成唯識論了義燈 1.114

1.114

《論》：此中識言，亦攝心所。本疏意云：外問：我法所依，內能變相，豈無心所？此意難言。心能變見、相，依此上立我法。心所變相、見，何不依彼立我法？今答：此難。此中識言，亦攝心所。何以故？定相應故。心起之時，非定有所，如貪、信等，心起之時，隨與一俱，非一切時恒貪、信並。故舉心王，攝於心所，不舉心所攝於心王。西明云：答：外難。難色等，依心變，攝本名唯識。心所非心變，心所非唯識故。今釋言：此中識言，亦攝心所。此未必然。何者？乘前為難，前云如是，諸相若由假說，依何得成？答：云彼相皆依識所轉變。乘此即難，識轉變見、相，依之立我法。心所變見、相，何不依彼立？此下即答：此中識言，亦攝心所，文勢相連，如西明釋，終有此難，應更須通。又未釋變義，及以唯識，何有斯難？或可外難，相、見識所變，依之立我法，心所非識變，應非立我法故。答：此中識言，亦攝心所，定相應故，此亦不然。若前言依識立我法者，可言識攝所。言所變非變，為難不齊故。本疏解正。《要集》云：二疏意同。讀不審細。《要集》又云：言定相應故，下釋所以。謂彼心所，雖非識變，而定相應，亦得識名。又問：云：色等心所變攝相明唯識，心所定相應，攝所辨唯識。解云：非倒。色等唯一分，隨彼能變說唯識。心所具三分，不隨彼識名唯識。謂彼心所，見等三分，具足成故。受等各各，自成唯識。此釋不然。以具三分，故名為識，心所具足三，得識名者。何故？但云識有八種，又違下第七不離識，故釋於唯識。

The Treatise says: "The word 'consciousness' here also includes mental factors (caittas)." The Fundamental Commentary explains its intent as follows: An external question arises: "The internal transformative aspects upon which self and phenomena depend—do they lack mental factors?" This intent forms an objection: Mind can transform into the seeing and object-aspects, and self and phenomena are established upon these. Why could self and phenomena not also be established upon the seeing and object-aspects transformed by mental factors? Now, responding to this objection: The word "consciousness" here also includes mental factors. Why is this so? Because they are invariably associated. When mind arises, it is not determinately accompanied by any [single] mental factor, just as greed, faith, and the like—when mind arises, it is merely accompanied by one or another; it is not always concurrently joined with greed or faith at all times. Therefore, citing the principal mind subsumes the mental factors, while citing a mental factor does not subsume the principal mind. Ximing says: "It replies to an external objection. The objection states: Matter and the like, depending upon mental transformation, subsume the fundamental and are called vijñapti-mātra. Mental factors are not transformed by the mind; therefore, mental factors would not be vijñapti-mātra. Now, the explanation states: 'The word consciousness here also includes mental factors.'" This is not necessarily so. Why? It builds upon the preceding text to make the objection: previously it said, "If such aspects exist merely through designation, on what basis are they established?" The answer said: "Those aspects are all based upon the transformations of consciousness." Taking this further, the objection is raised: Consciousness transforms into seeing and object-aspects, and depending upon them self and phenomena are established; why are they not established depending upon the seeing and object-aspects transformed by mental factors? Immediately below this comes the answer: "The word consciousness here also includes mental factors." The flow of the text is continuous. If one follows Ximing's explanation, this objection still remains and would need to be resolved again. Furthermore, since the meaning of "transformation" and of "vijñapti-mātra" has not yet been explained, how could such an objection even arise? Alternatively, an external objection might say: "The seeing and object-aspects are transformed by consciousness, and depending upon them self and phenomena are established; mental factors are not transformed by consciousness, so they should not establish self and phenomena." And the answer: "The word consciousness here also includes mental factors, because they are invariably associated." This, too, is incorrect. If the preceding text had said that self and phenomena are established depending upon consciousness, one could say consciousness subsumes mental factors; but raising an objection about what is transformed versus what is not transformed is an uneven objection. The Fundamental Commentary's interpretation is correct. The Yaoji says: "The intent of the two commentaries is identical." This shows a failure to read carefully. The Yaoji also says: "The phrase 'because they are invariably associated' explains the reason below. That is, although those mental factors are not transformed by consciousness, because they are invariably associated, they also receive the name 'consciousness.'" It also questions: "Matter and the like are transformed by the mind and subsume the aspect, clarifying vijñapti-mātra; mental factors are invariably associated, subsuming the factors to explain vijñapti-mātra." It resolves this: "It is not an inversion. Matter and the like consist of only a single aspect, so vijñapti-mātra is spoken of following that which is transformative. Mental factors possess all three aspects and are not called vijñapti-mātra following that consciousness. That is, because those mental factors are completely constituted by the three aspects of seeing, etc., feeling and the rest each independently constitute vijñapti-mātra." This explanation is incorrect. If, because they possess all three aspects, they are called consciousness, and mental factors possessing all three obtain the name of consciousness—why then does it say only that consciousness is of eight kinds? Furthermore, it contradicts the seventh fascicle below, where [it explains that mental factors are termed vijñapti-mātra] because they are not separate from consciousness.