成唯識論了義燈 1.115

1.115

《論》：相見俱依自證起故。問：相、見二分，為同種生，為別種起。答：有三師不同。一師云：見相同種，生起名唯識。若別種起，既與識殊，何名唯識？此有二類，一、三法同種生，謂本質、影像、及見分三。二、兩法同種生，謂相、見分。三法同種者，且眼識起時，緣於色境，熏成種子。種子有三功能：一、能生本質；二、生自相分；三、生自見分。兩法同種者，但自相、見，不生本質（謂緣過未、龜毛、无等）。或雖有質，質本有生，不能熏故。問：前三法同種生者，有二過失：一、第八相例失，眼識親緣色，相、見同種生，本識親緣色，亦應同種起。答：眼識自能熏，相、見同種起，第八不能熏，見、相各別起。問：若爾，眼不緣八見。八見、相別起，六既通能同八見、相同種？答：第八見、相，亦同一種。若爾，二諸法雜亂失。如第六識，一剎那中，緣十八界，質與見、相既同種生，故十八種成雜亂失，亦有三界雜亂過失。若依第二，不生本質，本質唯舊，亦有二失：一、違教失，若前轉識不熏成彼第八本識種，違《阿毘達磨經》云：諸法於識藏。識於法亦爾，更互為因性，亦常為果性。二者、界雜亂失。又若見分與相同種，如在下地，起上天眼，既許本識緣彼二根，以為相分，即欲界本識，與彼二根，同一種生，上界眼根，與下界識，同一種過。若言第八不能熏，故相見別種，一前言不簡，二違理失。八俱有相，何有不同？第二師云：見、相別種。若爾，亦有三過：一、假法種生失，如緣極微，極微無體，但假想惠折為極微。唯識下云：非謂極微有實自體。又《瑜伽》五十四云：建立極微，非由有體。是故極微無生無滅。若此相分，別熏成種，後生現行，極微有體，亦有生滅，緣不相應過，亦同此二，違聖教失。《顯揚》十八云：「謂諸極微，但假想立，自體實無。」《瑜伽》五十四非由有體，若別種生，即成有體，故違聖教。三、假法能熏失。既假想惠，安立極微，相分是假，許能熏種，即違第二。假法如無，非因緣故。第三師云：見、相二分，隨其所應，種或同、異。如緣龜毛、菟角等。相與見同種，以無自體相分復假，不別熏種，但隨見力，帶同熏種，如緣五根，有為實體。相與見分，即別種生，以十八界定異因故，不相雜亂。然相與質，一云同種，一云別種，雖有二義，相、質種別，理亦應好。以親、疎緣，種各別故。如緣第八，相、質同種，即許一種，生慮、非慮。亦有二身根等俱失，以相與質，既同種生，何不二身根等？若六緣時，相分是假，即有一種生假實失。此言假者，非如瓶等，以能熏故，但無根用，不發識故，名之為假。由此相、質，或說同、別。然於此義，應設劬勞。又解若相與質，同種生者，如眼等根，第八所變，是因緣故，實有根用。若起相分，因第六生，雖與本質，同一種生，以第六見為緣起故，分別變攝，故無實用。非無體假，故無假實，同一種失。然同別種，復有種別，性與見同。或復性同而繫種別。或復相分，性隨見質，判性不定。或雖有質，相、見同生，不生本質，由此不定故。三藏法師以為一頌，顯此差別云：性境不隨心，獨影唯從見。帶質通情本，性種等隨應。

The Treatise says: "Because both the object-aspect and seeing-aspect arise dependent on self-verification." Question: Do the two aspects of object and seeing arise from the same seed (bīja), or do they arise from different seeds? Answer: Three masters hold different views. The first master says: Seeing and object arise from the same seed, and their arising is called vijñapti-mātra. If they arose from different seeds, since they would differ from consciousness, how could it be called vijñapti-mātra? Here there are two types: First, three phenomena arise from the same seed—namely, the primordial entity (vastu/ālambana-bīja), the reflective image (pratibimba), and the seeing-aspect. Second, two phenomena arise from the same seed—namely, the object-aspect and seeing-aspect. In the case of three phenomena arising from the same seed: when the visual consciousness arises, it takes material form as its object and perfumes a seed. The seed has three functions: 1) it can produce the primordial entity; 2) it produces its own object-aspect; 3) it produces its own seeing-aspect. In the case of two phenomena arising from the same seed: it produces only its own object and seeing[-aspects], but does not produce the primordial entity (meaning when taking the past, future, a turtle's hair, non-existence, etc., as objects). Or, even if there is an entity, that entity arises fundamentally existent of itself and cannot be perfumed. Question: The former view that three phenomena arise from the same seed entails two errors: 1) The error of an identical parallel with the eighth consciousness: visual consciousness directly takes material form as an object, and its object and seeing[-aspects] arise from the same seed; the fundamental consciousness also directly takes material form as an object, so its [aspects] should likewise arise from the same seed. Answer: Visual consciousness is capable of perfuming, so its object and seeing[-aspects] arise from the same seed; the eighth consciousness cannot perfume, so its seeing and object[-aspects] arise separately. Question: If so, visual consciousness does not take the eighth's seeing-aspect as an object. When the eighth's seeing and object[-aspects] arise separately, since the sixth consciousness is universally capable, could it share the same seed with the eighth's seeing and object-aspects? Answer: The eighth's seeing and object[-aspects] also share the same seed. If so, 2) The error of confusing and mixing all dharmas: like the sixth consciousness taking the eighteen dhātus as its object in a single kṣaṇa; since the primordial entities and the seeing and object[-aspects] would arise from the same seed, the eighteen seeds would entail the error of being confused and mixed, and there would also be the error of confusing and mixing the three realms. If one relies on the second view—not producing the primordial entity, where the entity is solely old—there are also two errors: 1) The error of contradicting scripture: if the preceding transforming consciousnesses do not perfume into the seeds of that eighth fundamental consciousness, it contradicts the Abhidharmasūtra: "All dharmas reside in the consciousness-storehouse, and consciousness resides in dharmas likewise; they are mutually causal, and also eternally resultant." 2) The error of confusing and mixing realms. Furthermore, if the seeing-aspect and object-aspect share the same seed, as when one is in a lower stage and gives rise to the divine eye of a higher stage, since it is admitted that the fundamental consciousness takes those two sense-faculties as its object-aspect, the fundamental consciousness of the desire realm and those two faculties would arise from the same seed, entailing the error that the visual faculty of the higher realm and the consciousness of the lower realm share the same seed. If one says that because the eighth consciousness cannot perfume, its object and seeing[-aspects] are of different seeds, first, the earlier statement was unqualified, and second, it entails the error of contradicting principle. Since all eight possess the object-aspect, how could there be a difference? The second master says: Seeing and object[-aspects] are of different seeds. If so, there are also three faults: 1) The fault of a designated dharma arising from a seed: as when taking an atom as an object, the atom lacks real substance, but is merely broken down into an atom by conceptual wisdom. The Vijñapti-mātra text below says: "It is not that atoms have a real substantial nature." Also, Yogācāra-bhūmi fascicle 54 says: "The establishment of atoms is not because of an existing substance; therefore, atoms have neither arising nor cessation." If this object-aspect were perfumed into a distinct seed and later produced an actual manifestation, the atom would have real substance and would also have arising and cessation; the fault of taking non-concordant conditions as objects would also be the same as these two, 2) The fault of contradicting sacred teachings. The Prakaraṇārya-vācā fascicle 18 says: "Atoms are merely established by conceptual imagination; their own substance does not truly exist." Yogācāra-bhūmi fascicle 54 says they are not due to having substance. If they arose from distinct seeds, they would possess substance, which contradicts sacred teachings. 3) The fault of designated dharmas being capable of perfuming. Since the atom is established by conceptual wisdom, the object-aspect is designated; if it were permitted to perfume seeds, that would contradict the second [principle]. A designated dharma is like non-existence and is not a causal condition (hetu-pratyaya). The third master says: The two aspects of seeing and object, according to their proper circumstances, may arise from the same seed or from different seeds. For example, when taking a turtle's hair, a hare's horn, etc., as objects, the object and seeing[-aspects] share the same seed, because without an intrinsic substance the object-aspect is designated, so it does not separately perfume a seed, but merely accompanies the power of the seeing-aspect, brought along to perfume the same seed. When taking the five sense faculties as objects, which are conditioned real entities, the object and seeing-aspects arise from distinct seeds, because the eighteen dhātus have definitively distinct causes and are not confused or mixed. However, regarding the object-aspect and the primordial entity, one view says they share the same seed, while another says they are of different seeds; although both meanings exist, the rational view that the object-aspect and primordial entity have different seeds is preferable, because the immediate and distant conditions have their own distinct seeds. If, when taking the eighth consciousness as an object, the object-aspect and the primordial entity shared the same seed, then a single seed would be admitted to produce both that which cognizes and that which does not cognize. There would also be the fault of having two bodily sense faculties simultaneously, etc., because if the object and the primordial entity arose from the same seed, why would there not be two bodily sense faculties, etc.? If, when the sixth consciousness cognizes, the object-aspect is designated, then there would be the fault of a single seed producing both the designated and the real. The term "designated" here does not mean like a vase or the like; because it is capable of perfuming, it is merely that it lacks the function of a sense-faculty and does not generate consciousness, and is thus called "designated." Because of this, the object-aspect and primordial entity are said to be either the same or different. However, diligent effort should be applied to this meaning. Another explanation states: If the object-aspect and the primordial entity arise from the same seed—like the eye and other faculties transformed by the eighth consciousness, which are causal conditions and thus genuinely possess the functions of sense-faculties—when an object-aspect arises dependent on the sixth consciousness, even though it arises from the same seed as the primordial entity, because it arises with the seeing-aspect of the sixth consciousness as its condition, it is subsumed under conceptual transformation and thus lacks real function. It is not an unsubstantial designation, so it does not incur the fault of a single seed producing both the designated and the real. However, between sharing the same seed and having different seeds, there are further differences in seed type: the nature (guṇa/svabhāva) may be the same as the seeing-aspect, or the nature may be the same while the tied seed is different; or the nature of the object-aspect may follow either the seeing-aspect or the primordial entity, rendering the determination of its nature variable; or, although there is a primordial entity, the object and seeing arise together and do not produce the primordial entity. Because it is variable in this way, the Tripiṭaka Master composed a verse to illuminate this distinction, saying: "The objective nature does not follow the mind; / the solitary shadow solely follows the seeing; / bringing the substance along extends to both mind and origin, / their natures and seeds accord with each case appropriately."