成唯識論了義燈 2.106

2.106

《論》亦說：輪王成就七寶。豈即成就他身非情？西明云：有部許爾，即違自宗。外難云：大乘假得，如何一立一不立？例同所破，解云非例，實得有用，應通內外皆有實得，我立假得，故王成寶，假亦不成，非自身故。今謂，此釋不爾，大乘得等，既是假立，通情非情自他何過？以經說有成就言故，不爾，同他不能離難。問：若爾，殊輪可說成就，自識變故，餘有情等，依何假立說成就耶？答：亦許變他扶塵受用，故亦自識，又由業感依業假立，亦復不違。

The treatise also says: 'A wheel-turning king possesses the seven treasures.' Could he then possess the bodies of others or inanimate matter? Ximing states: 'The Sarvāstivāda school admits this, which directly contradicts their own tenets. An opponent objects: 'Possession in the Mahāyāna is nominal; why is one established and the other not? It follows the same pattern as what was refuted.' The explanation is given that it does not follow the same pattern: real possession has efficacious function and should extend to both internal and external things as having real possession. We establish nominal possession; thus, for the king possessing the treasures, it is nominally not established either, because they are not his own body.' Now I maintain that this explanation is incorrect. Since possession and so forth in the Mahāyāna are established nominally, what fault is there in extending them to both sentient and insentient, self and other? This is because the sūtra speaks of 'possession.' If it were not so, one would be identical to the other [school] and unable to avoid the objection. Question: If that is so, the special wheel can be said to be possessed because it is transformed by one's own consciousness; on what nominal basis is it said that other sentient beings and the like are possessed? Answer: It is also accepted that one transforms the external support elements (adhisthāna-rūpa) of others for one's own enjoyment, so they are also one's own consciousness. Furthermore, because of being induced by karma, it is nominally established on the basis of karma; this also does not contradict [the doctrine].