Abhidharma-samuccaya regarding the transformative power of faculties and so forth. Within the first part, there are again three: 1. explaining the three harmonious coming-together; 2. explaining alteration; 3. explaining discrimination. Because the three harmonious coming-together and alteration are neither of them one's own capability, they are explained separately beforehand, and only afterward is discrimination explained.

2.5

Here, since verbal expression arises from conception, for what reason is it not stated to be the cause of language? Because the fruit corresponds to the manifested [state], whereas conception is distant.

2.6

Regarding 'volition directs the mind': taking the correct cause and so forth, for what reason is faith and so forth said to be intrinsically wholesome?

2.7

Here, when the three come together in harmony, all possess the capacity to generate mental factors, which is called 'alteration'. Since the unconditioned has no alteration, how does it have the capacity to generate mental factors? The present explanation is: this is based on conditioned ālambanas having three alterations; if taking the unconditioned as an ālambana, the mind has two alterations, because the unconditioned lacks the capacity for alteration. Another explanation is: it relies on the unconditioned having positional alteration of being concealed or revealed, unlike the conditioned which has alteration of essence. Because the unconditioned has positional differences, it is described as a capacity, whereas its essence lacks capacity. Just as the seventh consciousness takes the eighth as faculty and again relies on it as object, touch is said to be the coming together of two.

2.8

In explaining activity, it first explains the general text, and from 'The Qijin jing states' downward, cites sūtras to establish and verify.

2.9

Within resolving contradictions, there are two parts: first, reconciling with the Yogācāra[bhūmi], and later, reconciling with the Abhidharma-samuccaya.

2.10

In explaining association (saṃprayukta), time and basis are identical, while cognitive object (ālambana) and substantive entity (dravya) are equal. If viewed according to the original archetype (bimba), or where there is no original archetype, dharmas are all called 'equal' because they simultaneously take the same realm as cognitive object, which is distinct from being equal in substantive entity. If they are called 'equal' because their reflected images (pratibimba) resemble each other, in what respect would they be of one kind? When non-conceptual wisdom takes Suchness as cognitive object, since there is no reflected image, they cannot resemble each other and would not be identical; thus we know that when there is an original archetype, reflected images are called 'resembling' while the original archetype is called 'identical'. If there is no original archetype, when conditioned things take aspects as cognitive objects, their resemblance is called 'identical'; when taking the realm of the unconditioned as cognitive object, being one is called 'identical'. This is based on actual cognizing, so there is no contradiction.

2.11

Concealed minds are of two kinds: first, the mind of dharma-nature; second, the mind of other-dependence.

2.12

Among the analogical extensions of mental factors: that the first master does not extend them analogously to vipāka and so forth should be contemplated. The reason each is not extended analogously is that their meanings differ. Why is it that contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra), and volition (cetanā) are all said to be [present] in minds and so on, whereas sensation (vedanā) and perception (saṃjñā) are not? Defiled nature in the ultimate sense refers to the transmigration of birth and death; why would it serve as a basis for the uncontaminated (anāsrava)? If it is said that the wholesome and the defiled conflict, it should not serve as a basis for both.

2.13

Among the analogical extensions of mental factors, the third master says: they are analogously extended according to six meanings. Now, observing the fourth master's refutation, he does not extend them analogously to discernment and co-occurring with sensation, but extends them analogously to six categories. Although there is the objection that contact co-occurs with contact, allowing the five dharmas to co-occur serves as the basis for the analogical extension. In all three explanations, that which an arhat does not relinquish as storehouse afterward, where only the primary mind (citta) relinquishes the storehouse, serves as the reason for mental factors not relinquishing the storehouse. The earlier analogical extensions are like this; otherwise, why make an analogical extension midway? Thus, relying on the first two explanations is correct, along with the fourth explanation.

2.14

Within the refutation there are ten [parts]: 1. General negation; 2. Cross-examination; 3. Objecting so that it cannot receive perfuming; 4. Hypothetically granting the receipt of perfuming to raise objections; 5. The opponent's salvage; 6. Further cross-examination; 7. Their explanation; 8. The direct objection; 9. Turning the question; 10. Stating the proper thesis.

2.15

Under the fourth [part], hypothetically granting the receipt of perfuming to raise objections, there are five [flaws]: 1. The flaw that one entity becomes six substances; 2. The flaw of multiple causes producing a single effect; 3. The flaw of the five kinds being useless; 4. The flaw of capacities being equal and not sequential; 5. The flaw of simultaneously producing six effects.

2.16

'Furthermore, what they say' is turning the question.

2.17

'Because of these,' and so on, states the proper thesis.

2.18

In the three metaphors for eternal flowing: 1. The metaphor of sinking and floating between the two destinies; 2. The metaphor of waves arising when encountering conditions; 3. The metaphor of drifting internal and external things. Who but a Buddha could bring this to an end?

2.19

There are four Sarvāstivādins. Here there are four kinds: differences of genre (bhāva), characteristic (lakṣaṇa), state (avasthā), and relativity (anyathātva). The third, positing the time periods based on functional activity (kāritra), is the most excellent, as in the twentieth fascicle of the Kośa.

2.20

In refuting the Sthavira masters' and others' views on cause and effect, there are two parts: 1. Stating their thesis; 2. The direct refutation. Within stating their thesis there are three parts: 1. General presentation; 2. Distinct demonstration; 3. General conclusion. The passage from 'Cause and effect being like this' downward is this.

2.21

Within the distinct demonstration there are three parts: 1. Adducing extreme velocity to clarify time; 2. Adducing a single substance forming two; 3. Adducing two substances to manifest coexistence.

2.22

Within the direct refutation there are seven parts: 1. General negation and initiating inquiry; 2. Showing contradiction to refute the time periods; 3. Determining existence and nonexistence to raise questions; 4. Hypothetically granting that cessation exists to cross-examine in return; 5. Setting forth contradiction so that substances are one; 6. Pursuing identity and difference so that reason is violated; 7. Concluding generally and stating the intent of the objection.

2.23

The Prajñāpāramitā disparages bodhisattvas to prevent them from entering the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti), whereas the Yogācāra says that four kinds of persons do not establish the ālaya[-vijñāna], and those who are non-retrogressing also enter it; how is this not contradictory? In according with these three explanations, [bodhisattvas of] the eighth stage do not enter it; the first master takes this as proof, thus not allowing those who proceed directly to attain the eighth stage, because the Buddha rebuked it. Therefore, those who make a detour are called 'non-retrogressing'.

2.24

The second clarifies that those who proceed directly are called 'non-retrogressing'. There are two meanings here: One says that the Yogācāra is correct, and that the Buddha rebuked indulging in its enjoyment because it lacks superior benefit, not that they do not enter it. Another explanation holds that the sūtra is correct: the Yogācāra speaks based on the maturation of non-retrogressing [bodhisattvas]; at first they had entered it, but later, because of the rebuke, they do not enter it. Because of mastery, it is also said that non-retrogressing [bodhisattvas] enter the attainment, while in reality they do not enter it. Examine the names of the lesser, greater, and extensive practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The third fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana, corresponding to the seventy-eighth fascicle of the Yogācāra, states: 'Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, regarding the defilements that these bodhisattvas generate in the various grounds, what should their characteristics, faults, and virtues be known to be?" "Good son, they do not have the characteristic of defilement. Why? In the first ground, these bodhisattvas have already thoroughly penetrated the dharmadhātu of all dharmas in reality; through this cause and condition, a bodhisattva gives rise to defilements only with knowledge, not without knowledge. Therefore, they are said to lack the characteristic of defilement. Because they cannot produce suffering within their own bodies, they are without fault. When a bodhisattva gives rise to such defilements, they can sever the causes of suffering in the realm of sentient beings; therefore, they possess immeasurable virtues." "Most wondrous, World-Honored One! Unsurpassed bodhi has such great benefits of virtue that it enables bodhisattvas to give rise to defilements that still surpass all the wholesome roots of sentient beings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, to say nothing of their other immeasurable virtues!"'

2.25

Why is it that when mind applies to all stages, it is said that it should be spoken of according to the meaning, whereas when vipāka also applies to all stages, it is not said to be according to the meaning? Since its relinquishment has already been separately stated, why would it need to be stated again?

2.26

Relying on the *Wuxiang lun* and the *Tongxing jing*: the untainted consciousness (amalavijñāna) is the consciousness-mind of intrinsic nature, which is the principle of Suchness (tathatā); thus we know that untaintedness applies to both kinds.

2.27

However, the fundamental consciousness has eighteen names. A verse says:

2.28

Non-sinking, fundamental, abode, storehouse, seed, untainted, holding, condition,
Manifesting, appearing, transforming, mind, support, maturation, consciousness, origin, birth, existence.

2.29

'The realm (dhātu) since beginningless time, the equal support of all dharmas; / Due to this there are all destinies (gati), and the attainment of nirvāṇa.' The commentary by Asvabhāva on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Since beginningless time' shows that the nature of this consciousness lacks an initial limit; 'realm' means cause, which is the seed consciousness. Of what is it the causal seed? It means of all dharmas. 'Equal support' means because it can sustain them, not because of causal nature; the meaning of being able to sustain is the meaning of support, not the meaning of causality. Because the nature of what is supported and that which supports are distinct; if this were not so, the word 'realm' would already be sufficient, so why make use of further words? The intention of these two lines: 'Since beginningless time' shows that the nature of this consciousness has no initial limit, which qualifies both lines; 'the realm of all dharmas' means it serves as a causal condition (hetu-pratyaya) for contaminated dharmas, and as a support and so forth for uncontaminated dharmas; due to being the realm of all dharmas, there are all destinies; due to serving as an equal support, 'there is the attainment of nirvāṇa.' This is partially similar to the second alternative explanation in the Cheng weishi lun, yet slightly different, as can be known from the text.

2.30

In 'Because it gathers and stores all dharmas, it is the all-seed consciousness,' there are three explanations: The first says that here it only adduces that which stores to name it 'ālaya', not the meaning of being stored, fully clarifying that which stores in contrast to the primary nature. The second says that here all three storehouses are fully present; adducing that which gathers and stores manifests the nature of that which is stored, because defiled seeds serve mutually as conditions, and through this it can grasp internally as self, which is the meaning of clinging and storing; thus it possesses all three storehouses. These two explanations above are stated in the prose of the treatise. The third meaning says: in reality, ālaya is only based on clinging and storing; now, based on that which stores possessing great sovereignty and resembling permanence and oneness, it distinctly resembles a self, manifesting the meaning of being clung to and stored by self-love; the intention is precisely that it is named 'ālaya' because it is clung to and stored. If ālaya were explained by that which stores, the Buddha fruit should be so named. If it were explained by the meanings of that which stores and that which is stored, the non-learners of the two vehicles and those from the eighth stage onward should obtain this name. Therefore, only clinging and storing is named 'ālaya'; if this is lacking, it is not. Now, adducing that which stores manifests the defiled storehouse: the Buddha has only that which stores; the non-learners of the two vehicles and those from the eighth stage onward have the two—that which stores and that which is stored; apart from these, there are three storehouses; therefore it is named 'ālaya' based on clinging and storing. In the treatise's 'To the superior I reveal it,' the treatise text speaks purely based on the ultimate realization of the fruit, thereby establishing the primary name. The primary name also applies to the stages prior to the bhūmis and so on; those of indeterminate nature are logically included within it; those above the bhūmis and prior to the bhūmis are subsumed as appropriate. When those determined for the two vehicles born in the formless realm have faith in the eighth consciousness and obtain entry into the cessation attainment, it is clear that it is also taught for them; however, because it is not primary and ultimately cannot obtain the great fruit, they are excluded here.

2.31

'I do not reveal it to the foolish'—Asvabhāva explains: 'To those harboring the view of self, it is not revealed, fearing that they would conceptually grasp it as a self. How could that sort conceptually grasp it? Because throughout the bounds of birth and death, its cognitive aspect is of one uniform kind without alteration.' This manifests that for ordinary beings of determined nature in the two vehicles whose innate view [of self] has not yet been eliminated, it cannot be taught to them, fearing an increase in conceptual views; it does not mean that it is not taught to those who have attained sageliness. Now we object: If it is not taught to ordinary beings because they possess the innate view, it should be taught to those of the two vehicles who have already severed it. If it is taught to those who are not foolish regarding dharmas, ordinary beings of determined nature also include those who are not foolish; why is it not taught to them? Thus we know it is not primarily taught to ordinary beings. Although Asvabhāva says it is not revealed to those harboring the view of self, it is not an exhaustive explanation. Furthermore, when this treatise says it obstructs the arising of the noble path, this holds for ordinary beings of determined nature, agreeing with Asvabhāva, because the bodies of noble ones do not further obstruct the noble path. Moreover, although it is not taught to the noble ones of the two vehicles, most of them are not foolish regarding dharmas, unlike ordinary beings; the intention is that it is not primarily taught to them, not that it is not taught secondarily.

2.32

In 'Establishing that the Mahāyāna is the word of the Buddha,' the treatise contains ten inferences (anumāna). To the first four counter-positions, the words 'delighting in the Mahāyāna' and 'accepted' are added to avoid the flaw of unestablished in either party (anyatarāsiddha), taking being subsumed under authentic teaching as the proposition (pakṣa), thereby establishing four reasons (hetu). Among the seven reasons of proof, under the first, 'not previously prophesied', there are further three inferences: One says: if the Mahāyāna, abiding within its own dharma, is spoken of broadly to destroy the true Dharma, the Buddha should have prophesied it beforehand; because the Buddha constantly possesses non-effortful wisdom; like the matter of the extinction of the Dharma. Also, because he constantly makes correct exertion to protect the true Dharma; also, because his wisdom knowing the future is unobstructed. There is another inference: The subject (dharmin) is as in the preceding statement, the property to be proved (sādhya) says the Buddha should have differentiated and prophesied it beforehand; because it is co-produced by those who destroy the true Dharma in later times; like the matter of the extinction of the true Dharma, and the teaching of the donkey wearing a lion's skin; there are seven inferences. The twentieth fascicle of the Xianyang speaks of the teaching of the Mahāyāna being spoken by the Buddha through ten reasons: 1. Not having arisen previously, which is this first reason; 2. Currently unknowable, which is this second; 3. Having extensive effects; 4. Being an extremely heavy obstacle, which is absent here; 5. Not being the domain of investigation and reflection (vitarka-vicāra), which is this third reason; 6. Realizing great awakening, which is the reason of 'if the Mahāyāna exists' in the fifth reason; 7. Lacking the fault of a third vehicle; 8. If this did not exist, omniscience would be nonexistent, which is the reason of 'the Mahāyāna does not exist' in this fifth; 9. Possessing an antidote, which is this sixth reason; 10. Meaning should not be grasped according to the literal words, which is this seventh reason. Among these seven reasons, each should be further contemplated to construct inferences.

2.33

The masters of the Sthavira school posit the wheel of nine minds: (1) bhavāṅga; (2) evoking; (3) seeing; (4) investigating; (5) determining; (6) establishing; (7) dynamic application; (8) registering; and (9) bhavāṅga. However, in reality there are only eight minds; it is said to have nine in total because it completes a full cycle, thus constituting the wheel of nine minds. For instance, when one first takes birth and is not yet able to discriminate, the mind merely operates by according spontaneously with its cognitive object; this is called the 'bhavāṅga mind'. When an object arrives and the mind is about to cognize it, alertness arises; this is called 'evoking'. Once that mind operates upon this object, 'seeing' illuminates it. Having seen it, it then 'investigates' by examining its good or bad [qualities]. Having examined it, it then 'determines' by recognizing its good or bad [qualities]. Then the 'establishing mind' initiates verbal discrimination to state its good or bad [qualities]. Consequent upon its good or bad [qualities], there is action, and the mind of 'dynamic application' arises. Once the action has been initiated and is about to subside, it then 'registers' by reflecting back on the action previously performed. Having registered it, it then returns to 'bhavāṅga', operating spontaneously according with its cognitive object. Because there are 'nine minds', the sense of a wheel is properly constituted. Among these, the seeing mind applies to the six consciousnesses, while the rest are solely mental consciousness. The bhavāṅga mind applies to death and birth; the registering mind only applies to death. For one who is free from desire and dies, there is only the bhavāṅga mind; since they have no self-love, there is nothing to register and no lingering attachment arises. One who is not free from desire dies with the registering mind, because there is attachment to change. If an object arrives, then [the corresponding] mind can arise; if there is no distinct object, it constantly acts as bhavāṅga, continuing spontaneously. However, the order of seeing and investigating is not fixed. The second fascicle of Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya states: 'The five consciousnesses have no discerning cognition regarding phenomena; this is first spoken of as the seeing mind.' It also says: 'Seeing merely illuminates, thus reconnecting with the preceding mind.'

2.34

As for 'the five desires are not places of attachment', when born into the upper two realms, the consciousness of self also arises.

2.35

Regarding the 'mind that accumulates and generates' in the first proof, it is also explained that because it is the cause from which accumulated seeds and bases generate dharmas, it is named 'mind' (citta). In refuting matter, the non-associated [dharmas], and mental factors, there should also be the mind that is accumulated and generated by seeds that are neither defiled nor pure. It is omitted for brevity.

2.36

To grant that a generic category is nominal and cannot sustain the real seeds of internal dharmas: in the first fascicle above, like a dike or embankment, nominal [structures] ward off real water; why would this not be so here? Temporarily halting and warding off can certainly be nominal; enduringly sustaining forever is unreasonable. If so, the Buddha's body, the prātimokṣa vows, and so forth also ward off permanently; why would their meanings differ? Warding off has the sense of cessation, so the nominal can ward off the real; sustaining has the sense of upholding, hence the nominal does not sustain.

2.37

Refuting Bhāviveka's fallacious inference: the pakṣa has a defect where a portion of the viśeṣya is unestablished. As discussed regarding the middle way and the paramārtha-satya, there is also the flaw of partially contradicting one's own thesis, which is unestablished, as explained in the commentary. In the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta 'like an illusion', based on saṃvṛti-satya there are two interrogations: if like the actual entity of an illusion, it is not dependently originated, hence the sādhana is unestablished; if like the illusory appearance, in this school it is not empty, hence the sādhya is unestablished. Based on paramārtha-satya, in both his school and our school all dharmas are ineffable, neither empty nor non-empty, neither dependently originated nor not dependently originated; how could one use sky-flowers and the like as examples? The sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta also has the flaw where both are unestablished; hence it is called a fallacious inference.

2.38

In the second proof, that physical bodies and the environment do not exist apart from mind is the fifth proof, 'karmic fruit', among the eight proofs.

2.39

Regarding 'destiny and birth', where it speaks of the five destinies: the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says that because asuras are full of deceit, they are called 'non-gods' (asura). In some sūtras they are expanded into six destinies, but in reality they are subsumed under the god destiny, hence there are five destinies. Other sūtras also state that they are subsumed under the ghost destiny, which accords with reason. Or the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra speaks from the perspective of the majority; in reality they extend across two destinies, as explained in the first volume of the Notes on the Lotus Sūtra.

2.40

As for 'arising without confusion', this is so for the realms and bhūmis, such as the five destinies and four modes of birth in the desire realm. Why? Because afflictions, karma, and fruits definitely belong to this destiny and birth. As for 'arising with confusion', just as transforming heavy [karma] into light, there are also fruits of the bad destinies experienced among humans and the six desire heavens, and humans and gods also give rise to discriminative afflictions and so forth. There are also distinct karmic fruits of wholesome karma experienced in the bad destinies, such as dragons, elephants, horses, and virtuous ghosts among gods and humans, all of which have no fixed assignment. Now if one says they arise in another [destiny], this may be termed confusion. The current explanation is not so. Those have no fixed assignment; only the eighth consciousness definitely belongs to a destiny and birth and cannot be experienced interchangeably, because interchangeable experience pertains only to distinct fruition and the like. Therefore the others are called confused, since it is not known to what destiny or what kind of birth they belong. Thus if they arise, they are termed confused; the eighth consciousness is not so, hence it is termed 'without confusion'.

2.41

Regarding 'innate wholesomeness and the karmic fruits of the mental consciousness arising without confusion': as for innate wholesomeness, although in this desire realm it also has a fixed assignment, its destiny and birth are called non-confused; otherwise, only the karmic fruit of the mind is non-confused. This is a designated name through association, not truly non-confused. This explanation is correct, because it universally obtains its fruit across the five destinies. As for mental vipāka, this master does not accept interchangeable experience across destinies, but only in its original place; or, it is spoken according to the majority, since real vipāka is also experienced interchangeably based on vipāka. 'Karmic fruit in the mind' is the text of Dharmapāla; 'innate wholesomeness' is the position of other masters. They are combined in one place, but this is not the standard doctrine.

2.42

Regarding real true vipāka and its mental factors being called the 'primary destiny and birth': Question: Is the substance of destiny and birth one or many? If it is one, it is established as a collective unity based on the six distinct real minds and mental factors; like a vase or bowl, destiny and birth would be nominal; if granted to be nominal, it contradicts the text above. If it is really one, how can a single real entity be established based on multiple real dharmas? If it is many, it would be like a single person having six human destinies and being subsumed under six births, which is a great error. This point should be contemplated. If destiny and birth are nominal, the Sautrāntika master objects: the jīvitendriya is established based on the six sense-faculties, so the jīvitendriya should be destiny and birth; since it is a collective nominal entity, it can only be established based on real dharmas. This does not contradict the above, because what it is based on is real. The latter explanation is correct. Alternatively, only citta is the substance of destiny and birth; the mental factors follow along with it and are not truly destiny and birth. Thus it is only one. Or, being together in the same aggregate, both being stated is without error; it is real and not nominal. One should consult the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra regarding real and nominal. In 'primary real destiny and birth', 'primary' means the mūla-vijñāna, because it is the root of 'destiny and birth'; the other distinct fruition five aggregates are nominally called 'destiny and birth' by association with it. Otherwise, there would be confusion, with one destiny giving rise to another. Here, only the consciousness and so forth attracted directly by the karma that produces the subsequent [existence] are taken as the substance of destiny and birth.

2.43

That one must abide in a distracted mind, and not in mindlessness or meditative absorption, is held in common by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. The Mahāmāyā Sūtra states: the Buddha entered nirodha-samāpatti and only then entered nirvāṇa; this agrees with the eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The text here may be divided into six parts: (1) refuting the Sautrāntikas. As in dreamless sleep, pravṛtti-vijñāna is absent, but other schools do not say so. Next, refuting the Sarvāstivādins and others. (3) Revealing true vipāka. The other three sections of text are clear in themselves.

2.44

Regarding 'at the time of taking birth and dying, the ākāras and ālambanas of the six pravṛtti-vijñānas must be knowable': the Sarvāstivādins and others assert that mental consciousness has knowable ākāras. Therefore, we now object to them, saying: if they were knowable, they should be clearly knowable just as in other states. Since there is no discrimination, it is clear that it is not mental consciousness.

2.45

Nāmarūpa conditioning each other is as explained in the Praise of the Heart Sūtra: 'Arbuda': here translated as blister; it gradually thickens like a blister. 'Peśī': translated as curdled flesh; they call coagulated blood also 'peśī'. 'Ghana': here translated as thick; it gradually solidifies and thickens. This agrees with the Five Kings Sūtra. 'Praśākhā': translated as possessing faculties; that is, the fifth seven-day period.

2.46

Fascicle Four

2.47

At the end of the proof of the four nutriments, it states that saying that sentient beings abide supported by nutriment is in all cases said in terms of manifestation. The Chapter on the Examination of the Tathāgata in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'The Tathāgata is also called a sentient being.' Furthermore, the thirtieth fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: 'Among two-footed, four-footed, and other sentient beings, he is supreme and most exalted,' and so forth; saying that he is a sentient being is entirely an expedient manifestation. It also says that he is supreme among sentient beings; why must the Buddha's body actually be a sentient being? Entering the city to beg for food and the like are all called abiding supported by nutriment, which is also a manifestation. The fifth fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya] states: (1) nutriment for abiding on an impure support, which refers to ordinary beings of the desire realm due to being fully bound; (2) nutriment for abiding on a pure and impure support, which refers to trainees (śaikṣa) and ordinary beings of the form and formless realms due to having remaining bonds; (3) nutriment for abiding on a pure support, which refers to arhats and others, because of being liberated from all bonds; (4) nutriment for abiding on a manifest support, which refers to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas who have attained great majestic power, because they abide solely through the manifested power of food. The tenth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is also the same: solely manifest nutriment is spoken of only for the Buddhas; the World-Honoured One does not actually receive food, nor does he depend on food. That text constructs its discussion around the four nutriments, and thus does not speak of bodhisattvas. Vipāka-vijñāna nutriment is not a manifestation for them, so the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya] conducts its discussion based on three nutriments; because it is constantly conjoined with the anāsrava, there are in reality no three nutriments, and hence it is called manifest; there is in reality no contradiction. Furthermore, this treatise relies on the fact that bodhisattvas from the eighth bhūmi onward are truly sentient beings, not manifestations; although they manifest the three nutriments, it does not speak of them. The Buddha manifests as a sentient being, and therefore is not comparable. Or, it refers specifically to kavaḍīkārāhāra, which those beyond the eighth bhūmi truly do not depend on for sustenance. Question: Why among the four nutriments does only one enter into nourishment, while the other three do not; and among the four kinds of nourishment, why are three not nutriment? The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra itself explains the latter question; what about the former question?

2.48

Regarding 'nirodha-samāpatti', the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa says: there are two kinds of mind: (1) the mind that accumulates and generates, because it is the place where immeasurable seeds accumulate and arise; (2) the diverse mind, because it operates with distinct ālambanas and ākāras. In states such as nirodha-samāpatti, the second mind is absent, and therefore it is called 'mindless'; just as a horse missing one leg is also called 'legless'. As for 'the ākāras of the eye-consciousness and the others are coarse, and their active arising necessarily involves labor and anxiety', and so on: this follows the common doctrine of the three vehicles; in reality, bodhisattvas beyond the eighth bhūmi have no sāsrava minds, so why would they necessarily involve labor and anxiety?

2.49

The refutation of the Sarvāstivādin position that consciousness does not depart from the body in nirodha-samāpatti has two parts: first narrating their position, and then properly refuting it. Within the refutation there are five points: (1) the objection that it should cease like samjñā; (2) the objection that life-span does not depart from the body; (3) the objection that they would not be a sentient being; (4) the objection that faculties and life-span would lack support; (5) the objection that the sūtra states it lacks affiliation. The Sarvāstivādin says: 'Feeling and conception were specifically reviled beforehand; the mental activities are spoken of as absent, but the substance of consciousness is not a mental activity, and therefore is said to exist in nirodha-samāpatti.' If so, one objects: 'The substance of consciousness is not a mental activity, and though really absent in nirodha-samāpatti is said to exist; life-span and so forth are not mental activities, and though really absent within the absorption should be said to exist.' Therefore the treatise says: 'Life-span, warmth, and the faculties should also be like consciousness,' which would result in a great error.

2.50

The refutation of the original doctrine of the Sautrāntikas has two parts: first through four objections, and then concluding them. The four objections are: (1) without a cause, the fruit does not arise; (2) that which lacks substantial entity cannot be a cause; (3) the others cannot receive perfuming, etc.; (4) establishing the existence of consciousness through anumāna. The second part, from 'by this line of reasoning' downward, is the conclusion.

2.51

In the seven sections refuting the existence of mental factors: in the fourth section, refuting the rejoinder, there are eight points: (1) taking speech as identical with mental activity;

2.52

2. carefully examining the omnipresent and non-omnipresent dharmas in order to raise subsequent objections. In this there are three points: first, a general statement;

2.53

second, showing their presence or absence according to circumstances;

2.54

third, concluding with the correct position;

2.55

3. objecting that volition (cetanā), like feeling and conception, should also cease together with them;

2.56

4. objecting that faith and the others are also absent;

2.57

5. that feeling and conception, by analogy with volition, should exist;

2.58

6. that by analogy with contact (sparśa), they should exist;

2.59

7. that feeling by analogy should be like this;

2.60

8. that conception by analogy is the same as this.

2.61

In the seventh section of refutation, there are five points: (1) generally negating the rejoinder;

2.62

2. citing sūtras to refute the analogy;

2.63

3. concluding the established thesis;

2.64

4. that by analogy there would be feeling and conception;

2.65

Fifth is the flaw of contradicting scripture.

2.66

Within the refutation of the absence of mental factors, there are five questions and answers. In the initial objection there are seven [points]: first, the objection that the citta would be identical with the absent [factors];

2.67

second, the objection that phenomena would cease following the cessation of universal [factors];

2.68

third, the objection that feeling would not be a universal ground [factor];

2.69

fourth, the objection that consciousness would not be associated;

2.70

fifth, the objection that it would lack basis and cognitive object;

2.71

sixth, the objection that [it must have contact,] as the sūtra states there is contact;

2.72

seventh, the objection that feeling and the others are necessarily concurrent.

2.73

Refuting the defiled indeterminate mind in the cessation attainment: It says that because other defiled indeterminate minds necessarily possess mental factors, here [the proposition (pakṣa)] is: 'The mind necessarily possesses mental factors.' Only when one adds the words 'the mind in the state of the cessation attainment' is the phrasing complete; otherwise, there would be the fault of proving what is already established (siddhasādhana). 'Because it is a defiled indeterminate mind' is the reason (hetu). 'Like other defiled indeterminate minds' is the example (dṛṣṭānta). The reason lacks the word 'because' (gu), and the example lacks the word 'like' (ru); otherwise the text is complete and should be read and grasped according to its meaning.

2.74

In the tenth proof, 'taking mind as the root': in the general clause of the various schools, conditioned and unconditioned, defiled and pure phenomena all take mind as their root. For the Sarvāstivāda and others, unconditioned phenomena are manifested by mind, and conditioned phenomena arise due to mind; because the causal efficacy of defiled and pure phenomena arising due to mind is most supreme, it is said to be the root. Therefore the sūtra says: 'If the mind is defiled or pure, sentient beings are defiled or pure.' Although the Sautrāntika master's intention is also like this, yet because mind receives perfuming and excels the faculties and the like, and because it pervades all realms, it is said that mind is the root. Although the general clause of conditioned phenomena and the specific clause of unconditioned phenomena are born due to mind—meaning that form and non-associated [formations] only begin to arise because mind serves as their homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu), co-arising cause (sahabhū-hetu), fruition cause (vipāka-hetu), and so forth. Although the principle is the same for the various mental factors, they are adjacent to the mind and abide only by relying on the mind. The preceding two clauses specifically address the Sarvāstivāda, and the subsequent two clauses address the Sautrāntika, as can be known from the text. The Commentary only recounts the four explanations of the Mahāyāna, while here it provides a general explanation. However, observing the intention of the subsequent text, it refutes both schools simultaneously, and therefore provides this explanation.

2.75

Regarding 'Karmic fruition, going and returning between realms and stages, and subsequent arising would lack a cause': Chapter Three of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'If someone dies in this non-equipoised stage and takes birth, relying on the manas of the intermediate existence (antarābhava) state, defiled mental consciousness arises, linking rebirth in succession. This defiled mental consciousness ceases in the intermediate existence, and in the mother's womb, consciousness and the kalala blend with each other. If mental consciousness blends with that, once they have blended, relying on this consciousness, mental consciousness operates in the mother's womb. If so, then two mental consciousnesses should operate simultaneously in the mother's womb,' up to extensive explanations.

2.76

'Being widely separated in time, there is no sense of condition' is addressed to the Sarvāstivāda. Because form in the state of consciousness is fruition, it is called 'formations condition consciousness.' First, the number of kalpas is widely separated in time; second, they are disjointed, and originally there is no fruition consciousness that could be designated as the consciousness branch—how could it be said that [formations] induce form in the state of consciousness? For the Sautrāntika master, the future world does not exist, and when they speak of 'inducing', the time is widely separated and separated for a long duration—how could it be called 'inducing'? Furthermore, if one says that inducing consciousness in the state of name-and-form is called a condition, then since it is separated from the consciousness branch, one ought to say that it serves as a condition for name-and-form, not that it serves as a condition for consciousness.

2.77

Regarding 'the ten proofs subsuming the eight proofs': this second [proof of] fruition is their sixth; this fourth [proof of] appropriation is their first, appropriation; this sixth [proof of] the mind at life and death is their eighth, termination of life; this ninth [proof of] the cessation attainment is their seventh, the cessation attainment; this tenth [proof of] holding seeds is their fourth, seeds.

2.78

In the first transformation, why is it that the mental factors of the eighth [consciousness] are analogously the same, and [the text] says that the citta 'is also like this,' whereas in the second and third transformations it is not so, only mentioning association without saying they are conversely the same?

2.79

Regarding 'fearing this might be conflated with that, for the seventh it only establishes the name of manas, etc.': Why is it that the sixth is not merely named manas, while the seventh is also a consciousness? The seventh is a karmadhāraya compound; the two meanings manifest the essence of the consciousness. The sixth is a tatpuruṣa compound; it takes the other to clarify itself. If the sixth were designated solely as 'manas' without saying 'consciousness', it could not manifest itself; if 'consciousness' were added to the seventh, it was feared that it would be conflated with the tatpuruṣa compound. Therefore, the seventh is designated solely with the name manas, fearing this might be conflated with that. The sixth has 'consciousness' added to show that it relies on the other, whereby it obtains its name.

2.80

Why is it that of the four conditions, three are named 'basis' (āśraya), while the substantial entity of the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is not named a basis? That which is superior is called a basis, and its causal force is intimate; the object-condition is distant, and therefore is not established [as a basis]. It may well be a cause, but the meaning of 'basis' is not [applicable to it].

2.81

Among the co-arising bases, the second is Master Sthiramati's position. Although his darśana-bhāga and nimitta-bhāga are conceptually constructed and utterly devoid of real entity, they also have appearances resembling form, like what is seen in a dream. Everything at present, such as mountains and rivers, is entirely like this; therefore, the faculties and cognitive objects transformed by the storehouse consciousness serving as the basis and condition is also without flaw.

2.82

Regarding the distinction between reliance (āśraya) and basis (āśraya), where a basis possesses four criteria: With respect to the four consciousnesses, what criterion does the body faculty lack such that it is not their basis? An interpretation provisionally explains: It lacks the criterion of determinateness, because one may rely on a lower body to produce the upper eye [consciousness] and so forth. This is also not correct. When the lower five consciousnesses co-arise with an upper mental consciousness, [that mental consciousness] would not be the basis of the five, since it is also indeterminate. Another interpretation explains: It lacks the criterion of possessing an object (sa-viṣaya). As a rule, to establish that which possesses an object, it must be that an operative faculty of the same class produces the function of possessing an object. An operative faculty of that same class is not a basis (āśraya), but is merely subsumed under reliance (āśraya); consequently, this body faculty definitely does not possess an object of the same class with the four. Even if the body consciousness of oneself does not necessarily co-arise to serve as a basis for the four consciousnesses, it is because of speaking of the function of reliance that it is named 'possessing an object', not because of the substance of reliance. This is also not correct. A subsequent passage of the treatise says: 'Although there is the form realm, it also relies on material faculties, yet it does not determinately exist, and is not subsumed under basis.' If one allows the function of reliance to be named 'possessing an object', then whether the five faculties produce or do not produce consciousness with respect to the eighth, all would be named 'possessing an object'; speaking in terms of the substance of reliance, 'possessing an object' is not excluded, only determinateness is absent. If speaking in terms of the function of reliance, one should also say that it lacks the criterion of possessing an object, because it does not constantly produce consciousness at all times, or because the seventh and eighth are not determinately of the same class with the fifth and sixth consciousnesses. Therefore, the present explanation has a distinct meaning: whatever is relied upon is entirely called an 'admixture/reliance' (āśraya). That which possesses the four criteria is the most supreme among reliances and is established as a basis (āśraya); the inferior are not so established. In possessing determinateness, what is called determinateness? It is not determinate co-existence that is called determinateness. There are four kinds of determinateness: first, determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, designated below as 'sharing the same object'; second, determinateness in clearly understanding an object, designated below as 'discrimination'; third, determinateness in status difference, designated below as 'defiled or pure'; fourth, determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, designated below as 'root'. Those that possess an object and act as master also each have four kinds: if any one among these four kinds of determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master is present, that itself constitutes determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master. The five faculties, with respect to the five consciousnesses, have determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, possess an object, and act as master; the mental consciousness, with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in clearly understanding an object, possesses an object, and acts as master. The seventh [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master; the eighth [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. Therefore, these five consciousnesses possess four bases, because the five faculties can facilitate the five consciousnesses in grasping their objects, and the mental consciousness can assist the five in clearly understanding their objects. The word 'discrimination' means clearly understanding the object. Otherwise, a meditative mind would not be a basis for the five. The seventh consciousness can cause the status of the five to differ; when the seventh ultimately becomes untainted, the five are determinately untainted. Otherwise, although the tainted cause turns due to the seventh, it is not ultimate. The eighth serves as a basis for the seeds of the five to give rise to actual manifestations; the eighth is broadly spoken of as the basis that can give rise, verified by such proofs as these. Thus we know that by merely possessing [one of them], it obtains that name. If determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master were only of one single kind and did not extend to the four, then the five consciousnesses would lack the four kinds of faculties. By this reasoning, the seventh, with respect to the sixth and the eighth consciousnesses, only has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master. The eighth, with respect to the sixth and seventh, only has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. The meanings of the latter four bases all extend to the former three; the fundamental intent of the treatise has been unpacked accordingly. Since the substance of the basis possesses three criteria, causing the produced result to grasp its own object constitutes the fourth criterion. Because whichever of the former three are completely possessed, it is thereby able to cause [the result] to grasp its own object. The superiority of these four criteria is such that whatever can completely possess [them] according to the three is named a basis; the others are not so established, because they are not exceptional with respect to the produced result. As for the aggregate of form, the five faculties with respect to the remaining five consciousnesses and the sixth, seventh, and eighth; the five dusts and the form of the dharma-base with respect to all consciousnesses; the non-associated formations and unconditioned phenomena with respect to all consciousnesses; and non-consciousness seeds with respect to all consciousnesses—all do not possess the three, because they lack the criteria among the three according to what is appropriate, and upon meticulous investigation there are none at all. All mental factors, with respect to whatever consciousness they are considered against, only have determinateness and possess an object, and may possess [them] accordingly among the four kinds, but they only lack acting as master. The various seeds, with respect to their own consciousness, may have the two criteria of determinateness in status difference and acting as master, but they only lack possessing an object. The former five consciousnesses mutually considered among themselves, as well as with respect to the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the sixth with respect to the seventh and eighth, all lack everything, because they lack the four criteria among the three as appropriate. All actual manifestations of other minds and mental factors, form, and non-associated formations, with respect to the various seeds, lack everything; the various mental factors with respect to their own seeds lack acting as master, because while they have determinateness in status difference and possess an object, their defilement and purity are the same. Their substance is like ministers to the king, and therefore they lack acting as master, nor do they cause the result to grasp its own object. The eight actual consciousnesses with respect to their own seeds only lack causing the result to grasp its own object, because they can have the criteria of determinateness in status difference, possessing an object, and acting as master. Among them, possession and lack should be known according to the principle. Having briefly collated and cited this, subsequent readers should examine it carefully. However, in the subsequent text, when the five faculties are considered with respect to the eighth, it only excludes determinate existence and does not exclude the others; this is because adducing what is absent at first by analogy shows the absence of what follows, for merely adducing the absence of one renders it disqualified as a basis, so why need it be fully stated?

First 82 of 278 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

成唯識論掌中樞要 — Classical Chinese