成唯識論了義燈 2.37

2.37

疏云：其眼識等，雖緣色等，亦假合生，非緣實等，無不定過。有云：亦有自違，緣色等智，應非色智，假合生，故如聲等智。《集》云：此亦非過，謂內破外實、德等，攝四大色等，故非自違蘊等，所攝色等之法。若外人作此比量破者，彼即有違世間、現量、自教等過，故不得立也。今謂不爾，設執緣於離識蘊等，亦同此破。今此論意，但破離識實有諸法，若外難云：緣離識色等智，應非現量，即犯相符。若但云：緣色等智，應非緣色等現量智攝，亦有一分相符及自違失，若別作量，即非前量過。

The Commentary states: 'Although its visual consciousness and so forth cognize form and so forth, they are also produced from a composite cause and do not cognize substance and so forth, so there is no fault of inconclusiveness.' Someone says: 'There is also self-contradiction: the cognition cognizing form and so forth should not be a cognition of form; because of being produced from a composite cause; like the cognition of sound and so forth.' The Essence Collection says: 'This too is not a fault. That is, the internal [Buddhist] refutes the external [Vaiśeṣika's] four great elements, form, and so forth subsumed under substance and quality; therefore it does not contradict oneself regarding the dharmas of form and so forth subsumed under the aggregates and so forth. If the outsider were to formulate this inference to refute us, he would incur the faults of contradicting worldly convention, direct perception (pratyakṣa), his own doctrine, and so forth, and thus it cannot be established.' I now say this is not so: even if one clings to cognizing aggregates and so forth apart from consciousness, it is refuted in the same way. Now the intent of this śāstra is merely to refute real dharmas existing apart from consciousness. If the outsider objects: 'The cognition cognizing form and so forth apart from consciousness should not be direct perception,' then he commits [the fault of establishing] what is already agreed (siddha-sādhana). If he merely says: 'The cognition cognizing form and so forth should not be subsumed under direct perceptual cognition that cognizes form and so forth,' there is also a partial agreement and the error of self-contradiction. If another inference is formulated, it is not a fault of the previous inference.