成唯識論了義燈 2.38

2.38

《論》云：「若法能生，必非常故者。」問：若許餘法為能生因，違彼宗計，執一因故，無餘能生，即闕同喻，其如何等能生無常？答：天是親能生因，餘是助緣，故得為喻。若爾，云何得為因耶？因生、緣生二種別故。答：准因明法，因不應分別，如所作性，此因及緣俱能生故。西明釋云：唯一常因，能生諸法，更無餘常，能為因生；云一因論：不障無常，能生諸法，如勝論師許六句實，不妨於中軍林等假。二解俱有違文之失，執一因故。下轉計中，云待欲或緣。難云待欲或緣，方能生者，違一因論，若他許有餘緣，能生及無常因，如何可得作斯難耶？此中，但是以彼世間，共許能生之法，以為同喻。又解本執自在，體是一、常，能生諸法，不假餘法助方能生，名為一因，不障餘法，亦能為因。今論主難云：體既常、遍應一切處、時能生諸法，遂轉計云：自在待餘或欲及緣，方能生果。論主云：若爾，即違本一、常因，猶能生果。待欲、緣，故違一因論。

The śāstra says: 'If a dharma can produce, it is necessarily not eternal.' Question: If other dharmas are accepted as producing causes, this contradicts their own doctrine, for they cling to a single cause; since there is no other producing [cause], it lacks a similar example—what then, being capable of producing, is impermanent? Answer: God (Īśvara) is the direct producing cause, and the others are auxiliary conditions; hence [other dharmas] can serve as examples. If so, how can they serve as causes, since cause-production and condition-production are of two distinct kinds? Answer: According to the rules of Hetuvidyā, causes should not be differentiated, like 'being produced' (kṛtakatva), for both this cause and the conditions can produce. Ximing explains: Only a single eternal cause can produce all dharmas, and no other eternal entity can act as a producing cause. The doctrine of a single cause does not preclude impermanent entities from producing all dharmas, just as the Vaiśeṣikas accept that the six categories are real, which does not prevent an army, a forest, and so forth among them from being conventional. Both explanations have the error of contradicting the text, because [the opponent] clings to a single cause. In the shift of tenets below, it is said that he awaits desire or conditions. The challenge is: if he only can produce by awaiting desire or conditions, this contradicts the doctrine of a single cause. If the opponent accepts that other conditions can produce and that there are impermanent causes, how could such a challenge be made? Here, it is merely taking dharmas commonly accepted by the world to be able to produce as the similar example. Another explanation is: the original claim was that Īśvara is single and eternal in substance, able to produce all dharmas without relying on other dharmas to assist in producing; this is called 'a single cause,' and does not preclude other dharmas from also serving as causes. Now the author of the śāstra challenges: Since his substance is eternal and all-pervading, he should be able to produce all dharmas in all places and at all times. Thereupon they shift their tenet, saying: Īśvara awaits other desires or conditions before he can produce effects. The author of the śāstra says: If so, this contradicts his original single, eternal cause still being able to produce effects; because he awaits desires and conditions, it contradicts the doctrine of a single cause.