成唯識論了義燈 1.82

1.82

第二，五法出體者，於中有二：依《瑜伽論》云：五法者，謂相、名、分別、正智、如如。若有漏敬者，以名、相、分別三法為體；身、語二業，假即相收，名依聲立。雖非名等，雖復非是語業，以假從實，聲由名表，故得通名。若取無表，即思種上，假無表是。若就實業，體即分別。若無漏者，正智為體。若色若心，俱名智故；第二、五法即心、心所、色、不相應、無為，准法可知。蘊、處及界、三性，百法皆可准知。問：答分別，問：出體中長等，依於色是假。假身業名等依聲，假名等為語業。答：長等表於心故，得名身業。名等詮所轉，不得名語業。二問：五逆業中，破和合僧，即是妄語重。三罰業中，意業重。五僻見中，邪見重。曾無處說身業為重，何故此說偏舉身業？答：邪見斷善勝，破僧損處大，意殺嫌恨深，所以各偏舉。此中身業，且據世間從事制戒，細犯多發身業為重，所以偏舉。又解身業是總，餘二是別。舉總攝別，並在其中。三問：二乘歸依，得通無漏以不？答：一解許得。以自在者，在定之中，得起五識。何故無漏不得歸依？一云不得，三乘真智，總不歸依。二乘後智，多緣帝理，無別功能，不能起發身、語等業，無勝用故，此解為正。四問：意通三界，理顯不疑。身語歸依，通何界地？答：身、語二業，通欲、色界。若准九地，語業唯初禪，身業通五地。二定已上，雖起語業，及以身業。若起語業，借下尋、伺故，隨尋、伺是初定繫，又是無記，上地不造下地業故。設無漏者，亦屬下故，或不繫故。身業通四定，以出入息，非是遍行，上得起身。又解：通上。若上不得作下地善業，四靜慮王俱受別脫，豈許無記心得戒耶？既許善心，方始得戒故，於上地得有語業，多由尋、伺，未必一切皆尋、伺起。又復尋、伺非語遍行，如出入息四定，雖無得有身業，以有思故，語業應同此。引證如下，第七論記。《要集》云：《俱舍》、《正理》皆說：愛、敬以法為緣，雖通三界，此中唯緣補特伽羅故，唯欲、色。若依大乘，《中陰經》說佛入中陰，無色有情。欝頭藍等，亦入中陰禮拜聽法。故知雖緣有情，亦通無色。問：已入中陰，非無色攝，如何說云彼有敬耶？解云：經意難尋，今且一解。無生中間，所有諸蘊，名為中陰，此意不說。中有名中陰，以在生死中間，名為中陰。如說世間，以在世間故。此釋不爾。若以生死中間，名為中陰，何須云欝頭藍子入先在彼故？又云：依定果色，變現似身，依下地定，發天眼、耳，借下地識，見佛聞法者。此亦不爾。若依有部，眼不下於身，如何色界？眼依無色界身，無色界身，非實身根，既無身根，眼等何依？若依大乘，此亦不許。《雜集》第二十八，界四句中云：有眼非眼界，謂最後蘊。有眼界非眼，謂在卵、胎、無色異生。有亦眼亦眼界，謂欲、色界，現得眼等。有非眼非眼界，謂無色聖及無餘依。欝頭若凡成界非眼，如何現起？現起即眼，非唯是界。若是聖者，眼及眼界二俱不成，復如何起？若云是化，如彼定果，所變似身，所起眼、耳，亦似眼、耳，何須起下？故正解者，佛既不滅，現彼中陰，欝頭不死，亦入中陰，故是化現，非實中陰。

Second, identifying the essential nature in terms of the five dharmas: within this there are two [points]. According to the Yogācārabhūmi, the five dharmas are: appearances (nimitta), names (nāma), discrimination (vikalpa), correct wisdom (samyagjñāna), and suchness (tathatā). If it is a defiled (sāsrava) reverence, it takes the three dharmas of name, appearance, and discrimination as its essential nature: bodily and verbal karmas are conventionally subsumed under appearance, while name is established based on sound. Although they are not properly names and the like, and although they are not verbal karma, because the conventional follows the real and sound is expressed by name, they are both conventionally called 'names'. If taking unmanifest [karma] (avijñapti), it is the conventional unmanifest posited upon the bījas of volition (cetanā). If speaking of real karma, its essence is discrimination. If it is anāsrava, it takes correct wisdom as its essential nature, because both matter and mind are called 'wisdom'. Second, the five dharmas of mind, mental factors, matter, dharmas non-concomitant with mind, and unconditioned dharmas can be understood by analogy with the [standard] classification. Aggregates (skandhas), bases (āyatanas), dhātus, the three natures (tri-svabhāva), and the hundred dharmas can all be known by analogy.

Questions and answers distinguishing [issues]:
Question: In identifying the essential nature, length and so forth are conventionalities based on visible matter. Conventional bodily karma is like this. Names and so forth are based on sound, taking conventional names and the like as verbal karma.
Answer: Because length and so forth express the mind, they receive the name 'bodily karma'. Names and so forth express that which is referred to, so they cannot be called verbal karma.

Second question: Among the five heinous karmas, causing schism in the Sangha is the gravest false speech. Among the three harmful karmas, mental karma is the gravest. Among the five perverse views, wrong view is the gravest. It has never been stated anywhere that bodily karma is the gravest; why then does this text specifically single out bodily karma?
Answer: Wrong view is superior in cutting off wholesome roots; schism in the Sangha causes immense damage; mental killing harbors deep resentment—therefore each is singled out respectively. Bodily karma here is singled out provisionally based on worldly matters where precepts are formulated, where subtle infractions frequently manifest through bodily karma as the gravest. Another explanation is that bodily karma is general, while the other two are specific; mentioning the general subsumes the specific, and both are included therein.

Third question: Does taking refuge by [practitioners of] the two vehicles extend to being anāsrava or not?
Answer: One explanation permits it. Since those who have attained mastery can produce the five consciousnesses within samādhi, why should taking refuge not be anāsrava? Another says it cannot: the true wisdom of the three vehicles does not take refuge at all. The subsequent wisdom of the two vehicles mostly takes the truths as its object and has no special capability, unable to arouse bodily and verbal karmas and possessing no superior function; this explanation is correct.

Fourth question: Mind extends through the three realms; the principle is clear without doubt. To which realms and bhūmis do bodily and verbal taking of refuge extend?
Answer: Bodily and verbal karmas extend to the desire and form realms. If according to the nine bhūmis, verbal karma is only in the first dhyāna, while bodily karma extends to five bhūmis. Above the second dhyāna, although verbal and bodily karma may be produced—if verbal karma is produced, it borrows vitarka and vicāra from the lower [stage]; following vitarka and vicāra, it is bound to the first dhyāna and is moreover indeterminate (avyākṛta), because higher bhūmis do not generate karma of lower bhūmis. Even if it is anāsrava, it still belongs to the lower or is unattached. Bodily karma extends to the four dhyānas, since inhalation and exhalation are not omnipresent (sarvatraga), bodily [actions] can be produced above. Another explanation: it extends above. If the upper could not perform wholesome karma of the lower bhūmi, when kings of the four dhyānas all receive the prātimokṣa vows, could they be allowed to obtain the precepts with an indeterminate mind? Since they must have a wholesome mind to obtain the precepts, verbal karma can exist in the higher bhūmis; it is mostly caused by vitarka and vicāra, but not necessarily all arisen through vitarka and vicāra. Furthermore, vitarka and vicāra are not omnipresent with speech, just as in the four dhyānas inhalation and exhalation are absent yet bodily karma exists; since volition exists, verbal karma should be the same as this. Textual citations follow below in the commentary to the seventh fascicle.

The Yaoji says: 'Both the Abhidharmakośa and Nyāyānusāra say: love and respect take Dharma as their intentional object; although extending to the three realms, here they only take the pudgala as their object, and hence belong only to the desire and form realms.' If relying on the Mahāyāna, the Zhongyin jing states that the Buddha entered the intermediate state (antarābhava), and formless sattvas such as Udraka-rāmaputra also entered the intermediate state to bow and listen to the Dharma. Therefore we know that even when taking sattvas as the intentional object, it also extends to the formless realm.
Question: Having entered the intermediate state, it is not subsumed under the formless; how can one say that they have reverence?
Answer: The intention of the sūtra is difficult to discern; here is one provisional explanation: The aggregates existing between without taking birth are called 'intermediate state' (zhongyin); this does not mean that the intermediate existence (antarābhava) is called zhongyin, but rather because it is intermediate between birth and death, it is called zhongyin, just as the worldly is so called because it is in the world. This interpretation is not correct. If intermediate between birth and death were called zhongyin, why need it say that the son of Udraka entered, having previously been there? Furthermore, it is said: relying on matter produced by samādhi, they manifest a simulated body; relying on samādhi of the lower bhūmi, they arouse divine eyes and ears; borrowing lower-bhūmi consciousness, they see the Buddha and hear the Dharma. This also is not correct. If according to the Sarvāstivāda, the eye cannot be lower than the body; how could a form-realm eye rely on a formless-realm body? The formless-realm body has no real body-sense-faculty; since it lacks a body-sense-faculty, on what would the eye and so forth rely? If according to the Mahāyāna, this is also not permitted. The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, fascicle 28, states in the four permutations of dhātus: 'There are those possessing the eye but not the eye-dhātu, namely the final aggregates. There are those possessing the eye-dhātu but not the eye, namely pṛthagjanas in eggs, wombs, and the formless realm. There are those possessing both the eye and the eye-dhātu, namely those currently possessing the eye in the desire and form realms. There are those possessing neither the eye nor the eye-dhātu, namely formless noble ones and those in the nirvāṇa without remainder.' If Udraka is an ordinary being, he possesses the dhātu but not the eye; how could it be manifest? If manifested, it is the eye, not merely the dhātu. If he were a noble one, he would possess neither the eye nor the eye-dhātu; how could it be manifested again? If one says it is a transformation (nirmāṇa), just like that simulated body transformed by the fruit of samādhi, the eye and ear aroused are also simulated eyes and ears; why would there be any need to arouse those of a lower stage? Therefore, the correct explanation is: since the Buddha was not yet extinguished, he manifested that intermediate state, and Udraka, without dying, also entered that intermediate state; therefore it was a magical manifestation, not a real intermediate state.