成唯識論了義燈 1.99

1.99

西明云：至千二百年，清辨菩薩依諸般若及龍樹宗，造《般若燈論》、《掌珍論》等，破無著等有相大乘。當時護法依《深密》等，成立有宗，破彼空義。今謂不爾。清辨三性總說為無，可得云空。護法三性非皆說有，何名有教？又若名有，與初何殊？由此應說護法依彼《瑜伽》等論，成非空有，依圓有故非空，遍計無故非有，如《中邊頌》等。西明《仁王般若經疏》中云：破瑜伽師，全立有故。護法釋《廣百論》中，明不空有。廣如彼辨，亦不應爾。豈可護法解，過彌勒，破瑜伽師？但彼論中云，破瑜伽師者，破餘後人學瑜伽者，一向執有，乖瑜伽故，名破瑜伽師。非破彌勒菩薩所說瑜伽，如《理門論》云：破古因明師者，破古餘師，非破彌勒、無著等師。又假敘清辨，立識空量云：內識非有，宗；能所取中，隨一攝故，因；猶如外境。又量云：真性有為空等，如《掌珍論》。此如後辨。今謂：前量若以緣生，內識為有法，因即有他，隨一不成過。護法不許內緣生，識能取外境故，若立實能取識，即有相符極成之過。故第二云：若執唯識是實有者，亦是法執，既云執實有，亦是法執。明無實能取識。今以能、所取因立，同外境無，故是相符。既有此過，不得與論主作比量相違過。

Ximing states: 'At the twelve-hundredth year, Bodhisattva Bhāviveka, relying on the Prajñāpāramitā texts and the lineage of Nāgārjuna, composed the Prajñāpradīpa-śāstra, the Karatalaratna, and other texts, refuting Asaṅga and others' Mahāyāna that posits characteristics. At that time, Dharmapāla relied on the Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts to establish the school of existence and refute their doctrine of emptiness.' I say now that this is not so. If Bhāviveka had generally declared all three natures to be non-existent, he could be said [to teach] emptiness. Dharmapāla did not declare all three natures to be existent, so how could it be called a teaching of existence? Furthermore, if it were called 'existence,' how would it differ from the initial [turning]? Therefore, one should say that Dharmapāla relied on the Yogācārabhūmi and other treatises to establish what is neither empty nor existent: because the dependent (paratantra) and the perfected (pariniṣpanna) exist, it is not empty; because the imagined (parikalpita) is non-existent, it is not existent, as in the Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā and similar texts. Ximing's Commentary on the Benevolent King Prajñā Sūtra states: 'He refutes the Yogācāras, because they establish existence entirely.' In his commentary on the Śataśāstra-vaipulya, Dharmapāla clarifies neither-empty-nor-existent, as extensively analyzed there; this [claim by Ximing] also should not be so. How could Dharmapāla's understanding surpass Maitreya's and refute the Yogācāra master? When that treatise speaks of 'refuting the Yogācāras,' it merely refutes other later scholars of Yogācāra who stubbornly grasped at existence and deviated from Yogācāra; hence it is termed 'refuting the Yogācāras.' It does not refute the Yogācāra taught by Bodhisattva Maitreya, just as the Nyāyamukha's statement 'refuting the ancient masters of hetuvidyā' refutes other ancient masters, not masters such as Maitreya and Asaṅga. Furthermore, [Ximing] tentatively presents Bhāviveka's inference establishing the emptiness of consciousness, stating: 'Internal consciousness is non-existent (thesis); because it is subsumed under either the grasper or the grasped (reason); just like external objects (example).' And another inference states: 'In true nature, conditioned phenomena are empty, etc.,' as in the Karatalaratna. This will be analyzed later. I say now: if the former inference takes dependently arisen internal consciousness as the subject (dharmin), the reason incurs the fault of being unestablished for the other (parasya asiddha) regarding either party (anyatara-asiddha). For Dharmapāla does not concede that internal, dependently arisen consciousness can grasp external objects. If one posits a truly grasping consciousness, then there is the fault of establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Therefore, the second [text] states: 'If one grasps consciousness-only as truly existent, that too is attachment to dharmas.' Since it says that grasping it as truly existent is also attachment to dharmas, this makes clear that there is no truly grasping consciousness. Now, by establishing it through the reason of being grasper or grasped, making it non-existent like external objects, it is establishing what is already accepted. Since it has this fault, it cannot serve as a contradictory inference against the author of the treatise.